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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background and Motivation 
 
Today neoclassical economics and the field of industrial 
organisation dominate the understanding of competition law. 
They influence the questions asked, the lines of enquiry 
developed and the data gathered in competition law.1 This is 
based on the conception of the firm as a rational, profit 
maximizing entity. Yet, scholars from different disciplines have 
long questioned the traditional understanding of the firm. One 
strand of literature finds that instead of maximizing profits firms 
take decisions that maximize other objectives, such as 
maximizing managerial utility (Williamson, 1964), maximizing 
revenue growth (Baumol, 1959) and maximizing firm growth 
(Marris, 1964).2 The other strand of literature questions the very 
notion of maximization by firms and this literature is classified as 
the behavioural theory of the firm.  
 
The behavioural theory of the firm argues that firms, just like 
individuals, are subject to biases and limitations. Further, firms 
are susceptible to complexities and conflicts in their internal 
organisation and functioning. Recent events such as the financial 
                                                
1 See Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust: What Role for Strategic 
Management Expertise, 90 BOSTON L. REV. 1457, 1464 (2010).   
2 See Steven Toms & John F. Wilson, Revisiting Chandler on the Theory of the Firm, in 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS & THEORY OF THE FIRM 297, 299 (Michael Dietrich & 
Jackie Krafft eds., Edward Elgar, 2012). 
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13 
crisis have highlighted problems in the traditional understanding 
of the firm. Much scholarly attention has been devoted to 
understanding limitations in the current theoretical framework 
conceptualising firm decision-making. Moreover, there is a 
growing sentiment that the actual behaviour of businesses is very 
different from the manner in which this behaviour has been 
theorized in economics. Contrary to the assumption of economic 
models, many successful and fast-growing companies do not see 
maximizing revenues or profits as their goal. This is because, as 
areas such as competitive strategy and marketing are teaching 
business executives, achieving lasting market share is the key to 
survival in dynamic markets.3 Porter argues that every firm 
competing in an industry has a competitive strategy, whether 
explicit or implicit, and every firm is concerned about how to 
achieve market power or defend itself against competitive forces 
in the industry.4 
 
The gap between theory and the reality of firm behaviour is 
portrayed humorously in the following dialogue from the TV 
show Silicon Valley, which is partially inspired by real-life 
experiences in Silicon Valley. In the dialogue below, Hanneman 
who is an investor, advises Hendricks, the inexperienced new 
CEO of a start-up company that the goal of companies is not to 
make money.5  
 
“Hanneman: No one wants to see revenue. 
Hendricks: Oh, uh I just thought that mainly the goal of 
companies is to make money. 
Hanneman: …That’s not how it works… if you show 
revenue, people will ask how much, and it will never be 
                                                
3 See Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and the Language of Business, 52 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283, 317-18 (2001-02). 
4 See Waller, id. at 319. 
5 Farhad Manjoo, ‘Silicon Valley’ Recap: It’s Not About How Much You Earn, NEW 
YORK TIMES (Apr. 26, 2015), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/silicon-
valley-recap-season-2-russ-hanneman/. 
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14 
enough. But if you have no revenue, you can say you’re 
pre-revenue. You’re a potential pure play… It’s not about 
how much you earn but what you’re worth…and who is 
worth the most? Companies that lose money.”6 
 
Hanneman’s point is not too far away from the reality. As one 
commentator points out, Google bought the home-device 
company, Nest last year for $3.2 billion, a relatively small 
amount for a company that actually sold products and made 
profits.7 Meanwhile companies that did not have earnings, like 
Snapchat and Pinterest, were valued at much higher amounts.8  
 
This work aims to address this gap between theoretical models of 
firm decision-making and the reality of firm behaviour as it 
pertains to competition law. This is inspired from the work of 
certain business theorists who are also gradually moving away 
from the key assumptions of price theorists and orthodox 
economic analysis.9 Further, this work is motivated by the 
argument that rational choice theory provides a more limited 
view of firm behaviour when compared to the richer 
understanding found in managerial and behavioural theories. 
Thus, importing business strategy into competition law may help 
in understanding aspects of firm behaviour that economics cannot 
provide.  
2. Research Question 
 
This study draws on the existing literature on firm behaviour to 
examine the following questions. Firstly, are firms boundedly 
rational and do they exhibit behavioural biases? If so, what forms 
do these biases take? Secondly, if firms are boundedly rational, 
                                                
6 Silicon Valley: Bad Money (HBO Entertainment, Apr. 26, 2015). 
7 See Manjoo, supra note 5. 
8 See Manjoo, id. 
9 See Waller, supra note 3, at 319. 
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does this have an impact on competitive decisions taken by firms 
in the market? In other words, can these biases be cured within 
the firm or by the competitive process? Or, do firms commonly 
depart from rationality when taking competitive decisions? 
Finally, if markets are not able to correct bounded rationality in 
firms, is this of relevance to competition law? How and to what 
extent are firm’s biases normatively relevant to competition law? 
What kind of impact does bounded rationality have on the 
competitive decision-making of firms? Do biases cause welfare 
losses? Can a behavioural understanding of the firm have any 
implications for competition law? Should existing competition 
law rules be changed to accommodate this literature?  
3. Contribution 
 
The majority of scholarship, particularly in the US, advocates 
that competition law should follow a strictly economic approach. 
The emphasis on the application of economic principles to 
competition law has also created a minority view that is slowly 
gaining in strength, which argues that a rigidly economic 
approach can be harmful to competition law because it departs 
from the realities of market behaviour. Behavioural antitrust is 
based on the idea that if the economic models used to evaluate 
anticompetitive behaviour rest on flawed assumptions of firm 
rationality, the resulting analysis may not give useful predictions 
for competition law.10 This work seeks to contribute to the 
existing literature in ‘behavioural antitrust’ by showing how 
bounded rationality can affect the decision-making of firms in 
ways that may be relevant to competition law.  
 
Despite the richness of the literature on bounded rationality, with 
certain notable exceptions, the study of behavioural biases in 
competition law remains an under-explored area of study. The 
                                                
10 Elizabeth M. Bailey, Behavioral Economics and U.S. Antitrust Policy, 47(3) REV. 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 355, 356 (Nov., 2015). 
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bounded rationality of consumers has gained wider acceptance 
than the bounded rationality of firms and there is more literature 
applying consumer biases to competition law, compared to firm 
biases.11 This is also because experimental evidence of firms’ 
bounded rationality is more limited. Consumers have been more 
compellingly found through experimental evidence to have 
bounded rationality, bounded will power and bounded self-
interest.12  
 
A substantial amount has been written on behavioural biases of 
firms in different fields ranging from management and finance to 
economics and law. However, comparatively little has been done 
to determine to what extent this literature has implications for 
competition policy. A few review articles survey this literature 
and introduce the readers to its diversity but do not draw any 
policy inferences from it.13 Given the substantial amount of 
scattered theoretical and empirical literature indicating that firms 
are boundedly rational there is an incongruity in terms of the 
comparatively little work done to critically evaluate it to 
determine the possibility of drawing policy implications from it 
for competition law. This study aims to address this gap in 
assessing the policy relevance of behavioural literature. 
 
Various scholars have argued that management studies can 
contribute to competition analysis. As Sidak and Teece wrote in 
the context of dynamic competition, “By embedding recent 
developments in evolutionary economics, the behavioural theory 
                                                
11 See Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A 
Primer, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y. INT’L. 33 (2010). 
12 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998). 
13 See e.g., Christoph Engel, The Behaviour of Corporate Actors: How Much Can We 
Learn from the Experimental Literature, 6(4) J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 445, 446 (2010); 
Armstrong & Huck, supra note 11, at 33; Weiland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 
Experimental Economics in Antitrust, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 229 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
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17 
of the firm and strategic management into antitrust analysis, one 
can develop a more robust framework for antitrust economics.”14 
This work supports the work of these scholars from a legal 
perspective by highlighting how insights from management 
studies and behavioural theories can be relevant to understanding 
firm behaviour in competition law. In addition, this thesis 
examines the relevance of management insights to particular 
types of anticompetitive behaviour. This thesis also contributes to 
behavioural antitrust by comparing how behavioural insights are 
incorporated differently into the competition law framework in 
the US and EU.   
4. Methodology 
 
This thesis brings together literature on firm behaviour from 
different disciplines. These include the fields of economics, law, 
management studies, psychology, institutional theory, 
organisational theory, behavioural economics, evolutionary 
economics, behavioural theory of the firm etc. The principle that 
brings these disciplines together in this study is that of bounded 
rationality. The inter-disciplinary nature of the evidence of 
bounded rationality in firms enriches this study because it shows 
how similar conclusions can be drawn by employing insights 
from different perspectives.  
 
Another method of analysis employed in this study is 
comparative. This study compares the law in the US and the EU 
from the perspective of the extent to which each jurisdiction is 
open to behavioural insights. The comparative nature of this 
analysis means that this study does not provide a comprehensive 
overview of the law in each jurisdiction. Rather, it seeks to 
highlight selective aspects of the law that are particularly relevant 
to the objectives of this study. In this way, the focus of this study 
                                                
14 J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5(4) J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581 (2009). 
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18 
is to provide a view of the law in so far as it is relevant from a 
behavioural perspective.  
 
This research also uses the case study method by examining 
individual competition cases. The advantage of this approach is 
that it allows an in-depth examination of particular situations. 
The objective of these case studies is to examine in more detail 
the decision-making processes of firms and how firm’s decisions 
depart from rationality. This analysis is motivated by the classic 
legal method of studying cases. In other respects, these case 
studies are inspired by the methodology used in management 
studies and borrow some of the tools from that literature. In 
essence, the case studies in this book use a mixture of methods 
employed in management studies and legal studies. Further, since 
the case study approach involves an in-depth investigation into 
individual firm behaviour, it is also compatible with a central 
aspect of the behavioural theory of the firm i.e., that firm 
behaviour is heterogeneous. The limitation of this approach is 
that it does not offer generalizable conclusions but the benefit of 
it is that it enables a deeper understanding of actual firm 
behaviour.  
5. Structure of the thesis 
 
This book comprises six chapters. Chapters two and three 
(following this Introduction) set the foundation for chapters four 
and five and these chapters must be read in conjunction with each 
other. Chapter two examines the insights from management 
studies and behavioural theories of the firm with the objective of 
determining whether these insights can lead to a better 
understanding of firm behaviour. This chapter establishes the 
substantive idea of bounded rationality in firms. It explains what 
is meant by the term ‘bounded rationality’ used in this thesis, the 
reasons for bounded rationality in firms and the contexts in which 
decisions in firms are boundedly rational. The discussion in this 
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chapter contrasts the rationality assumption in traditional 
economic approaches with the use of bounded rationality in 
behavioural and management studies. This chapter also serves to 
introduce the issues that are addressed in subsequent chapters of 
this thesis namely, the normative relevance of bounded 
rationality to competition law (addressed in chapter three) and the 
application of behavioural and managerial insights to competition 
law (addressed in chapters four and five).  
 
Chapter three sets the normative foundation for the thesis. It 
addresses the issue introduced but left open in chapter two i.e., 
the contribution of the literature on bounded rationality to the 
normative debate in competition law. It examines whether and to 
what extent behavioural insights have a normative significance to 
competition law. This chapter is an essential part of this thesis as 
it brings together competition law with insights from behavioural 
studies and examines the possibilities and limitations of applying 
the learning from chapter two to competition law. It highlights 
the dominant approaches to competition goals, the difficulty in 
arriving at a consensus on what the goal of competition law 
should be and which of the different goals of competition law are 
more compatible with behavioural studies. Since the discussion 
of competition goals is extensive, this chapter does not provide a 
comprehensive overview but only summarizes some of the more 
pertinent aspects of the literature in so far as they are connected 
to the theme of this book.  
 
Chapters four and five examine how insights from the bounded 
rationality of firms can be applied to particular aspects of 
competition law. Chapter four considers predatory pricing and 
chapter five deals with merger analysis. Both chapters follow a 
similar approach to examining the contribution of the literature 
from behavioural and management studies to particular aspects of 
competition law. Both chapters compare US and EU law and 
both provide a broad overview of the areas where behavioural 
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insights can potentially contribute to the law before more 
specifically examining individual cases. Chapter four focuses on 
two aspects of the law of predatory pricing viz., the requirements 
of intent and recoupment. Specifically, this chapter examines to 
what extent firms engaged in predation are motivated by 
recoupment and by the intent to eliminate competitors. The 
difficulty lies in distinguishing anticompetitive predation from 
competition on the merits. Here, the normative discussion in 
chapter three can be used to resolve some of the issues raised in 
chapter four. Finally, with respect to merger analysis in Chapter 
five, there is a substantial amount of literature on bounded 
rationality pertaining to mergers. Chapter five focuses on the 
motivations to merge and to what extent mergers are carried out 
to achieve efficiencies or in order to eliminate a potential or a 
close competitor. Further, this chapter examines the relevance of 
behavioural insights to mergers in dynamic markets. 
 
6. Criticisms and Limitations 
 
The idea that firms are boundedly rational and that biases in firms 
are systematic and persist despite market processes has received a 
critical response. For instance, Bailey argues that existing 
evidence of firms’ deviations from profit maximization is 
anecdotal and suggests “non-systematic mistakes or actions” by a 
firm attempting to reach interim goals such as maximizing 
revenues or market shares, which will evolve over time to profit 
maximization.15 One reason for the skepticism surrounding firm 
bounded rationality is that much of the evidentiary support for 
this comes from experimental economics. Experimental 
economics is based on laboratory experiments where a firm’s 
decision-making behaviour is simulated and its decisions are 
observed within an artificial environment. The results from 
experimental economics have been criticised for not providing 
                                                
15 Bailey, supra note 10, at 356. 
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conclusions with external validity since laboratory conditions 
may not be replicated in reality. For this reason, this study has 
relied to a greater extent on management studies as a source of 
data on bounded rationality because it is largely based on 
empirical rather than experimental work and it does not have the 
external validity problem because it studies decision-making in 
actual firms rather than in simulated conditions in a laboratory. 
Yet, the literature in management studies has its own limitations. 
A majority of these studies have a narrow scope and are confined 
to certain types of decisions taken in specific industries. The 
firms and industries studied may have their own various 
peculiarities. For instance, the behaviour of firms in dynamic 
industries will differ from those in more slow-growth industries. 
Consequently, the results of these studies may not be 
generalizable to all firms across all industries. While this work 
has attempted to resolve some of these criticisms, for instance by 
using a diversity of studies from across different industries, it 
does not comprehensively address the variety of critiques offered 
against the evidence on firm bounded rationality. 
 
The other section of scholars who agree that firms do not always 
act rationally are skeptical because they feel that an alternative 
model of firm behaviour will not be able to replace profit 
maximization as the way of providing clear predictions of how 
firms behave.16 Another section of scholars believes that 
behavioural scholarship has been unable to provide a convincing 
theory of firm behaviour. As Wright and Stone argue, “without a 
comprehensive framework for discerning which individuals or 
firms will suffer from which biases, to what extent, and when, the 
                                                
16 See Roger Van den Bergh, Behavioural Antitrust: Not Ready for the Main Stage, 9(1) 
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 203 (2013); Roundtable Interview with Joseph Farrell, 
Director, Bureau of Economics, FTC & Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General for Economic Analysis, DOJ Antitrust Division (Interview conducted by 
Elizabeth M. Bailey in 9(3) THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb., 2010), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb10_FullS
ource2_25.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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implications of a behavioural approach are simply incoherent.”17 
Further, behavioural scholarship imputes biases to some classes 
of individuals or firms and not to others.18 This causes ambiguity 
about the precise conditions under which biases inhere and take 
effect.19 Behavioural scholarship has also been criticised for 
focusing on the irrationality of certain market participants to the 
exclusion of others and thus applying cognitive biases 
asymmetrically “either to a monopolist or to potential entrants, 
but not to both, and certainly not market-wide”.20 Wright and 
Stone argue that it is essential at a minimum to determine the 
magnitude of a bias and the direction in which the bias will affect 
a firm’s predicted behaviour to draw any implications for 
competition law. This author agrees that behavioural scholarship 
does not offer an alternative theoretical paradigm to rational 
choice theory. More work needs to be done to understand the 
behaviour of firms descriptively before any outcome-oriented 
contributions can be made.  
 
In its place, this thesis takes the perspective that indeterminacy in 
predicting outcomes is inherently connected to the nature of firms 
as heterogeneous entities. Behavioural scholarship does not 
attempt to replace the existing neoclassical economic framework 
of firm behaviour. Rather, this work shows how behavioural 
scholarship can be important to the understanding of firm 
behaviour. Moreover, this book does not offer any final answers 
on normative questions as to the role of behavioural insights in 
competition law. Instead, it seeks to inform the existing 
normative debates within competition law. One reason for this is 
that the nature of this work does not lend itself to arriving at 
normative conclusions. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is 
                                                
17 Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone, Still Rare Like a Unicorn? The Case of 
Behavioral Predatory Pricing, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 859, 866 (2012). 
18 Wright & Stone, id. at 865. 
19 Wright & Stone, id. at 865. 
20 Wright & Stone, id. at 866. 
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to offer more of a descriptive narrative about the nature of 
bounded rationality and its applicability to competition law and 
to offer some suggestions from a normative perspective without 
arriving at any prescriptions.  
 
Another aspect to note is that behavioural scholarship in 
competition law has been accused of promoting greater 
intervention into markets. Existing scholarship in this area 
suggests such an ideological bent, particularly because this 
scholarship finds that markets are not necessarily self-correcting. 
Yet, advocating for greater intervention is not the objective of 
most behavioural scholarship and it is certainly not the objective 
of the present study. As critics argue, it may be that applying 
behavioural biases to firms does not change the results of the 
competitive effects analysis from the results achieved under 
rational choice analysis.21 Applying behavioural analysis could 
create a more and not less competitive environment.22 We are 
still at a stage where we have not arrived at conclusive answers to 
these questions. The direction of the results, whether advocating 
for greater or lesser intervention, are not relevant to the present 
study and are still speculative.  
 
This thesis compares US antitrust law and EU competition law. It 
does not analyse the competition laws of other jurisdictions. 
Competition law in each jurisdiction has its own features that are 
based on various factors including the cultural and historical 
context of each country. Accordingly, the applicability of 
behavioural scholarship will vary in each jurisdiction, depending 
on the existing structure of competition law in that jurisdiction.  
 
Finally, this study does not provide a comprehensive overview of 
the legal issues it surveys. It does not address all the points of 
debate in the law and in the ‘law and economics’ literature. The 
                                                
21 See Wright & Stone, id. at 868-70. 
22 See Wright & Stone, id. at 870. 
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inter-disciplinary nature of this scholarship requires considering 
points of law from the perspective of behavioural and 
management studies and this comes at the cost of considering 
other perspectives.  
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CHAPTER II 
COMPETITION LAW, FIRM BEHAVIOUR 
AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
MANAGEMENT STUDIES23 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Competition law regulates the conduct of firms in the market. To 
this end, agencies and courts enforcing competition law are often 
required to make predictions regarding the conduct of firms. 
These predictions are generally based on a view of the firm as a 
rational, profit maximizing entity. Firm rationality plays a role in 
several aspects of competition law such as cartels, vertical 
restraints, abuses of dominance and mergers. Firms rationally 
decide to collusively fix prices because they can set a higher 
price by colluding rather than competing on price, provided 
incentives to defect are not too high. The treatment of resale price 
maintenance as a vertical restraint on the theory that downstream 
firms have incentives to free ride is also based on firm rationality. 
Further, the law of predatory pricing assumes that rational firms 
will only engage in predation when there is recoupment. 
Accordingly, an alternative conception of the firm as boundedly 
rational may impact the understanding of firm conduct in 
competition law.24 
 
                                                
23 This chapter is partly based on the following publication: Shilpi Bhattacharya & 
Roger Van den Bergh, The Contribution of Management Studies to Understanding 
Firm Behaviour and Competition Law, 37 WORLD COMPETITION 515 (2014). 
24See Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 573, 658 
(2013) [Hereinafter Tor I]. 
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Nevertheless, the conception of the firm as a rational, profit 
maximizing entity has been disputed. Starting from Barnard,25 
Simon26 and then Cyert and March’s27 contributions, a substantial 
theoretical and empirical literature has evolved that questions the 
idea of the firm as a solely profit maximizing entity.28 This 
literature builds on empirical observations of market behaviour 
and the heterogeneity of firms in markets to argue that firms 
often fall short of rationality in their operations. For instance, a 
significant finding of this literature (which departed from 
traditional conceptions) was Simon’s idea that firms seek to 
‘satisfice’ rather than maximize profits in certain situations.29 
Satisficing firms take decisions by selecting purposively 
satisfactory and sufficient rather than profit maximizing 
alternatives.30 Another contribution of this literature was to 
introduce the idea of the bounded rationality of firms.31 
Experiments conducted in the laboratory are an additional source 
of evidence of bounded rationality in firms.32 
 
                                                
25CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (Harvard University Press, 
1938). 
26See e.g. Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69(1) Q. J. ECON.99 
(1955). 
27See e.g. RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIOURAL THEORY OF THE 
FIRM (Prentice Hall, 1963). 
28See Dennis C. Mueller, The Corporation and the Economist, 10 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 
147, 153-54 (1992) (reviewing the work of different scholars arguing against the 
conception of the firm as profit maximising). 
29See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKING 
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION (3d ed., Free Press, 1976). 
30See Reva Brown, Consideration of the Origins of Herbert Simon’s Theory of 
‘Satisficing’ (1933-1947), 42(10) MGMT. DECISIONS 1240, 1241 (2004). The concept of 
satisficing was later connected by Selten to build a theory of the firm based on adapting 
to the aspiration levels of decision-making agents. See Reinhard Selten, Bounded 
Rationality, 146(4) J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 649, 649 (1990) 
[Hereinafter Selten I]. 
31See Simon, supra note 26, at 99. 
32See e.g., Engel, supra note 13, at 446 (providing an excellent overview of the existing 
experimental literature which sheds light on different aspects of firm behaviour across 
disciplines such as economics, law and psychology). 
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Since the early contributions by Simon, other well-known 
economists have also been wary of considering firms as solely 
profit maximizing entities. For instance, according to Alchian, 
inherent uncertainty in a firm’s environment makes it difficult to 
consider profit maximization as a meaningful guide for firm 
decisions.33 Alchian has observed that the relevant decision-
making criteria for firms is not profit maximization but 
improving relative positions since a firm’s success in a market 
depends on its ability to improve its position relative to its 
competitors.34 The greater concern for relative positions 
strengthens the argument that firms are not concerned with 
maximizing profits.35 
 
The increasing evidence of the bounded rationality of firms 
warrants a closer examination of this literature and its possible 
implications for competition law. Behavioural antitrust scholars 
have argued that since deviations from profit-maximizing 
assumptions are systematic, structural approaches that assume 
profit-maximization might detect increases in welfare when, in 
fact, welfare may be reduced.36 Accordingly, proponents of 
behavioural approaches believe that it requires a re-thinking of 
several competition problems.37 For instance, an alternative 
conception of the firm as boundedly rational may affect the 
analysis of predatory pricing by finding that firms can price 
predatorily in cases where claims would be dismissed because 
                                                
33See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58(3) J. POL. 
ECON.211, 213 (1950). 
34See Alchian, id. at 213. 
35See Tor I, supra note 24, at 596-97. 
36 Armstrong & Huck, supra note 11, at 34. 
37See Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economics at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-
First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 513 (2007); see also Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice 
E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L. J. 1527, 1581 (2011); see also Avishalom 
Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline and Legal Policy, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 482, 565 (2002) [Hereinafter Tor III]. 
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recoupment is not possible.38 Further, traditional models may 
overstate the likelihood of harm from the exercise of market 
power.39 Merger simulation may also be inaccurate if the 
assumption is strictly that firms maximize profits. This is because 
if the acquiring firm is not maximizing profits, conventional 
economic models of pricing based for instance, on the 
relationship between gross profit margins and own-price 
elasticity of demand won’t provide useful predictions about post-
merger price increases and market power.40 
 
Competition law scholars have had a mixed response to the 
literature criticizing the rationality assumption in firms. One 
group of scholars has criticised behavioural economics as either 
irrelevant for competition law or, in spite of its explanatory 
potential in specific cases, not yet ready to provide normative 
conclusions.41 Several reasons have been advanced to justify the 
reluctance to accept the bounded rationality of firms as a 
blueprint for competition policy. For instance, biases found to 
exist at the individual (consumer) level and in artificially 
constructed firms in laboratories cannot be blindly applied to 
real-world firms, due to concerns about the external validity of 
such experimental evidence. In addition, quantitative evidence of 
firm behaviour is limited.42 Also, individual behavioural biases 
                                                
38See Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a Behaviorally Informed Approach to Antitrust: The 
Case of Predatory Pricing, 18 ANTITRUST A.B.A. 52 (2003); Thomas B. Leary, The 
Dialogue Between Students of Business and Students of Antitrust, 47 N.Y. L. SCH. L. 
REV. 1, 13 (2003). 
39See Tor I, supra note 24, at 598. 
40See Bailey, supra note 10, at 358. 
41See Roger Van den Bergh, Behavioural Antitrust: Not Ready for the Main Stage, 9(1) 
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 203 (2013); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg & Derek D. 
Moore, The Future of Behavioral Economics in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 6 
COMPETITION POLICY INT’L. 89, 98 (2010); see also Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone, 
Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1517, 1526 (2012). 
42See Avishalom Tor, The Market, The Firm, and Behavioral Antitrust, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 539 (Eyal Zamir & Doron 
Teichman eds., Oxford University Press, 2014).  
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may not translate to biases at the firm level, since firms may have 
internal devices to rid themselves of these biases.43 Moreover, 
even if individuals within firms are biased, market mechanisms 
may correct departures from rationality. In this respect the role of 
learning, market competition and evolutionary processes must be 
acknowledged.44 Most importantly, critics argue that there is 
insufficient evidence that departures from rationality within firms 
affect market outcomes.45 Since competition law is concerned 
with the ultimate performance of markets and not just with 
explaining individual firm behaviour, caution should be exercised 
before proposing a more interventionist competition law.46 
 
The rest of this chapter is divided into the following sections. 
Section 2 introduces the literature on the behavioural theory of 
the firm. Section 3 correlates this literature with management 
studies. Section 4 describes some of the findings of firm bounded 
rationality in management studies and in the behavioural 
literature. It describes prominent biases found to exist in choices 
made by managers47 and internal decision processes within firms 
that cause departures from rationality. Section 5 questions the 
novelty of these behavioural findings in light of the existing 
                                                
43See Gregory J. Werden, Luke M. Froeb & Mikhael Shor, Behavioral Antitrust and 
Merger Control, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 126 (2011). 
44See Werden et al., id. at 126. 
45 Experimental evidence shows that consumers are subject to bounded rationality, 
bounded will power and bounded self-interest, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1476 (1998). However, experimental evidence of firms’ bounded rationality is 
more limited. As a result, the bounded rationality of consumers has gained wider 
acceptance than the bounded rationality of firms. See Armstrong & Huck, supra note 
11, at 33. 
46See Armstrong & Huck, id. 
47This is not to say that only managers and not lower level employees are subject to 
behavioural biases or that only biases at the managerial level affect firm behaviour. 
However, this work focuses on the study of biases at the managerial level because these 
biases are given greater importance in the existing literature and are likely to have a 
greater impact on firm behaviour given that responsibility for decisions in firms is 
borne in greater proportion by managers rather than lower level employees. 
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knowledge within neo-classical economics. Section 6 examines 
whether behavioural biases can be overcome by learning or may 
be eliminated by competitive market processes. Section 7 
investigates the relevance of behavioural findings to competition 
law. The impact of behavioural biases among managers or 
irrationalities in decision processes within firms is unclear. In the 
absence of such evidence, there remains a gap between the 
behavioural literature and competition law and any normative 
conclusion is premature. Section 8 concludes the discussion. 
2. The Behavioural Theory of the Firm 
 
In the mid-twentieth century a number of empirical studies were 
conducted where managers were interviewed about their pricing 
and output decisions.48 These studies showed that managers did 
not take decisions in the manner predicted by price theory. The 
field called the ‘Behavioural Theory of the Firm’ or BTF arose 
from these divergences between theory and practice regarding the 
decision-making practices of firms and the consequent need for 
theory to better describe how decisions are actually made within 
firms.49 
 
The central aspect of BTF is that firms are boundedly rational. 
Bounded rationality describes decision-making under cognitive 
constraints.50 Bounded rationality in firms is said to be a result of 
human limitations arising due to: uncertainty, particularly in the 
future consequences of decisions, inconsistent preferences, 
changing risk preferences51 and limited knowledge of available 
                                                
48For a review of these studies see, Mueller, supra note 28, at 151 (narrating the 
historical evolution of the concept of the profit maximizing firm in economics and 
describing its inadequacies and methods for developing a more realistic conception of 
the firm in accordance with empirical evidence). 
49See generally Selten I, supra note 30, at 649. 
50Selten I, id. at 649. 
51 See James G. March, Understanding How Decisions Happen in Organizations, in 
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 9, 12-15 (Zur Shapira ed., Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
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and feasible alternatives.52 As described by Selten, the two 
essential aspects of bounded rationality are non-optimization and 
cognitive constraints. Selten used experimental evidence on 
framing effects, preference reversal and the intransitivities in 
choice to argue that decisions are not taken with the objective of 
optimising particular goals; rather firms are said to take 
‘satisficing’ decisions.53 Selten further clarified that motivation, 
adaptation and cognition are three aspects of human behaviour 
that produce limits to rationality.54 Motivation represents the 
objectives of human behaviour.55 Many different factors may 
motivate people to act in particular ways and so it may be hard to 
impute definite objectives to human actions. The second factor, 
adaptation, refers to routine learning behaviour without the use of 
reasoning.56 This builds a connection between the actions of 
individuals and what they learn from their everyday experiences. 
Thus, people may behave in certain ways because of previous 
learning. Finally, cognition describes all conscious and 
unconscious reasoning processes of the human mind.57 Cognitive 
limitations are often cited as the primary reason for bounded 
rationality. 
 
Since firms operate in an inherently complex environment, it 
pushes them to take decisions using rules of thumb and standard 
operating procedures rather than on rationality.58 Some of the 
complexity in the environment of firms arises from: new and 
changing technologies; unpredictable actions of competitors; 
changing consumer-spending choices; dispersed information and 
                                                
52See JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (Wiley, 1958).  
53See Selten I, supra note 30, at 650. 
54 Reinhard Selten, Features of Experimentally Observed Bounded Rationality, 42 
EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 413, 414 (1998). 
55Selten, id. at 414. 
56Selten, id. at 414. 
57Selten, id. at 414. 
58See Christos N. Pitelis, A Note on Cyert and March (1963) and Penrose (1959): A 
Case for Synergy, 18(3) ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 478 (2006). 
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limited cognition.59 Other scholars argue that firms follow many 
objectives such as expanding sales, reducing costs and increasing 
revenue and balancing between these sometimes-competing 
considerations causes departures from rationality.60 
 
The understanding of bounded rationality in firms has evolved 
with time and with intellectual assistance from the contributions 
of different disciplines to this field.61 At the same time, ideas 
from BTF and firm bounded rationality find a place in a broad 
range of disciplines including economics, organisational theory, 
management or business studies, psychology, sociology and law. 
The multi-disciplinary nature of this scholarship has helped to 
provide a richer understanding of firm behaviour. 
 
3. Management Studies and Firm Bounded 
Rationality 
 
Various linkages can be drawn between management studies and 
BTF. Both disciplines relate a firm’s internal processes to its 
competitive position in the market.62 Both disciplines also 
emphasize factors such as cognitive limitations of managers and 
organisational obstacles for understanding firm behaviour.63 
Moreover, behavioural findings have been gaining acceptance in 
business studies. For instance, the idea that managers in firms are 
                                                
59See Peter E. Earl, Behavioral Theory, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS AND THEORY 
OF THE FIRM 96 (M. Dietrich and J. Krafft, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012). 
60See Earl, id. 
61 Institutional theory also supports the view of the firm in BTF scholarship. Both 
theories take a similar view that firms are embedded in their own internal institutional 
environments, which consist of established structures, systems and practices, and the 
external institutional environment, which a firm shares with other firms. Both internal 
and external environments influence a firm’s actions. See Jane W. Lu, Intra and Inter-
organizational Imitative Behavior: Institutional Influences on Japanese Firms: Entry 
Mode Choice, 33(1) J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 19 (2002). 
62See Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, supra note 1, at 1462. 
63See e.g. Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, id. at 1464. 
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subject to biases is now widely accepted. A number of top-ranked 
MBA programmes offer courses on behavioural biases in 
decision-making to future executives.64 There is also a growing 
awareness of the importance of potential flaws in managers’ 
decision-making. For instance, a survey of approximately 2,000 
executives by McKinsey revealed that a majority of them thought 
the quality of strategic decisions taken by their firms was sub-
optimal.65 Finally, both management studies and BTF believe that 
firm behaviour is heterogeneous. Management studies uses 
methods like the ‘case study’ method, to study the differences 
between companies, which makes some companies succeed and 
others fail, in contrast to economics, which treats all firms as 
being the same or places them in broad, generalizable 
categories.66 
 
Firm heterogeneity is also a feature of strategic management 
theory, a sub-discipline of management studies. Strategic 
management theory asks why firms adopt different strategies, 
why heterogeneity persists and why competing firms perform 
differently.67 Business strategy is approached differently within 
managerial economics and management studies. In managerial 
economics, strategy refers to the “general policies that managers 
adopt to generate profits.”68 The objective of strategic decision-
making in managerial economics is to generate sustained 
profits.69 Whereas in business studies, strategy refers to how 
firms can differentiate themselves from the competition or beat 
the competition. In a competitive environment it can take 
                                                
64 Examples include Universities of Columbia, Harvard, New York University and 
London Business School. 
65See MCKINSEY QUARTERLY, 2010. 
66See Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, supra note 1, at 1461. 
67See Thomas C. Powell, Dan Lovallo & Craig R. Fox, Behavioral Strategy, 32 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1369, 1370 (2011). 
68JAMES A. BRICKLEY, CLIFFORD W. SMITH , JR. & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, 
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 214 (4th ed., McGraw-
Hill, 2007). 
69See BRICKLEY et al., id. at 215. 
19B_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Firm Behaviour 

 
 
 
 
35 
significant managerial effort and talent (devoted to decisions like 
choosing products as well as producing and marketing them 
efficiently) just to earn a normal return.70 
 
Traditional literature in strategic management has explained firm 
heterogeneity through Bainian market power, Penrose’s resource 
based view of the firm and Schumpeter’s theory of innovation.71 
Yet, as Powell, Lovallo and Fox argue, behavioural theory has 
much to contribute to strategic management.72 While firms might 
differ due to resource scarcity, barriers to mobility, causal 
ambiguity and difficulty to imitate others, there may be other 
reasons for heterogeneity within behavioral theory such as the 
self-confirming beliefs of managers, over optimism, competitive 
blind spots, self-interested causal attributions, disordered learning 
processes, institutional conformity, unwillingness to imitate or 
perceptual filtering. Any of these conditions could help some 
firms to exploit available opportunities and improve their 
performance over others.73 Firms’ individual culture, prevailing 
business models and previous experiences also affect its strategic 
decisions.74 All of these factors contribute to increasing the 
relevance of behavioural theories in understanding firm 
heterogeneity in strategic management.  
 
In addition, both within management studies and BTF, certain 
kinds of decisions taken by firms are likely to be more rational 
than others. There is a distinction in management studies between 
operational and strategic decisions of firms. This is similar to the 
distinction between routine behaviour that is automatically 
induced by the context and problem-solving behaviour, which 
requires decisions by instinct or deliberation, in the literature on 
                                                
70See BRICKLEY et al., id. at 247. 
71See Powell et al., supra note 67, at 1370.  
72See Powell et al., id. at 1370. 
73Powell et al., id. at 1377. 
74See Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics, 
16(2) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 23, 34-35 (2002). 
20A_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Competition Law and Bounded Rationality 

 
 
 
 
36 
evolutionary economics, which also draws inspiration from 
BTF.75 While all actions involve some elements of both routine 
and problem-solving decisions, some types of actions have more 
of a routine component and others require more problem-solving 
skills. The purpose of the distinction between operational and 
strategic decisions is that strategic decisions are more prone to 
biases and errors than operational decisions because they require 
greater deliberation and are not taken routinely. This is another 
area where management studies supports BTF.  
4. Describing Bounded Rationality in Firms 
 
The literature from management studies and BTF describe two 
different sources of bounded rationality in firms: (i) behavioural 
biases of managers that affect decision-making in a firm; and (ii) 
internal decision-making processes within firms that cause 
departures from rationality. The following discussion discusses 
these sources of bounded rationality in greater detail. 
 
4.1 Bounded Rationality and the Behavioural Biases of 
Managers 
 
Empirical observations have shown that a corporation is affected 
by the individual personalities within it.76 This departs from the 
traditional view in economics, that individual managers do not 
have an impact on firm behaviour.77 Therefore, firms that share 
similar market conditions are assumed to make the same choices 
regardless of who is managing them or how they are being 
                                                
75See Richard R. Nelson, Human Behavior and Cognition in Evolutionary Economics 6 
BIOLOGICAL THEORY 293, 297 (2011). 
76 Ross Stagner, Corporate Decision Making: An Empirical Study, 53(1) J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 1, 11-12 (1969). 
77 See Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, Managing with Style: The Effect of 
Managers on Firm Policies, 168(4) QUART. J. ECON. 1169, 1173 (2003).  
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managed.78 BTF scholars have disputed this position by 
highlighting that economic agents with similar goals and facing 
similar constraints take different decisions.79 The importance of 
individual managers to a firm’s decisions is reinforced by the 
literature from management studies. The influence of particular 
individuals on the decisions taken by a corporation is also evident 
from markets’ reactions to new CEO appointments.80 As such, 
managers can have an impact on the conduct of firms.81 
 
Stagner describes corporate policy as determined by persons 
occupying certain positions in the organisation.82 These persons, 
according to Stagner, are motivated partly by their position and 
role within the organisation and partly by their personal 
motives.83 Goldfarb & Xia use econometric techniques and game 
theory to show that firm behaviour (specifically, entry into new 
markets) is related to manager and firm characteristics in a 
systematic way.84 They find that manager effects can be 
attributed to observable characteristics such as education and age. 
Generally, older firms with educated and more experienced 
managers have been found to take better entry decisions and are 
able to better assess competitor behaviour.85 Moreover, CEOs 
with MBA degrees appear to be more aggressive on average – 
                                                
78 See id. 
79 See Nelson, supra note 75, at 298. 
80 The share price of the technology company, Yahoo Inc. increased after it announced 
that it was appointing Marissa Mayer as its new CEO, despite Yahoo’s uneven business 
performance, indicating that the market felt that the new CEO would bring value to the 
company. See Mariko Oi, Is Yahoo Boss Marissa Mayer Responsible for Growth? BBC 
News (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24545737. 
81 For a recent example see, Role of Key Officials at Corporates Violating Norms under 
CCI Scanner, ECONOMIC TIMES (Oct. 24, 2013), (“the Competition Commission [of 
India] is looking at the role of directors and key officers at entities suspected of 
indulging in anti-competitive practices.”) 
82See Stagner, supra note 76, at 3. 
83See Stagner, id. 
84See Avi Goldfarb & Mo Xia, Who Thinks About the Competition: Managerial Ability 
and Strategic Entry in US Local Telephone Markets, 101(7) AM. ECON. REV.  3130 
(2011). 
85See Bertrand & Schoar, supra note 77, at 1204. 
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e.g. by undertaking greater capital expenditure.86 Certain types of 
decisions that are effected by executives in-charge at the firm 
include investment, financing and strategic decisions.87In 
addition, managerial effects matter more for acquisition and 
diversification decisions.88 
 
The reason that managers’ individual attributes are not 
considered relevant to a firm’s decisions is because in traditional 
economic literature all managers are viewed as rational agents 
taking profit-maximizing decisions on behalf of firms.89 
However, empirical and experimental evidence finds that 
managers may not always be motivated by profit but by social 
considerations such as fairness and equity as well as other 
considerations such as reference dependence, self-control, 
inattention and context effects.90 For instance, a study shows that 
a new CEO’s decision to allocate resources to different divisions 
of a firm depends on the CEO’s prior connection with the 
division.91 Another study found that when taking decisions, 
executives were influenced by differing organisational goals, 
their personal views, previous work experience, personal 
position, power and prestige.92 Managers are bounded not only 
by the formal constraints of their job but also by the informal 
                                                
86See Bertrand & Schoar, id., at 1204. 
87See Bertrand & Schoar, id at 1204. 
88 See Bertrand & Schoar, id at 1170. 
89See Tor I, supra note 24, at 593. 
90See Avi Goldfarb et al., Behavioral Models of Managerial Decision-Making, 23 
MARKETING LETTERS 405 (May, 2012) (providing a review of literature applying 
behavioural economic models to managerial decision-making). 
91See Yuhai Xuan, Empire-Building or Bridge-Building?: Evidence from New CEO’s 
Internal Capital Allocation Decisions, 22(12) REV. FIN. STUD. 4919 (2009) (conducting 
an empirical investigation into the internal capital allocations of firms with new CEOs 
and finding that the divisions from which those CEOs came or with which they were 
associated got a larger share of internal funds, particularly where the CEO had less 
authority or the divisions had greater power and that this affects segment investment 
efficiency). 
92See Stagner, supra note 76, at 3. 
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traditions and expectations implicit in their role.93 Moreover, 
because information is costly, decisions are not made based on 
perfect information, instead managers satisfice when collecting 
information for taking decisions.94 Another study finds that 
managers often take decisions and solve problems by relying on 
their intuition rather than on rationality.95 
 
Managers’ attitudes towards risk may be inconsistent with 
conceptions of risk-taking used in rational choice models.96 
Based on two survey studies of business executives, managers 
have been found to be relatively insensitive to estimates of 
probabilities of potential outcomes; they are more affected by 
performance targets set for them and sharply distinguish between 
taking risks and gambling.97 Managers take greater risks when 
targets are not reached or personal positions are at stake and also 
when the targets set for them have been exceeded.98 Managers 
associate risk more often with negative rather than positive 
outcomes.99 Further, managers express the necessity to take risks 
but have reported that these attitudes are supported more by 
personal than organisational incentives.100 
 
Managers have also been found to be subject to perceptual biases 
when processing information.101 Managers often selectively use 
information when taking decisions, in some cases information is 
                                                
93See James L. McKenney & Peter G.W. Keen, How Managers’ Minds Works, HARV. 
BUS. REV. 79, 81 (1974).  
94 Stagner, supra note 76, at 2 (citing Simon (1960), Cyert, Simon & Trow (1956)). 
95See McKenney & Keen, supra note 93, at 79-80 (other aspects of bounded rationality 
that McKenney & Keen consider are ambiguity and that managers may not always be 
able to explicitly formulate the problems with which they are faced).  
96See James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk 
Taking, 33(11) MGMT. SCI. 1404 (1987). 
97See March & Shapira, id.at 1404. 
98See March & Shapira, id.at 1409. 
99See March & Shapira, id. at 1407. 
100See March & Shapira, id. at 1408. 
101 Stagner, supra note 76, at 2. 
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ignored and in others it may be interpreted in a biased way.102 
Decisions and the analysis of information based on which 
decisions are taken are affected by ‘role-induced experiences’ as 
well as by personal experiences.103 Biases may also arise due to 
cognitive limitations and the previous experiences of managers. 
For instance, managers estimating the likely occurrence of future 
events make subjective probability assessments that may be 
subject to biases such as overconfidence, which can affect 
managers’ estimates of these events. Highly confident predictions 
are more likely to be the ones that managers will act upon and 
commit resources to without pausing to consider additional 
information.104 
 
A number of studies have found managers of firms to suffer from 
overconfidence bias.105 Overconfidence bias is the tendency of 
individuals to overstate their likelihood of success while 
underestimating their vulnerability to risks. Over confidence has 
also been described as the overestimation of probabilities for a set 
of events.106 As a result, managers making strategic or tactical 
predictions may underestimate uncertainty. Recent studies 
suggest that overconfidence bias is connected to excessive 
merger activity.107 Over confidence bias can also be used to 
explain why managers underestimate the chances of getting 
caught when they enter into cartels.108 
 
                                                
102See Stagner, id. at 2. 
103See Stagner, id. 
104See Jayashree Mahajan, The Overconfidence Effect in Marketing Management 
Predictions, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 329 (1992). 
105See Goldfarb et al., supra note 90, for a review of some of these studies. 
106Mahajan, supra note 104, at 329. 
107See e.g., Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Behavioral CEOs: The Role of 
Managerial Overconfidence, 29(4) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 37 (Fall, 2015); See also 
Riding a Wave, ECONOMIST (April 6, 2006). 
108 Amanda P. Reeves, Behavioral Antitrust: Unanswered Questions on the Horizon, 9-
5 ANTITRUST SRC. 3 (2010). 
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Research has found that optimistic biases are attenuated when 
people are deciding between courses of action or choosing their 
objectives and are exaggerated once a choice has been made and 
the plan has to be implemented.109 This research suggests that 
optimism may provide a motivational edge rather than seriously 
hinder decision-making.110 Optimistic biases, even when they are 
unrealistic may also lead to improvements in performance when 
compared to the situation where optimism is absent.111 People 
who make optimistic predictions tend to achieve more than they 
would had they not made those predictions, though they may not 
achieve the initial goals they had set for themselves.112 However, 
in the context of the firm this kind of over-optimism may also 
lead to firms pursuing loss-making activities. Once an initial 
decision to undertake such activities has been made, a firm may 
persist in these activities, even after it has been found that such 
activities are not providing the expected returns.  
 
Studies have found that overconfidence is more likely in certain 
circumstances than others. People are more optimistically biased 
under conditions of greater uncertainty, i.e. when the odds for 
success or failure are the closest.113 Since there is substantial 
uncertainty in the environment in which firms take decisions, 
decisions taken in such environments may be taken 
overoptimistically. People also tend to be more optimistically 
biased when the outcomes of their predictions will not be 
revealed for some time.114 While this may be because of greater 
availability of information as the outcome nears, experiments 
have revealed that even when information is equally available or 
                                                
109See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of 
Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT 334, 338 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
110See Armor & Taylor, id. at 341. 
111See Armor & Taylor, id. at 341. 
112Armor & Taylor, id. at 341. 
113Armor & Taylor, id. at 338. 
114See Armor & Taylor, id. at 339. 
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not, proximal predictions (people’s expectations when time for 
performance was close) are less optimistically biased. 
 
4.2  Bounded Rationality and the Internal Process of Firms 
 
Corporate decision-making involves an inter-play of factors such 
as objective environmental constraints, subjective constraints, 
internal patterns of communication, authority relations and a 
firm’s history and traditions.115 According to Shapira, firms take 
decisions in a ‘longitudinal context’, which makes a firm’s 
decisions a product of its history.116 Sometimes decision-making 
in a firm is part of an on-going process rather than a single 
activity and the commitment to the decision-making process is 
more important than judgmental accuracy.117 Not only 
individuals, but also internal departments may have an impact on 
a firm’s decisions as a firm is often viewed as a collection of 
internal departments or divisions rather than as a single entity. 
For instance, the stronger divisions within the company may have 
a greater influence on the decisions taken by the firm as a 
whole.118 The goals of individual members of a firm may conflict 
with the goals of the firm as a whole.119 Policy proposals by 
executives of different internal departments within a firm reflect 
the differing perceptions and motivations of these executives. For 
instance, individuals may concentrate on short-term gains and 
may not consider the long-term interests of the firm. As a result, 
Stagner takes the view that corporate decisions are taken by 
compromising between different internal positions and are 
                                                
115See Zur Shapira, Introduction and Overview, in ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
1,4 (Zur Shapira ed., Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
116 Shapira, id. at 4-5. 
117See Shapira, id. at 4. 
118See Stagner, supra note 76, at 12. 
119See Stagner, id. at 2 (citing Soelberg (1967)). 
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affected by the power of participants and the logic of their 
arguments as much as by the data.120 
 
Firms are constrained by their decision-making processes, which 
can impact their ability to assess and respond to market 
competition. The literature from management studies suggests 
that firms may not be able to optimally respond to environmental 
changes due to strategic persistence, organisational structures, 
frames of reference, organisational routines, institutional 
pressures and organisational ideology.121 BTF scholars refer to 
certain processes through which firms take decisions as frames of 
reference. Organisational frames of reference use cognitive and 
environmental factors to select, organise and validate information 
before taking decisions.122 Further, an organisation’s frame of 
reference depends on the domain of inquiry and manner of 
articulation of information. These processes may help or at times 
hinder the efficiency or quality of decisions taken by a firm 
because frames of reference can form a barrier to the firm’s 
ability to holistically evaluate the changes to its environment. 
Further, with time, frames of reference can become rigid and they 
may constrain rather than enable rational decision-making.123 In 
the context of larger organisations with prominent frames of 
reference such as those in the public sector, decision-making may 
be removed from rationality to a greater extent and influenced by 
biased information.124 In addition, organisations can create 
                                                
120See Stagner, id. 
121See Pino G. Audia, Edwin A. Locke & Ken G. Smith, The Paradox of Success: An 
Archival and a Laboratory Study of Strategic Persistence Following Radical 
Environmental Change, 43(5) ACAD. MGMT. J. 837, 850 (2000).  
122 Paul Shrivastava & Susan Schneider, Organisational Frames of Reference, 37(10) 
HUM. REL. 795 (1984). 
123Paul Shrivastava, Ian I. Mitroff & Mats Alvesson, Nonrationality in Organizational 
Actions, 27(3) INT’L STUD. MGMT. & ORG., 90, 91 (1987). 
124 B. Douglas Skelley, Radical Institutionalism and Public Administration: A Review 
of Nils Brunsson’s Contributions to Understanding Public Sector Organizations, 5(3) 
PUB. ADMIN. & MGMT.: AN INTERACTIVE J. 112, 115 (2000) (reviewing Brunsson’s 
famous book, The Irrational Organization).  
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routine processes to adapt to the complexity in their 
environment.125 Organisational routines help firms to take routine 
decisions more effectively but make it difficult for them to 
respond to environmental change. Organisational routines may 
persist because they are costly to change and to re-learn and can 
also prevent firms from identifying profit opportunities. 
 
Management studies also find that firms suffer from strategic 
persistence and competitive inertia. Competitive inertia is the 
level of activity that a firm exhibits when altering its competitive 
stance in areas such as pricing, advertising, introducing new 
products or services and market scope.126 When taking such 
decisions firms tend to stick to strategies that have worked in the 
past. This is called strategic persistence.127 Strategic persistence 
may be detrimental when the environment changes because 
managers may fail to respond to signals indicating a need for 
strategic change and instead may fall into patterns of strategic 
persistence.128 
 
Firms do not always follow rational pricing strategies.129 Firms 
frequently use a budget forecast of cost and quantities for making 
their pricing and operating decisions, which are usually based on 
historical performance, technical studies or competitor 
performance.130 This is because firms often operate so as to set 
and achieve targets rather than maximize profits.131 Accordingly, 
historical performance and economic conditions may have as 
much of a role to play as cost in a firm’s setting of target levels. 
                                                
125See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 52. 
126 Danny Miller & Ming Jer-Chen, Sources and Consequences of Competitive Inertia: 
A Study of the U.S. Airline Industry, 39(1) ADMIN. SCI. QUARTERLY. 1, 2 (1994). 
127Audia et al., supra note 121, at 837. 
128See Audia et al., id. at 837. 
129 Nabil Al-Najjar, Sandip Baliga & David Besanko, Market Forces Meet Behavioural 
Biases: Cost Misallocation and Irrational Pricing, 39(1) RAND J. ECON. 214 (2008). 
130Al-Najjar et al., id. at 218. 
131 Armstrong & Huck, supra note 11, at 18.  
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Thus, prices may not always be based on a constant assessment 
of current market conditions and any changes in those conditions.  
 
An incomplete view of the industry, poor design of the 
competitive analysis system, inaccurate managerial systems or 
ineffective organizational processes can cause flaws in the 
competitive analysis undertaken by firms.132 These flaws are of 
particular relevance to competition law as they can slow a firm’s 
response to competitors or cause firms to make mistakes in the 
kinds of strategic decisions that are regulated by competition law. 
Zahra and Charples identify six serious ‘blind spots’ in a 
company’s competitive analysis. These are: misjudging industry 
boundaries, poor identification of competition, overemphasizing 
a competitor’s visible competence, over-emphasizing where and 
not how rivals will compete, faulty assumptions about the 
competition and paralysis by analysis.133 These mistakes are 
more evident when firms take decisions to enter and exit markets 
in response to changes in market conditions. An example of how 
firms can be slow in responding to competition is Microsoft 
Corporation’s delayed entry into the smart cellular phone market, 
particularly its slow response to Apple Inc.’s very successful 
smart phone, the ‘iphone’.134 Microsoft’s slow response may be 
imputed to its organisational structure and decision-making 
processes.135 According to Krugman, Microsoft’s delayed entry 
into smart phones and tablets was because its leading market 
position in operational systems for computers made it less alert to 
                                                
132 Shaker A. Zahra & Sherry S. Charples, Blind Spots in Competitive Analysis, 7(2) 
ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 7, 9 (1993). 
133Zahra & Charples, id. 
134See Paul Krugman, The Decline of E-Empires, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/opinion/krugman-the-decline-of-e-
empires.html?smid=fb-share&_r=0 (giving reasons for the rise of Microsoft vis-à-vis 
Apple and its failure to capitalise on its monopoly position). 
135See also Microsoft’s Downfall: Inside the Executive E-mails and Cannibalistic 
Culture that Felled a Tech Giant, VANITY FAIR (Jul. 3, 2012), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2012/07/microsoft-downfall-emails-steve-
ballmer.print. 
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changes in the market and slower to take the necessary steps to 
stay abreast of those changes.136 An alternative view is that 
Microsoft’s inability to respond to the changing environment due 
to the introduction of smart phones arose from Microsoft’s 
organisational design.137 Its organisational divisions may have 
hampered Microsoft’s ability to recognise the importance of 
changing market trends.138 Another factor may have been its size. 
An organization’s size affects its likelihood of taking competitive 
actions. Small firms are generally more likely than larger firms to 
launch competitive actions and to do so quickly.139 Larger firms 
are generally perceived as slow and inflexible competitors.140 
 
The management studies literature also finds that firms imitate 
the actions of other firms when introducing new products and 
processes, adopting managerial methods, or when determining 
entry and investments in new markets.141 Firms may more 
particularly imitate when taking strategic decisions because these 
decisions are taken in situations involving uncertainty and the 
conduct of other firms can serve as a guide that certain strategies 
may work better than others.142 Imitation also occurs because it is 
more costly to calculate optimal actions and thus easier to follow 
other firms and target relative performance. The tendency of 
firms to mimic is connected to a firms desire to maximize relative 
rather than absolute profits because firms are more interested in 
                                                
136See id. 
137See Joshua Gans, Is Microsoft of the 1990’s Similar to Apple of Today?, DIGITOPOLY 
(Aug. 2013), http://www.digitopoly.org/2013/08/26/is-microsoft-of-the-1990s-similar-
to-apple-of-today. 
138See Gans, id. 
139MICHAEL A. HITT, R. DUANE IRELAND & ROBERT E. HOSKISSON, STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS: COMPETITIVENESS AND GLOBALIZATION 139 (8th ed., South 
Western Cengage Learning, 2009). 
140See HITT et al., id., at 139. 
141See Marvin B. Lieberman & Shigeru Asabu, Why do Firms Imitate Each Other?, 
31(2) ACAD. MGMT. REV. 366 (2006). 
142See Lieberman & Asabu, id. at 366. 
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outperforming their competitors from a relative perspective.143 
Imitative behaviour of firms is also connected to findings 
regarding managerial behaviour as managers are found to be 
more concerned about their relative rather than their absolute pay 
and position. Thus, firms imitate to avoid falling behind 
competitors and missing out on opportunities available to other 
firms. Empirical evidence supports theoretical findings of 
imitation. In a study of what influenced listed Japanese firms to 
adopt particular modes of entry into international markets, Lu 
found that transaction cost theories did not provide a full account 
of the motivations of these firms. Instead, institutional theories 
including theories of imitative behaviour had considerable 
explanatory power beyond that of the transaction cost 
approach.144 Experience had a moderating impact on this effect. 
 
An interesting theory for why firms imitate is the ‘minimax 
regret’ model, which postulates that if firm A is involved in a 
merger, the managers in competitor firm B will feel more regret 
for not following firm A and not merging even if the merger is 
unsuccessful than following firm A and merging and finding that 
the mergers are not successful for both firms.145 This is because 
in the first situation where firm B does not merge and the 
merging firm A is successful, firm B suffers competitive 
disadvantage from not merging, whereas in the second case 
where firm B also merges and both firms fail in their mergers, 
there is no relative competitive disadvantage to firm B compared 
to the merging firm A. In highly competitive markets, firms may 
believe that the savings in costs from not undertaking a merger 
are not as much as the costs to the firm of the loss associated with 
decay in competitive position, which may never be regained. 
Further, the psychological hype associated with mergers can 
                                                
143 Armstrong & Huck, supra note 11, at 15. 
144 Lu, supra note 61, at 19. 
145Gábor Péli & Hans Schenk, Organizational Decision-Maker Bias Supports Market 
Wave Formation: Evidence with Logical Formalization 3 (Antwerp Center for 
Evolutionary Demography Working Paper Series No. 1169-006, 2011).  
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increase the expectations of reaping high benefits in an 
unrealistic way from mergers while underestimating the 
difficulties associated with them. This belief may be reinforced 
by the view that reorganisation costs will be incurred only at the 
time of the merger whereas the benefits of the merger will last a 
longer time.146  Consequently, in these situations firms are likely 
to imitate another firm and merge even though a rational 
assessment will indicate that merging is unwise.147 
 
Scholars have also identified other types of biases in the decision-
making processes of firms that build on BTF but lack empirical 
evidence in support of it. For instance, Gigerenzer & Goldstein 
identified a new set of so-called ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics in 
decision-making. These heuristics are adaptively matched to the 
information structure and demands of decision makers’ 
environments.148 However, extensions to this research have not 
successfully established that these heuristics are used in decision-
making.149 Other theories describing heuristics in firm decision-
making include the theory of ‘naturalistic decision-making’.150 
5. Explaining Bounded Rationality Using 
Traditional Economic Theory 
 
A common criticism of behavioural theories is that many of its 
findings are already accounted for in neoclassical economics and 
that, therefore, the behavioural literature does not add anything to 
the existing discourse within economics. Rationality proponents 
also argue that as long as existing theoretical models are able to 
                                                
146Péli & Schenk, id. at 11. 
147Péli & Schenk, id. at 3 (the authors show that this result holds using logical 
formalization in a wider set of scenarios). 
148See G. Gigerenzer & D.G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models 
of Bounded Rationality, 103(4) PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 650 (1996). 
149 Gerard P. Hodgkinson & Mark P. Healey, Cognition in Organisations, 59 ANNUAL 
REV. PSYCHOL. 387 (2008). 
150See generally GARY KLEIN, JUDITH ORASANU & ROBERTA CALDERWOOD, DECISION 
MAKING IN ACTION: MODELS AND METHODS (Ablex, 1992). 
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accurately predict market outcomes, it is irrelevant that they are 
not able to explain individual firm behaviour. Moreover, 
neoclassical economists hold that the analytical basis of welfare 
economics provides an objective and sound mechanism for 
determining market outcomes. In their view, behavioural 
economics departs from this basis without providing an equally 
sound alternative.151 These concerns are addressed below. 
 
The rational choice model of a profit-maximizing firm can 
explain several behavioural findings, such as satisficing, 
imitation and the pursuit of power and prestige by career-driven 
managers. A well-known manifestation of bounded rationality is 
that economic agents do not optimize but seek only satisfactory 
outcomes. Tirole counters this reasoning by arguing that many 
actions that seem non-optimizing may actually be the outcomes 
of optimizing actions under certain constraints, given a well-
defined objective function.152 He points at the trade-off between 
the cost of time and effort needed to take complex decisions and 
the ex-post efficiency of these decisions.153 If the costs of time 
and effort are factored into the decision-making process, it may 
be rational for economic agents to satisfice. 
 
A second manifestation of bounded rationality that merits 
discussion is imitation. Under conditions of uncertainty, imitation 
may be perfectly rational. Alchian argues that uncertainty in real-
life situations prevents firms from ascertaining what the optimal 
actions in the pursuit of profits are. Hence, firms adopt forms of 
‘conscious adaptive behaviour’ as guides of action. One 
possibility is to imitate the behaviour of more successful firms 
and another course of action is following a ‘trial and error’ 
strategy. Firms may prefer to imitate for the following reasons: 
                                                
151See Werden et al., supra note 43, at 136. 
152See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 48 (7th ed., MIT Press, 
1994). 
153See TIROLE, id. at 48. 
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the absence of identifiable decision-making criteria, a changing 
environment with many factors to be considered in decisions, the 
uncertainty attaching to these factors and to outcomes, and the 
need to outperform competitors.154 
 
A third finding of the behavioural literature is that managers are 
motivated by factors that differ from the standard variables 
prevalent in neoclassical economic theory. These include 
prestige, power and ego. Mainstream economists refer to this as a 
principal-agent problem.155 Connected to the principal agent 
problem are issues of moral hazard arising from informational 
asymmetries and managerial discretion. These give incentives to 
managers who are primarily concerned with maximizing their 
own utility to act contrary to the interests of the firm. Managers 
are also concerned with their wealth and with the costs of the 
effort expended by them on behalf of the principal. Managers 
may be more concerned for their own careers rather than with the 
well being of the firm. Economists use both adverse selection and 
moral hazard to explain these principal-agent problems.156 
Contrary to behavioural scholarship, economists take the view 
that managers could be disciplined through reputation effects and 
incentives arising from the repeated nature of the interactions 
between managers and their employers and the observability of 
managerial actions in the long-term. Managers who do not 
perform well may not be trusted to do well in the future; as a 
result they may not be promoted and may also develop a bad 
reputation.157 However, this requires shareholders to monitor 
managers’ actions, which increases costs and is not always 
possible to achieve.158 
                                                
154See Alchian, supra note 33, at 218. 
155 Agency costs arise because a company is structured so as to separate ownership 
from control so managers (agents) do not have the same incentives as shareholders 
(principals) to maximise a company’s profits. 
156TIROLE, supra note 152, at 44. 
157See TIROLE, id. at 44. 
158See TIROLE, id. at 34. 
27B_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Firm Behaviour 

 
 
 
 
51 
 
The above discussion shows that rational choice theory can 
explain behavioural findings to some extent. By adjusting the 
definition of rationality, seemingly irrational behaviour can be 
incorporated into traditional economic theory. However, 
incorporating behavioural findings comes at a cost. Including 
these variables in the utility functions of managers may be able to 
better explain the real world but increasing the number of 
variables reduces the predictive power of the theory.159 Tirole 
states that this is a trade-off that has proved a big challenge for 
economic theory to overcome. Aside from the difficulties 
connected with the above trade-off, it must be acknowledged that 
behavioural theories provide added value for a proper 
understanding of firm behaviour. Neoclassical explanations are 
based on assumptions that may not fit reality and may fall short 
of explaining the range of observed organisational behaviour. In 
the words of Nobel Prize winning economist Tirole, “neoclassical 
theory leaves many questions unanswered and this raises some 
doubts about its ability to cope with certain complex 
organizational phenomena.”160 For instance, rational choice 
theories largely employ individual incentives to analyse 
organisational behaviour. However, behavioural approaches 
demonstrate that organisational decision-making is motivated by 
more than the incentives of individuals and thus, a framework 
that is centered around the study of individual incentives may fall 
short of fully explaining the behaviour of firms.161 Tirole also 
points to the different treatment of communication and 
knowledge within traditional organisational theory and 
                                                
159See TIROLE, id. at 49. 
160See TIROLE, id. at 48. 
161See Alexander Pepper & Julie Gore, Behavioral Agency Theory: New Foundations 
for Theorizing about Executive Compensation, 41(4) J. MGMT. 1045, 1048 (May, 2015) 
(developing a “behavioural agency theory” that assumes bounded rationality and 
arguing that rather than setting incentives to align the interests of principals with 
agents, agents perform better when they are intrinsically and extrinsically motivated, 
though and motivation is not connected to monetary rewards); see also TIROLE, id. at 
50. 
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behavioural approaches. Traditional economic theory considers 
information flow and knowledge within an organisation from the 
perspective of incentive effects.162 Behavioural approaches, on 
the other hand, consider knowledge within an organisation from 
the perspective of organisational culture and memory, a result of 
a shared view of thinking, communicating, perceiving and 
decision-making within an organisation.163 In such cases 
behavioural theories may fill the resulting explanatory gap in the 
understanding of firm behaviour in neoclassical economics. 
 
The limitations of neoclassical economics are illustrated in the 
solution to the principal-agent problem. As a solution to the 
principal-agent problem, rational choice theorists suggest that the 
principal should set appropriate incentives for its agent in order to 
align the agent’s interests with those of the principal.164 However, 
this has not proved to be entirely successful in reality.165 
Organizational theorists have found that it is difficult to measure 
each functional division’s and also each manager’s contribution 
to the firm.166 Consequently, the outcomes of managerial actions 
may not be easily observable within a firm and this makes it hard 
to monitor managers or to use reputation to discipline them. 
According to Mueller, the predictions of the principal-agent 
model are not reflected in empirical observations of corporations. 
In reality, managers have significant control over their 
employment contracts and are often able to set their own 
incentives.167 Some scholars have argued that manager 
compensation represents rent extraction rather than optimal 
                                                
162See TIROLE, id. at 49. 
163See TIROLE, id. at 49. 
164See e.g. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-
Management Incentives, 98 J. POLITICAL ECON. 225, 226 (1990). 
165See Jensen & Murphy, id. at 227 (conducting an empirical study and finding that 
contrary to agency theory, the performance of top executives is not entirely connected 
to payment incentives and does not represent optimal contracts and offering an 
alternative explanation about the role of political forces in contract formation.) 
166See TIROLE, supra note 152, at 45. 
167 Mueller, supra note 28, at 157-58. 
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contracting with much more favourable terms given to 
executives.168 One reason for this is that company boards, which 
set remuneration packages, often are not entirely independent and 
are influenced by the managers whose remuneration they 
determine.169 Further, empirical evidence suggests that the utility 
of stock options is also limited in aligning incentives as stock 
options can benefit corporate insiders to the detriment of 
employees and other corporate stakeholders.170 In sum, 
managerial performance is not well correlated to their incentives. 
As a result, agency costs are not able to explain the full range of 
observed managerial behaviour.  
6. Firms’ Bounded Rationality, Learning and the 
Competitive Process 
 
Even if managers in firms or certain processes within firms do 
exhibit bounded rationality, critics claim that, unlike with 
consumers, firms’ internal mechanisms and market discipline 
work to overcome these biases at the firm level. Behavioural 
scholars argue on the contrary that markets and firms may both 
facilitate and inhibit rational behaviour in different 
circumstances.171 Competitive discipline makes market behaviour 
more rational and yet these forces may not be uniformly 
                                                
168See LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1-10 (Harvard University Press, 
2006) (arguing that managerial incentives are not optimal or a result of arms-length 
transactions, are a product of managerial power though an important constraint on 
manager compensation is shareholder ‘outrage’ and that other behavioural factors also 
may have a role in setting manager compensation). 
169 Chris Giles, Curbs on Covetousness: Envy can make Capitalism more Efficient and 
Help to Restrain Executive Pay, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 5, 2002), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/FT.Curbs.on.Covetousness.pdf 
(“CEO contracts bear little relation to the optimal contracts assumed in economic 
theory.”). 
170Michel Aglietta & Antoine Rebérioux, Financialization and the Firm, in HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS & THEORY OF THE FIRM 308, 312 (Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft 
eds., Edward Elgar, 2012). 
171See Tor I, supra note 24, at 580. 
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efficacious in different markets and may not work with equal 
force for different kinds of firms.172 On the contrary, behavioural 
scholars argue that learning may be ineffective in the real world. 
Feedback is ambiguous and delayed or not always available.173 
Managers make selective use of information and cognitive biases; 
in particular overoptimism can distort the way in which 
information is processed. Also, the size of the company may have 
an impact on the efficacy of learning. This section evaluates these 
arguments in greater detail. 
6.1 Does learning remove bounded rationality in firms? 
 
Neoclassical economists believe that firms are disciplined by 
economic forces and benefit from feedback mechanisms due to 
repeated interactions in the market that individuals do not 
confront.174 These mechanisms make firms more rational.  
 
Much literature in management studies discusses why firms are 
not able to learn effectively. These reasons are primarily 
connected to biases that prevent learning including biases that 
cause people to focus too much on success and past performance, 
causing fixed mind-sets, the inability to think creatively and the 
fear of failure; biases to take actions too quickly and with 
insufficient time to reflect, biases towards conformity rather than 
doing things differently and depending too much on the view of 
experts.175 
 
Management studies have also highlighted limitations in the 
learning processes of firms. This indicates that learning in a 
market environment may be less efficacious than rational models 
predict. As explained by March, “experience is often ambiguous 
                                                
172See Tor I, id. at 580. 
173See Tor III, supra note 37, at 500. 
174Wright & Stone, supra note 17, at 865. 
175See Francesca Gino & Bradley Staats, Why Organizations Don’t Learn, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Nov., 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/11/why-organizations-dont-learn 
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and the inferences to be drawn from it are unclear, and the 
contribution of ‘experiential learning’ to long term improvements 
in organizations is difficult to establish.”176 There are well-
documented cases of business firms failing to copy the successful 
practices of other firms.177 Organisational theorists have 
documented and studied cases where firms have failed to adapt to 
their environments and to imitate successes of other firms. Firms 
are equally unable to learn from the failure of other firms. This 
may be because it is hard to isolate causes of failure and apply 
them to the particular situation of a firm. For instance, the 
company Research in Motion, which produces Blackberry 
phones, saw a steep decline in the sales of its phones because it 
was unable to adapt to the technical changes in the smart phone 
market.178 Arguably, Research in Motion could have learnt from 
the similar mistakes of many other firms such as Kodak, who was 
also effected by its inability to adapt to technical change. Yet, the 
lessons from Kodak’s mistakes are difficult to extrapolate to the 
particularities of another company, which makes it harder to learn 
from them. Thus, learning processes may be imperfect because 
feedback is ambiguous and learning takes time. 
 
The literature on learning at the firm level describes various types 
of learning. March identified two modes of learning, namely: 
low-intellect learning, which is built on the replication of success 
and high-intellect learning, which is based on understanding the 
causal structure of the events of experience and deriving actions 
from that understanding.179 This is similar to the idea of reactive 
learning and experimental learning.180 Reactive learning is based 
on the rewards and punishments that drive actions. In many 
instances this kind of learning takes place when firms are not 
performing well and this kind of learning dissipates when firms 
                                                
176JAMES G. MARCH, THE AMBIGUITIES OF EXPERIENCE 15 (2010).  
177See Blackberry: Only Thorns, ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2013).  
178See id. 
179MARCH, supra note 176. 
180 Miller & Jer-Chen, supra note 126, at 2. 
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are doing well. Experimental learning on the other hand is not 
driven by performance problems or crises but is driven by 
provocative information, market diversity and the desire to seize 
opportunities.181 This learning is more proactive than one driven 
by market pressures, and is driven more by motivations that 
inspire than motivations that threaten. In the context of 
competitive inertia it has been found that while tactical 
adjustments are made because of poor performance, strategic 
actions are not very influenced by firm performance (perhaps 
because managerial egos are at stake) and are taken more often in 
a growing and positive market.182 
 
Under conditions of uncertainty, considering that experiences are 
pooled, larger organisations that have the capacity to 
simultaneously pursue a variety of solutions to a problem should 
theoretically learn more efficaciously.183 However, Posen et al. 
find that increasing organisational size may make learning less 
efficacious because of the unintended consequences of having too 
much of information within the organisation about possible 
alternatives.184 Larger organisations will search for alternatives 
already present within their structures whereas smaller 
organisations will have fewer alternatives within their structures 
and thus are likely to conduct a greater search for external 
options.185 Their empirical study shows that on average larger 
organisations perform better from learning than smaller 
organisations but they also have fewer chances of finding the best 
alternatives from learning. 
 
                                                
181 Armstrong & Huck, supra note 11, at 18. 
182Armstrong & Huck, id. at 17. 
183 Hart E. Posen, Dirk Martignoni & Daniel A. Levinthal, E Pluribus Unum: 
Organizational Size and the Efficacy of Learning 2 (DRUID Working Paper No. 13-09, 
Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics 2013), 
http://www3.druid.dk/wp/20130009.pdf. 
184Posen et al., id. at 23. 
185 Posen et al., id. at 23. 
30B_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Firm Behaviour 

 
 
 
 
57 
Managers’ learning may be curtailed because they are selective 
processors of information.186 Effective perceptual filtering 
amplifies relevant information and attenuates irrelevant 
information, so that the relevant information comes into the 
perceptual foreground and the irrelevant information recedes into 
the background.187 The filtered information is less accurate but, if 
the filtering is effective, more understandable.188 People filter 
information quite instinctively as it helps to process complex 
situations though it might make learning less accurate. 
Experiments found that managers’ processing of information is 
influenced to some extent by their functional experience.189 This 
may form a reference point on which managers anchor their 
learning and decision-making. People are particularly confident 
in areas where they have some expertise. Managers in firms 
operate from their own field of expertise and construct mental 
models of information presented to them and give added weight 
to data that they are more familiar with. Thus, data can be filtered 
unknowingly by the background and experience of managers.190 
This impacts managers’ ability to learn from the information 
presented to them. 
 
Further, managerial learning may be affected by hindsight bias.191 
This might affect managers’ ability to evaluate past experiences, 
which in turn can have an impact on learning. In addition, 
                                                
186 Janice M. Beyer, Prithviraj Chattopadhyay, Elizabeth George, William H. Glick & 
Dulce Pugliese, The Selective Perception of Managers Revisited, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
716, 734 (1997). 
187 William H. Starbuck & Francis J. Milliken, Executives Perceptual Filters: What 
They Notice and How They Make Sense, in THE EXECUTIVE EFFECT: CONCEPTS AND 
METHODS FOR STUDYING TOP MANAGERS 35 (Donald C. Hambrick ed., JAI Press 1998), 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~wstarbuc/Hambrick.htm. 
188Starbuck & Milliken, id. 
189 Beyer et al., supra note 186, at 734. 
190 Anthony Howard, The Thinking Organisation, 31 J. MGT. DEV. 620 (2012). 
191 Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly, Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some 
Problems in Learning from Experience, 31(3) ACADEMY MGT. J., 628 (1988) (through 
an experiment conducted on advanced management students the authors found that 
these students were subject to hindsight bias).  
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learning is hampered because executives lack clear feedback 
about the effectiveness of their perceptions and the relevance of 
information as there are long lags between executives’ actions 
and the visible outcomes of those actions, and these outcomes 
have multiple causes.192 Learning is difficult in the real world 
because feedback is ambiguous and delayed or not always 
available.193Moreover, constant changes in their environments 
mean that executives’ knowledge grows rapidly obsolete and that 
they do not benefit as much from practice.194 
 
Hmieleski and Baron claim that there is a connection between 
managerial learning and over optimism.195 Entrepreneurs learn 
very differently from their experiences and the authors suggest 
that this may be due to difference in the optimism levels of 
entrepreneurs. People with positive expectations reinterpret the 
outcomes they receive positively, even when those outcomes may 
reasonably be considered to be disappointing.196 In a correlational 
analysis of the determinants of entrepreneurs’ satisfaction with 
their business ventures after three years of business ownership, it 
was found that their satisfaction levels were positively related to 
their initial expectations even after controlling for the 
performance of the business. Optimistic entrepreneurs are more 
likely to focus on positive information that confirms their 
previously formed beliefs. This is also known as the confirmation 
bias, which is the tendency of individuals to process information 
in a way that is consistent with their preconceived notions. 
Further, studies show that past failures at prediction are often not 
recognised and are explained away so that they are unlikely to 
influence relevant self-evaluations or lead to improvements in 
                                                
192 Starbuck & Milliken, supra note 187.  
193See Tor III, supra note 37, at 500. 
194 Starbuck & Milliken, supra note 187. 
195See Keith M. Hmieleski & Robert A. Baron, Entrepreneurs’ Optimism and New 
Venture Performance: A Social Cognitive Perspective, 52(3) ACAD. MGT. J. 473 (2009). 
196See Armor & Taylor, supra note 109, at 345. 
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future predictions.197 Managers ignore there past failures by 
shifting the standard of comparison or by re-evaluating the 
standard they had originally set for themselves. Other research 
has suggested that cognition plays an important role in 
transforming entrepreneurial experience into knowledge that is 
useful for their future activities.198 Thus, highly optimistic 
entrepreneurs may learn less from past experience than their 
moderately optimistic counterparts.199 
 
The hypothesis that learning processes eliminate boundedly 
rational behaviour of firms has been examined in both theoretical 
and empirical research. In a theoretical model where firms follow 
naïve adaptive learning processes to adjust prices and 
reinforcement learning to adjust costing methods, Al-Najjar et al. 
show that in some markets irrational pricing is eradicated and in 
others there is a departure from equilibrium predictions.200 In 
general, experience does not necessarily remove behavioural 
biases. Studies showed that professionals who are experienced in 
making certain decisions also exhibit behavioural biases in 
making those decisions. For instance, in an experiment conducted 
on professional traders and students in which subjects were asked 
to take trading decisions, the subjects who were professional 
traders exhibited behaviour consistent with myopic loss aversion 
to a greater extent than student participants.201 Another 
experiment conducted on financial market analysts, who make 
investment decisions routinely, found that they exhibited patterns 
of overreaction consistent with behavioural biases.202 Further, 
                                                
197Armor & Taylor, id. at 345. 
198 Andrew C. Corbett, Learning Asymmetries and the Discovery of Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities, 22 J. BUS. VENTURING 97 (2007). 
199 Hmieleski & Baron, supra note 195, at 483. 
200See Al-Najjar et al., supra note 129. 
201Michael S. Haigh & John A. List, Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss 
Aversion? An Experimental Analysis, 60 J. FIN. 523 (2005). 
202 Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Do Analysts Overreact?, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 678, 685 (Thomas 
Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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due to overconfidence, mutual fund managers were found to trade 
more when their past trades had been more successful.203 This 
indicates that learning in a market environment may be less 
efficacious than rational models predict.  
 
From the perspective of competition law, Tor is of the view that 
to argue that learning removes biases is to make a normative 
claim that profit maximizing behaviour leads to the best 
outcomes, when in some cases it may be more profitable for 
firms to deviate from such behaviour and it is not clear to what 
extent the neoclassical tradition seeks to make normative claims 
about rationality.204 
 
6.2 Does competition eliminate boundedly rational firms 
from the market? 
 
Another popular argument against bounded rationality in firms is 
that firms exhibiting behavioural biases are not able to effectively 
compete in markets with their more rational counterparts and are 
thus, naturally selected out through evolutionary processes. 
Rational agents, it is argued, drive irrational ones from the market 
by making higher profits, so with time the impact of rational 
agents on aggregate market outcomes increases and markets 
become more rational.  
 
These arguments have been applied by economists in the 
construction of evolutionary models in markets where firms are 
not profit maximizers and there is natural selection. In these cases 
economists have shown that in the long run the market converges 
to a monopolistic equilibrium.205 The argument, as put forth by 
                                                
203See Alexander Puetz & Stefan Ruenzi, Overconfidence Among Professional 
Investors: Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers, 38 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCTG. 684 (2011). 
204See Tor III, supra note 37, at  500. 
205See Guo Ying Luo, Natural Selection, Irrationality and Monopolistic Competition, 
53(5) EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 512 (Jul., 2009). 
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Enke in 1951, is that natural selection will cause only those 
actively competing firms in a market to survive which have 
optimised their position and earned the profits necessary for 
survival. In other words natural selection will select out firms that 
act ‘as if’ they are profit maximizers (even though they are 
boundedly rational) for their long run survival. However, later 
studies of evolutionary models testing whether natural selection 
favours profit maximizing firms have shown that not all 
surviving firms are profit maximizing;206 that not all profit 
maximizing firms will survive in the long-run (only those facing 
most favourable market conditions and possessing the most 
efficient technology survive)207 and that equilibrium models 
based on the profit maximizing hypothesis are not able to 
effectively describe the long-run behaviour of evolutionary 
market models.208 
 
Evolutionary economists, like organisational theorists and other 
scholars outside economics, also predominantly view the firm as 
boundedly rational.209 Evolution involves three processes: 
variation, retention and selection.210 Nelson and Winter are of the 
view that competitive market forces between organisations 
induce ‘selection’ in the evolutionary sense.211 However, it is not 
necessary that evolution will lead to optimal results. For instance, 
it is not necessary that the best possible variant is selected 
because of: cognitive and resource limitations in searching for 
better variations, optimal variants may change with time and 
changes in the environment, and sub-optimal variants may be 
                                                
206See Prajit K. Dutta & Roy Radner, Profit Maximization and the Market Selection 
Hypothesis, 66(4) REV. ECON. STUD.769 (1999). 
207See Luo, supra note 205. 
208See Larry Blume & David Easley, If You're So Smart, Why Aren't You Rich? Belief 
Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets, 74(4) ECONOMETRICA 929 (Jul., 2006). 
209See Nelson & Winter, supra note 74, at 42. 
210 David Barron, Evolutionary Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STRATEGY: A 
STRATEGY OVERVIEW & COMPETITIVE OVERVIEW 12 (Andrew Campbell & David O. 
Faulkner eds., Oxford University Press, 2006).  
211See Barron, id. at 11. 
33A_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Competition Law and Bounded Rationality 

 
 
 
 
62 
locked in because of switching costs.212 It can also be argued that 
boundedly rational firms may in some circumstances earn greater 
profits, perform better and be more aggressive competitors than 
their rational counterparts. Thus, it is not necessary that they will 
get ‘selected out’ when competing with rational firms. 
Consequently, it is possible to argue that competition may not 
always succeed in removing boundedly rational firms from the 
market. 
 
Evolutionary economists argue that firms with better 
organisational routines make more profit in the competitive 
market place and increase their market share.213 Firms are a 
bundle of routines, which constitute their tacit knowledge or 
memory. Firms carry out their core operations through these 
routines. Managers are satisfied with firm performance that meets 
some target level of performance even if it is not the best that a 
firm could achieve. Here Nelson and Winter further Simon’s idea 
of satisficing behaviour. Only if firm performance falls below 
target levels do managers wanting to improve firm performance 
in the future trigger a search for new routines and only then are 
new routines implemented.214 The outcome of the adoption of 
any routine is uncertain and firms may develop higher-level 
routines to guide the search for routines based on past experience. 
Examples of such routines are not repeating past mistakes and 
copying other successful firms.215 It is widely accepted that in 
reality the implications of implementing innovations go beyond 
what is already known and thus managerial decision-making 
cannot be fully rational.216 
                                                
212See Barron, id. at 12. 
213See Nelson & Winter, supra note 74. 
214See Barron, supra note 210, at 11. 
215See Barron, id. at 11. 
216Barron, id. at 11. 
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7. The Relevance of Firm Bounded Rationality to 
Competition Law  
 
The above discussion has shown various linkages between 
management studies and bounded rationality in firms. 
Management studies provide an important contribution to the 
construction of a behavioural theory of the firm and may help in 
understanding aspects of firm behaviour that neoclassical 
economics cannot provide. This section discusses the relevance 
of these insights to competition policy. 
 
At the outset it can be stated that the legal interpretation of 
competition rules may invite arguments based on real-world 
business behaviour, as they are revealed by management studies. 
Examples include concepts such as ‘objective (business) 
justification’, ‘intent’217 and ‘commercial usage’218. So far, these 
openings in competition law have not been sufficiently exploited 
to bring arguments from business studies, and in particular, 
business strategy into the analysis of competition law problems. 
Nevertheless, competition authorities have taken some effort to 
try to incorporate principles of business strategy into competition 
law.219 If this interest is taken further, it may prove to be useful 
because considering a competition problem from the lens of a 
different discipline may provide a more holistic picture of its 
causes and consequences. 
 
Some competition law scholars have argued that competition law 
can improve its accuracy by taking into account the realities of 
                                                
217See Waller, supra note 3, at 283. 
218Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), § 102(d), 2008 O.J. C 115/47. 
219See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING 
INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 161 (The Free Press, 1980); see also Leary, supra note 
38, at 17 (explaining the difficulty of importing this kind of learning into manageable 
legal rules). 
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business operations.220 Thomas Leary, Commissioner of the FTC, 
has encouraged antitrust enforcers to pay more attention to the 
thinking of business persons.221 In the words of Leary, “we need 
to better appreciate what the competitive landscape looks like to 
the people who do battle on it.”222 This may require a re-
evaluation of the existing understanding of competitive 
behaviour.223 For instance, knowledge of the manner in which 
competition actually takes place in the industry (in contrast to the 
manner in which it is theorized) provides a more realistic account 
of which geographical and product segments to protect and which 
are less vulnerable to the exercise of market power.224 
 
According to Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, business strategy can 
contribute to competition law by predicting market behaviour and 
outcomes in areas where economics has difficulty in providing 
accurate assessments, such as assessing the impact of a merger on 
product quality or innovation.225 Further, one aspect of business 
strategy that competition law may benefit from incorporating is 
the separate assessment of short-term and long-term 
consequences of firm conduct. Unlike lawyers, business 
strategists do not always fit firm’s actions into neat categories so 
that a particular anticompetitive strategy may have efficient 
market outcomes in the short-term and be anticompetitive in the 
long-term.226 
 
Using behavioural insights in competition law implies a 
normative use of this literature. Jumping from explaining 
behaviour of firms to regulating such conduct is not obvious. 
                                                
220See e.g. Albert A. Foer, The Third Leg of the Antitrust Stool: What the Business 
Schools Have to Offer to Antitrust, 47 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 21 (2003). 
221See Leary, supra note 38, at 5. 
222Leary, id. at 12. 
223See Leary, id. at 7. 
224See Leary, id. at 12. 
225See Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, supra note 1, at 1465. 
226See Leary, supra note 38, at 5. 
34B_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Firm Behaviour 

 
 
 
 
65 
There are two main reasons why insights from behavioural 
theories do not lend themselves easily to normative conclusions. 
First, firms active in the market are heterogeneous and are subject 
to bounded rationality in different degrees; this makes it difficult 
to generalize welfare outcomes. Second, behavioural biases may 
work in opposing directions and thus make any prediction about 
market outcomes illusory. Economists argue that any individual 
firm irrationality, even if it exists, is random and will cancel each 
other out at the aggregate level.227 Behavioural literature disputes 
the claim that deviations from rationality are random and 
contends that they are systematic.228 For instance, a study by Fehr 
and Tyran shows that in certain circumstances, such as with 
strategic complementarity, individual irrationality is magnified at 
the aggregate level rather than cancelled out.229 If bounded 
rationality occurs in firms systematically, it may have an effect 
on aggregate outcomes in the market.230 Nevertheless, even if 
market outcomes are affected by bounded rationality, it is 
necessary to understand the direction and manner of this change. 
 
It may be extremely challenging to determine with any clarity the 
market effects arising from bounded rationality. The 
heterogeneity of firms implies that market outcomes must be 
predicted from the interaction of boundedly rational firms with 
other rational and boundedly rational firms, as well as other 
rational and boundedly rational consumers.231 Also, if decision-
makers are vulnerable to different biases that work in opposite 
directions, it may not always be possible to recognize biases ex 
                                                
227See e.g. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998). 
228See Ernst Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, Individual Irrationality and Aggregate 
Outcomes, 19(4) J. ECON.PERSPECTIVES 43 (2005). 
229See Fehr & Tyran, id. 
230 This view has been criticized because it is argued that the experiments that form the 
basis of this claim do not show that such behaviour is systematic. 
231See Maurice E. Stucke, The Implications of Behavioral Antitrust (University of 
Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 192, 2012), available at 
http://.com/abstract=2109713; see also Van den Bergh, supra note 41. 
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ante and to predict in which direction the biases may affect 
decisions.232 These problems become even more complex when 
the interactions of multiple heterogeneous players in the market 
are to be determined. In short, different policy implications and 
welfare effects may arise by considering and altering the relative 
rationality of firms and consumers, and coming to any clear 
conclusions is extremely challenging.233 Given these limitations, 
it is clear that management studies in themselves will not allow 
final answers regarding the legality of certain business practices. 
Their relevance will be more modest, but not unimportant. The 
potential application of behavioural insights and its normative 
significance to competition law are discussed below with the help 
of two examples. 
7.1 Merger Analysis 
 
The competitive analysis of mergers may profit from business 
studies in three ways: to identify cognitive biases that may have 
an impact on merger decisions, to analyse the likely performance 
of mergers inspired by innovation and to assess the size of the 
productive efficiencies generated by a merger. Each of these 
contributions is further discussed below. 
 
The desire to take action and the belief that such action will be 
successful may drive decisions to merge. Managers believe that 
they are hired to take action.234 Those who stay idle may be 
perceived more negatively than those who have ‘at least tried to 
do something’.235 Further, recent studies suggest that the 
                                                
232See Van den Bergh, id. 
233See Stucke, supra note 37, at 526 (citing MILTON FREIDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 14-16 (University of Chicago Press, 1953)). 
234Péli & Schenk, supra note 145, at 6. 
235Péli & Schenk, id. 
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overconfidence bias is connected to excessive merger activity.236 
Overconfidence is more likely to occur in decisions whose 
outcomes are not immediately available. Since the success of a 
merger is not known immediately, decisions to merge are more 
likely to suffer from overconfidence. Managerial overconfidence 
may lead to more optimistic assessments of potential synergies 
between merging firms and the profitability of the target 
company or underestimate problems such as disruptions resulting 
from the merger.237 With some exceptions, a large number of 
studies found that the post-merger performance of acquired firms 
is systematically lower than expected. One study found that 
shareholders of acquiring firms experience an approximate 
wealth loss of 10 per cent over a period of five years after the 
merger.238 The under-performance of firms post-merger may be 
due to mean-reversion as stocks of acquiring firms generally 
outperform the market prior to the merger.239 However, the result 
that mergers systematically perform worse than expected was 
found to be robust to differences in time periods and to different 
types of merging firms. This result was obtained after adjusting 
for firm size and ‘beta risk’.240 In sum, overconfident, self-
serving CEOs may push for mergers more frequently and to that 
extent any claims of efficiencies or benefits from mergers need a 
very careful evaluation.241 
 
Nevertheless, it cannot be conclusively established that 
overconfidence will result in more mergers. Overconfidence in 
managers may have two opposing effects on merger decisions. 
                                                
236See e.g., Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO 
Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 60(6) J. FINANCIAL ECON. 20 (2008); See 
also Riding a Wave, ECONOMIST (April 6, 2006). 
237 Armstrong & Huck, supra note 11, at 33. 
238See Anup Agrawal, Jeffrey F. Jaffe & Gershon N. Mandelker, The Post-Merger 
Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly, 68(4) J. FIN. 1605, 
1606 (1992). 
239See Agrawal et al., id. at 1611. 
240Agrawal et al., id. at 1606. 
241See Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1459, 1532 (2005).  
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Overconfident managers may overestimate their ability to create 
value and thus, the returns they can generate in their own 
company as well as from a merger.242 Managers’ overconfidence 
with respect to the returns they can generate from their own 
company increases financing costs, as managers believe that 
markets undervalue their companies.243 On the other hand, 
managers’ overconfidence with respect to their ability to generate 
value from mergers creates excessive willingness to acquire.244 
These forces work in opposite directions as overconfident 
managers may forego value-creating mergers, which in their view 
are too costly to finance.245 Thus, the net effect of overconfidence 
on merger frequency is ambiguous when external financing is 
required to finance the merger.  
 
Another interesting insight from business strategy is the link 
between innovation-inspired mergers and organizational 
efficiency. Mergers involving even small innovations can 
undermine the value of existing organizational competences, 
because of entrenched linkages among the components of a 
product within a firm. Further, tacit knowledge is an important 
part of replicating innovations that is often left out of economic 
theory and may be responsible for the failure of merging firms to 
manage innovation capabilities.246 This understanding of the 
impact of technological change on organizational structure may 
enable a better understanding of the market performance of 
mergers that are supposed to enhance innovation capabilities. 
7.2  Barriers to Entry  
 
Entry barriers are relevant for the analysis of different types of 
anticompetitive conduct such as abuses of dominance. 
                                                
242Malmendier& Tate, supra note 236. 
243See Malmendier& Tate, id. 
244See Malmendier& Tate, id. 
245See Malmendier& Tate, id. 
246See Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, supra note 1, at 1468. 
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Competition law considers that dominant firms cannot exercise 
market power if barriers to entry in a market are low. However, 
based on empirical studies, behavioural findings suggest that 
incumbents can exercise market dominance even in markets with 
low entry barriers.247 Economic commentators give a larger role 
to the analysis of entry barriers than is common in today’s 
antitrust practice. Also on this point management studies provide 
useful information. Various behavioural factors may have an 
impact on entry decisions and show that entry may be more or 
less likely than predicted under traditional models. These biases 
are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
Due to loss aversion, firms may prefer a sure gain even if it is 
lower than an uncertain higher gain. If the gains from entry are 
uncertain, firms may be discouraged from entering even when 
traditional barriers to entry are low. In addition, firms may 
irrationally persist with unprofitable entry because they 
myopically focus on sunk costs.248 This may be due to anchoring 
effects, which makes managers believe that spending a little more 
money on entry is worthwhile given the large amount of money 
already spent on it.249 This bias results in the ‘non-rational 
escalation of commitment’ or ‘throwing good money after bad’ to 
reaffirm the wisdom of the initial decision.250 
 
                                                
247See Nicolas Petit & Norman Neyrinck, Behavioral Economics and Abuse of 
Dominance: A Fresh Look at the Article 102 TFEU Case Law, in ÖSTERREICHISCHE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KARTELLRECHT 203 (No. 6, Dec., 2010), 
https://antitrustlair.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/n-petit-n-neyrinck-behavioral-
economics-and-abuse-of-dominance-a-fresh-look-at-the-article-102-tfue-case-law.pdf. 
248See Stephen Martin, Sunk Cost and Entry, 20(4) REV. IND. ORG. 291 (2002). 
249 Charles Roxburgh, Hidden Flaws in Strategy: Can Insights From Behavioral 
Economics Explain Why Good Executive Back Bad Strategies, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 
(May, 2003), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/hidden_flaws_in_strategy. 
250MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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On the one hand, next to traditional entry barriers (such as 
economies of scale, product differentiation, advertising251) 
cognitive biases may inhibit entry. On the other hand, 
behavioural research suggests that firms with overoptimistic and 
overconfident managers may enter markets with high entry 
barriers.252 This is because overconfident entrants exhibit relative 
insensitivity to market predictors of success.253 Further, start-up 
entrants may enter markets more optimistically and not perform 
as well as those who enter by diversification.254 Entry by 
overconfident firms may occur in spite of the fact that it is 
unprofitable. Even if such entry is not successful, it may 
discipline incumbent firms’ exercise of market power.255 In sum, 
behavioural factors may influence entry decisions in two opposite 
directions. If they are accounted for in the entry analysis, the 
result may point towards either limited entry or excessive entry. 
The relevant factor for competition law to consider is not entry 
per se but successful market penetration and likelihood of 
survival in the long run.256 
 
Insights from business studies further add to a proper 
understanding of entry conditions. If organizational factors are 
also considered, entry might turn out to be more difficult for 
larger firms due to bureaucratic gridlock.257 Business studies 
further point at the potential effects of over optimism on the 
ultimate performance of the firm. A study by Hmieleski and 
Baron showed that entrepreneurs’ dispositional optimism had a 
negative effect on firm performance when entering new 
                                                
251See Michael A. Spence, Notes on Advertising, Economies of Scale and Entry 
Barriers, 95 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 493 (1980). 
252See Tor III, supra note 37, at 486. 
253Tor III, id. at 486. 
254Tor III, id. at 486. 
255PETIT & NEYRINCK, supra note 247. 
256 Reza Dibadj, supra note 241, at 1532. 
257See PETIT & NEYRINCK, supra note 247. 
37B_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Firm Behaviour 

 
 
 
 
71 
markets.258 This effect arose because more optimistic individuals 
have more unrealistic expectations and discount negative 
information to a greater extent, by mentally reconstructing 
negative experiences to avoid contradictions.259 These factors can 
interfere with the decision-making and judgment of entrepreneurs 
and can combine to affect the performance of firms entering new 
markets. By contrast moderately optimistic persons are more 
sensitive to negative information, less likely to gloss over 
discrepancies, less easily persuaded by positive information and 
have more realistic expectations when engaging in high-risk 
situations.260 Entrepreneurs starting new ventures are said to be 
disproportionately overly optimistic compared to the general 
population, as suggested by the fact that they decide to start a 
venture despite the various degrees of obstacles facing them.261 
Though the study discussed above found a negative relationship 
between entrepreneurs’ optimism and the performance of new 
ventures, the authors claim that this relationship is not uniformly 
negative. Performance of new ventures may improve initially 
with increases in optimism levels. However, after a certain 
threshold of optimism has been reached, performance may 
decrease with increasing optimism of entrepreneurs. The authors 
believe that a reason for the reversal may be that a very high level 
of entrepreneurial optimism has an impact on judgment and 
decision-making. Thus, moderately optimistic entrepreneurs who 
are highly experienced are likely to perform better in dynamic 
business environments when starting a new venture. 
 
Further, vengeance may make entry unlikely even when barriers 
to entry are low. Firms can be vengeful by willingly incurring 
costs to punish others or to teach them a lesson. Firms may act 
                                                
258See Hmieleski & Baron, supra note 195, at 481 (the method of the study involved 
taking a sample of 1000 new enterprises in the US and sending them survey forms – 
207 of the forms were returned). 
259See Hmieleski & Baron, id. at 475. 
260See Hmieleski & Baron, id. at 475 (citing various studies). 
261See Hmieleski & Baron, id. at 473. 
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more aggressively in these situations. For instance, firms can 
engage in predatory pricing just to establish or maintain a 
reputation for aggression and fighting entry, even if it is more 
costly to fight entry than to allow it.262 Thus, firms engaging in 
predatory pricing may be willing to incur extra costs to fight 
competition.263 On the other hand, the threat of punishment from 
vengeance may cause fear in the mind of managers and prevent 
entry into markets or even defections from cartels.264 The threat 
of punishment in case of defection may make cartels more stable 
than predicted under traditional economic theory. This suggests 
that due to vengeance predatory pricing and cartels may occur 
more frequently than currently predicted in competition law.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter is inspired by the conception of the firm as 
boundedly rational in the literature on BTF. It draws on BTF and 
other empirical and experimental evidence to question the 
assumption in competition law that firms are rational, profit-
maximizing entities. More particularly, the chapter explores the 
contribution of management or business studies to BTF and 
introduces some potential implications for competition law. The 
implications for competition law are examined in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters. This chapter has documented how 
departures from rationality in firms can arise from the 
behavioural biases of managers or from flaws in the internals 
processes of firms. Further, biases of managers may perpetuate at 
the firm level and may affect the competitive conduct of firms in 
the market. Firms may not be able to effectively respond to 
environmental changes due to strategic persistence, 
                                                
262See David Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. 
ECON. THEORY, 253 (1982). 
263Dibadj, supra note 241, at 1532.  
264Dibadj, id., at 1532. 
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organizational structure, frames of reference, organizational 
routines, institutional pressures and organizational ideology. 
 
Behavioural theories and business studies thus help to provide a 
better and richer understanding of firm behaviour that is closer to 
reality than the traditional economic conception of the firm in 
competition law. Rational choice theory is constrained in its 
ability to provide a suitable framework for incorporating the 
different aspects of bounded rationality. Even though certain 
aspects of bounded rationality of firms can be included in 
neoclassical economic models, the insights from the inter-
disciplinary nature of behavioural scholarship are too rich to 
neatly mold into economic theory. Moreover, this chapter shows 
that mitigating factors such as learning and selection through 
competitive pressures may not operate in the manner theorized by 
traditional scholars and succeed in making firms more rational. 
The evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that learning is a 
complex process and is not effective in removing all behavioural 
biases. Also evolutionary processes may not necessarily eliminate 
irrational firms from the market.  
 
Nevertheless, behavioural literature is unable to provide a means 
of measuring and predicting the direction of aggregate market 
outcomes in cases of bounded rationality. If competition rules 
must take account of the effect of the potential biases of firms 
and consumers interacting with each other in a market, it will be 
extremely challenging to determine the market effects arising 
from bounded rationality with any clarity. Further, behavioural 
and business studies may suffer from indeterminacy when results 
from the application of biases point in opposing directions. When 
market outcomes cannot be predicted with certainty, the 
normative relevance of behavioural and business studies to the 
application of competition rules will be limited. This has created 
a gap between behavioural theories and competition law that 
remains unresolved. While behavioural insights may provide 
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insufficient guidance under the welfare-based framework of 
competition law, their contribution can still be important under an 
alternative normative conception of competition law. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Bounded Rationality of Firms and the 
Normative Foundations of Competition Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the normative framework within which 
behavioural theories can seek to make a contribution to 
competition law. The discussion about the goals of competition 
law is so extensive that it can easily constitute the subject matter 
of many Ph.D. theses in itself. This chapter can thus barely do 
justice to the vast normative debates within competition law. The 
modest objective of this chapter is to briefly highlight three 
prominently discussed goals of US and EU competition law, viz. 
consumer welfare, total welfare and promoting economic 
freedom or the competitive process. This chapter then discusses 
how behavioural insights could contribute to each of these goals. 
The premise of this approach is that behavioural insights will be 
more amenable to a particular normative framework while it may 
be more difficult to find a place for behavioural insights in other 
normative frameworks. 
 
Interestingly, despite the immense literature on this subject, there 
is still an absence of consensus on what should constitute a 
normatively appropriate framework for competition law. There is 
more agreement in the US compared to other jurisdictions where 
an efficiency-based view is the generally accepted normative 
standard. However, in addition to efficiency, various political and 
socio-economic objectives also find a place in competition law 
such as generating employment, ensuring a level playing field, 
economic development, increasing product variety and 
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innovation. These goals play a more prominent role in 
jurisdictions other than the US. One reason for the absence of 
consensus about the goals of competition law is that some 
scholars find the efficiency-based view normatively limiting and 
others find that a broader set of objectives are harder for courts 
and competition authorities to administer. A common point of 
debate is choosing between static and dynamic views of 
competition. Price theory employs a static view of competition, 
which preferences price-effects over innovation and other 
benefits of competition. However, proponents of dynamic 
competition argue that in the long-term consumers are more 
benefited by innovation than by lower prices. An approach that 
can integrate price and non-price effects of competition may be 
normatively preferable but is yet to be developed. 
 
This chapter examines some of these normative issues in 
competition law and how insights from behavioural and business 
studies can contribute to these normative debates. It also stresses 
on the importance of goals in shaping competition law by 
describing how the different views of competition in the US and 
EU are a result of the differing normative foundations of 
competition law in both jurisdictions. The rest of this chapter is 
organised as follows: section 2 describes the different economic, 
social and political goals of competition law and the historical 
evolution of these goals in the US and EU. Section 3 discusses 
consumer welfare as the most prominent goal of competition law. 
It highlights the two main problems with consumer welfare i.e., 
ambiguity in the meaning of the term consumer welfare, and its 
narrowly static approach, which does not take into account 
dynamic efficiencies. Section 4 briefly examines the strengths 
and shortcomings of the total welfare standard. Section 5 
discusses the goal of protecting economic freedom, its historical 
roots and applications in competition law. This goal is a product 
of the Ordoliberal school of thought, which was prominent in 
Germany. Section 6 argues that behavioural insights support 
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Ordoliberal goals. Behavioural insights can be more easily 
incorporated into Ordoliberal goals rather than welfare-based 
goals. Section 7 provides a short description of current thought 
on the normative suitability of the different competition goals 
using normative individualism as a tool of analysis. Section 8 
illustrates the importance of normative criteria to the outcome of 
competition decisions through the recent case charging Google of 
abuse of dominance in its comparison shopping services. This 
discussion also underscores the different normative traditions in 
US and EU competition law, a fact that is variously highlighted 
throughout this chapter. Section 9 concludes the discussion. 
 
2. The Differing Goals of Competition Law 
 
The question of the goals of competition law has generated much 
debate among competition law scholars. The International 
Competition Network (ICN), an international organisation 
comprised of national competition law authorities from 
jurisdictions across the world, has found through recently 
conducted surveys that the objectives of competition law vary 
widely across jurisdictions.265 The goals listed by members of the 
ICN include: improving consumer welfare, increasing efficiency, 
ensuring an effective competitive process, creating a level 
playing field, preserving economic freedom, fostering consumer 
choice, achieving market integration, ensuring fairness etc.266 
 
                                                
265For a detailed discussion of the report of the ICN see, Maurice E. Stucke, 
Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B. C. L. REV. 551, 567 (2012) [Hereinafter Stucke 
I]. 
266INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNILATERAL 
CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND 
STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 6-21 (2007), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf 
[hereinafter ICN Survey]. 
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The understanding of what should be considered the proper 
objectives of competition law has also changed with time as legal 
developments in the US have paved the way for the 
understanding of antitrust goals globally. Much disagreement and 
debate about the content and scope of competition goals has 
arisen due to the ambiguous wording of the Sherman Act, and 
other US antitrust statutes.267 Bork famously developed the 
prevailing efficiency-based goal of competition law by arguing 
that the Sherman Act was enacted in order to protect consumer 
welfare through maximizing allocative efficiency.268 While 
Bork’s view is adopted by a majority of the antitrust community 
in the US, some dissenting voices persist. For instance, 
Hovenkamp points out that the Sherman Act could not have been 
enacted with the objective of preserving economic efficiency 
because concepts of efficiency and price theory on which it is 
based evolved much after the enactment of the Sherman Act.269 
Another interpretation of the Sherman Act is that it was enacted 
to achieve justice and fairness in business behaviour.270 Public 
choice theorists consider the Sherman Act a special interest 
legislation enacted in order to protect small businesses.271 Yet 
another view is that the objective of the Sherman Act was to stop 
wealth transfers from consumers to monopolies. Hovenkamp 
states that, from the perspective of American ideology prevailing 
at the time of enactment of the Sherman Act, it seems most 
plausible that the objective with which the Sherman Act was 
enacted was to prevent private ‘bigness’ of firms so as to create a 
level playing field for entrepreneurs.272 This objective is also 
                                                
267See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE 49 (West, 1994). 
268See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & 
ECON. 7 (1966); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (Basic Books, 1978). 
269See HOVENKAMP, supra note 267, at 49. 
270See HOVENKAMP, id. at 49 (citing Louis B. Schwartz, ‘Justice’ and other Non-
economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 1076 (1979)). 
271See HOVENKAMP, id. at 49 (citing George J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 
14(1) J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1985)). 
272See HOVENKAMP, id. at 50. 
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connected to the reasons behind the enactment of other US 
antitrust legislations i.e., the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
1914; the Clayton Act, 1914; the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936 
and the Celler-Kefauver Amendments to the anti-merger 
provisions of the Clayton Act, 1950, which were all enacted in 
order to protect small businesses.273 
 
Despite the various views of the legislative intent behind the 
enactment of the antitrust statutes in the US, the Chicago school’s 
efficiency-based approach has dominated antitrust analysis in the 
US.274 This is because consonant with its common law tradition, 
the US Supreme Court has played a decisive role in shaping 
antitrust law in the US and court decisions have greatly diverged 
from the language of antitrust statutes.275 For instance, concepts 
such as per se illegality and rule of reason do not find their origin 
in any of the US antitrust statutes but were created in the US 
Supreme Court judgment of Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United 
States.276 This judgment was used as a precedent by the US 
Supreme Court to create a number of antitrust principles using 
evolving economic concepts.277 The Sherman Act is thus 
considered an ‘enabling legislation’ because it allows courts and 
antitrust enforcers to change applicable standards in antitrust in 
consonance with changes in the economy, ideology, technology 
and scholarship.278 
                                                
273See HOVENKAMP, id. at 50. 
274See ROGER VAN DEN BERGH & PETER D. CAMESASCA, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 
& ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 48 (Intersentia, 2001). The central tenets 
of the Chicago school’s approach derived from price theory are that: conduct based on 
profit maximization is inherently competitive, markets have self-correcting 
mechanisms and market power is often acquired by superior efficiency. See VAN DEN 
BERGH & CAMESASCA, id. at 41. 
275See HOVENKAMP, supra note 267, at 52. 
276175 U.S. 211 (1899) 
277See HOVENKAMP, supra note 267, at 55 (also noting that that the opinion of Justice 
Taft in Addyston Pipes was fundamental to the introduction of economics into US 
antitrust law). 
278See HOVENKAMP, id. at 53. 
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The Chicago school’s focus on efficiency as the goal of 
competition law has been critiqued in evolving scholarship as 
being too narrow.279 The post-Chicago school, for instance, 
acknowledges the importance of efficiency but believes that the 
goal of competition law cannot be limited to efficiency and 
should include other ‘economic’ goals as well such as protecting 
consumer choice and preventing wealth transfers from consumers 
to producers, which are goals that are closer to EU competition 
law.280 Different views about competition goals prevail in 
different jurisdictions. Efficiency is more generally accepted as 
the objective of competition law in the US. On the other hand, 
non-economic goals such as market integration play a significant 
role in EU competition law.281 
 
The goals of competition law have evolved differently in the EU 
where there is only a more recent movement among competition 
agencies towards a more economic approach in conformity with 
the US. Given the diversity of competition traditions in the EU, 
there is no consensus, particularly in the case law, about any 
particular goals of competition law with the exception of market 
integration, which is uniformly recognised as a goal of European 
competition law.282 European courts have highlighted different 
objectives in their interpretations of Article 101 and 102 of the 
                                                
279See Wolfgang Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some 
Reflections of an Economist on the Normative Foundation of Competition Law, in 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW 93, 118-19 (Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot & 
Joël Monéger eds., Edward Elgar, ASCOLA Competition Law Series, 2009); for a 
general discussion on the objectives of competition law see, VAN DEN BERGH & 
CAMESASCA, supra note 274, at 31-32. 
280 See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life 
Cycle and the Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163, 2163-64 (2013). 
281 See VAN DEN BERGH & CAMESASCA, supra note 274, at 4. 
282 See Ioannis Lianos, Some Reflections on the Goals of Competition Law, in 
HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS, 41 (Ioannis 
Lianos & Damien Geradin eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013). 
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union283 (TFEU).284 
Some of the objectives include the welfare-based objective, 
protecting the structure of competition285 and protecting the 
interests of consumers.286 
 
Historically, during the founding of the EU, competition policy 
was given prominence as a tool to promote economic progress 
and the welfare of European citizens.287 While the main 
objectives of competition law today can be considered to be 
economic efficiency and market integration,288 social and 
political considerations also influence the implementation of 
European competition policy and take precedence over efficiency 
in some situations.289 European competition policy has also 
favoured small and medium sized enterprises.290 This is because 
smaller firms are often hurt to a greater extent by market 
imperfections.291 Along similar lines, achieving free and fair 
competition is also considered one of the goals of European 
competition law.292 Given the diversity of objectives imputed to 
                                                
283 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), § 101 (ex § 81, TEC) and § 102 (ex § 82, TEC), 2008 O.J. C 115/47 at 0088-
0089. 
284 See VAN DEN BERGH & CAMESASCA, supra note 274, at 42. 
285 See GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission, in Joined Cases C-501/06 P, 513/06 
P, 515/06 P and 519/06 P, § 63 ECR I-9291 (2009) (holding that one of the aims of 
Article 81 [101 TFEU] is to protect the structure of the market and hence, competition 
as such). A system of undistorted competition may also be protected by protecting 
equality of opportunity, see Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v. 
Elliniko Dimosio, C-49/07, § 51 ECR I-4863 (2008). 
286 See Lianos, supra note 282, at 45-46 (citing Konkurrenverket v. TeliaSonera 
Sverige, §§ 21-24 ECR 527 (2011). 
287See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY & PRACTICE 14 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
288See MOTTA, id.at 15. 
289See MOTTA, id. at 16 (the Ford / Volkswagen joint venture was cleared particularly 
because of its substantial potential to create jobs). 
290See MOTTA, id.at 16. 
291See MOTTA, id. at 22 (though Motta questions whether competition policy is an 
appropriate instrument for promoting small and medium sized enterprises). 
292 The meaning of ‘free and fair competition’ remains unclear. Free could mean free 
entry and exit of firms, which are hindered by entry barriers and strategic actions to 
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EU competition law, some objectives might conflict with others, 
for instance, market integration may conflict with consumer 
welfare.293 Reconciling these differing objectives remains a 
challenge. 
 
The following discussion will throw further light on the different 
views about the goals of competition law and will highlight the 
importance of the efficiency-based approach in the existing view 
of competition law goals. 
 
3. Consumer Welfare 
 
Following Bork’s influential hypothesis in his book The Antitrust 
Paradox, it is generally agreed that the objective of competition 
law is to maximize consumer welfare. Consumer welfare, in 
Bork’s view and as is traditionally understood, is an efficiency-
based view involving maximizing consumer surplus through 
reduced prices. However, in actuality, consumer welfare is not 
limited to consumer surplus, and different conceptions of 
consumer welfare exist.294 As a result, the understanding of what 
constitutes ‘consumer welfare’ remains unclear.295 Moreover, no 
court has ever directly examined the meaning of the term 
‘consumer welfare’ in competition law.296 The US Antitrust 
                                                                                                       
prevent entry of competitors such as limit pricing or investing in excess capacity. Free 
competition could also mean the absence of restraints on buyers and sellers in a market, 
e.g. resale price maintenance is a vertical restraint. The meaning of fair competition is 
more ambiguous because fairness does not have a precise interpretation in economics. 
It could mean levelling the playing field between small and large firms in a market. See 
Cassey Lee, The Objectives of Competition Law 11 (ERIA Discussion Paper No. 2015-
54, Aug., 2015). 
293See Lianos, supra note 282, at 53-54 (citing GlaxoSmithKline Services v. 
Commission, supra note 285). 
294See Stucke I, supra note 265, at 572. 
295See Stucke I, id. at 551; Barak Y. Orbach & Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals 
of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1020, 1020, 1032 (1987).  
296See id. at 161. 
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Modernization Committee in a report in 2007 highlighted that the 
understanding of consumer welfare was still up for debate in the 
US Supreme Court with no clarity between whether it should 
mean achieving allocative efficiency,297 or preventing wealth 
transfers from consumers to producers. According to Bork, the 
implementation of consumer welfare requires courts to 
distinguish between actions that increase wealth through 
efficiency and those that decrease it by restricting output.298 This 
has largely been followed as the goal of US law, and practices 
that result in lower prices or increased output are rarely held to be 
anticompetitive. However, from an economic perspective, Bork’s 
usage of the term consumer welfare was not correct, as the 
meaning he gave to the term is very different from the generally 
understood meaning of consumer welfare in economics.299 
Scholars and courts have also been reluctant to equate consumer 
welfare with consumer surplus.300 This is because consumer 
welfare has been interpreted by some in a broader way to include 
compensating consumers for harm caused by anticompetitive 
practices, improving product quality, variety and innovation and 
preserving consumer choice.301 These aspects of consumer 
welfare do not fit into the popular price theory oriented, 
consumer surplus understanding of consumer welfare propagated 
by Bork. Interestingly, Orbach states that consumer welfare has 
so many interpretations that the controversy over the goals of 
                                                
297 Orbach traces the origin of consumer welfare as the goal of competition law to 
Robert Bork and argues that by consumer welfare Bork actually referred to allocative 
efficiency. See Barack Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7(1) J. 
COMPT. L. & ECON. 133, 144 (2011). 
298See id. at 144 (citing Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in 
Antitrust, FORTUNE MAGAZINE 138 (1963). 
299See Orbach, supra note 297, at 140-41; Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real 
and Proper Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 347 (2010). Orbach argues that Bork was wrong to 
equate efficiency with consumer welfare, as these are two different concepts in 
economics since savings in cost do not necessarily get passed on to consumers and 
could instead benefit producers. See Orbach, supra note 297, at 144. 
300See Stucke I, supra note 265, at 575. 
301See Lianos, supra note 282, at 20-23. 
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antitrust laws has merely transformed itself into a controversy 
over the meaning of the term “consumer welfare”.302 
 
Whereas US law is more narrowly concerned with maximizing 
consumer surplus, EU law takes a broader approach to consumer 
welfare. In various pronouncements the ECJ has held that the 
primary concern of EU competition law is to “protect the 
interests of consumers”.303 This is certainly a broader standard 
than the US approach of focusing on low prices. According to 
Schweitzer, the primary concern of EU competition law is with 
delivering the benefits of competition to consumers, though not 
necessarily through improved efficiency.304 Also, the wording of 
provisions such as Article 101(3) TFEU, which provides that 
consumers should be provided a fair share of efficiency gains 
claimed by the producer from the anticompetitive agreement, 
suggests that EU law is also concerned with the distributive 
aspects of consumer welfare. Additionally, the Guidelines 
published by the Commission to assess vertical agreements under 
Article 101 TFEU states that only those restrictions that are likely 
to result in consumer harm will fall within the ambit of Article 
101.305 This is similar to the US concept of consumer welfare. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ has not explicitly endorsed this concept of 
consumer welfare.306 The ECJ’s reluctance to adopt modern 
economic thinking into EU competition law may be a result of its 
reliance on historical objectives of EU competition law.   
                                                
302See Orbach, supra note 297, at 163. 
303See Orbach, id. at 171. 
304See Heike Schweitzer, Efficiency, Political Freedom and the Freedom to Compete – 
Comment on Maier Rigaud, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW 169, 171 (Daniel 
Zimmer ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, ASCOLA Competition Law Series, 2012) 
(Further, Schweitzer argues that though efficiencies and consumer interests are relevant 
to EU competition law, this does not mean that the application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU is to be based on a full-blown consumer welfare analysis). 
305See Anne C. Witt, From Airtours to RyanAir: Is the More Economic Approach to EU 
Merger Law Really about More Economics?, 49 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 217, 221 
(2012). 
306See Lianos, supra note 282, at 20. 
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 3.1 Static vs. Dynamic Efficiencies 
 
Bork’s notion of consumer welfare was predicated on a model of 
static or allocative efficiency, based on a narrowly static view of 
competition. Allocative efficiency is achieved when prices equal 
marginal costs so that firms produce what consumers want and 
are willing to pay for.307 In addition, competition law can also 
maximize productive efficiencies. These are achieved when firms 
maximise output through the use of the most effective 
combination of inputs.308 These efficiencies can be realised by 
exploiting economies of scale and may be hampered by X- 
inefficiencies because managers might pursue goals other than 
profit maximization.309 
 
Since allocative and productive efficiencies are static, they do not 
take into account the effects of changing market conditions such 
as those arising from innovation, which is the domain of dynamic 
efficiency.310 Implicitly, consumer welfare favours short-term 
price decreases over long-term efficiency gains.311 The problem 
with focusing on achieving lower prices is that it will result in 
lower profits for firms, which will in turn reduce incentives to 
innovate and develop new products in the long-term.312 Thus, 
lower prices can cause consumers harm in the long-term by 
reducing incentives to innovate. In addition, efficiencies that 
benefit consumers in the long-term are often ignored under the 
static view of consumer welfare. Motta states that, “at the very 
least one should consider the objective [of competition law] as 
                                                
307See VAN DEN BERGH & CAMESASCA, supra note 274, at 5. 
308See VAN DEN BERGH & CAMESASCA, id. at 5. 
309See Kerber, supra note 279, at 96-97. 
310See Kerber, id. at 97. 
311See Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?, 21(3) J. ECON. 
PERSP. 155, 157 (2007). 
312See MOTTA, supra note 287, at 21. 
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that of maximizing consumer surplus over time (i.e., in dynamic 
terms), otherwise by helping consumers today one would hurt 
consumers tomorrow.”313 Motta thus, prefers a total welfare 
standard to a consumer welfare standard.314 
 
Dynamic efficiencies’ focus on future benefits to consumers may 
come at the cost of short-term price competition, a key aspect of 
static efficiencies.315 Thus, typically, the trade-off between static 
and dynamic efficiency is between higher prices and greater 
innovation or lower prices and reduced innovation.316 This 
translates into prioritising short-term effects on price over long-
term effects on innovation.317 Neoclassical economics does not 
provide a suitable framework to conduct such an analysis. Areeda 
and Turner have defended their disregard for long-term market 
outcomes on the basis that in the long run, market outcomes are 
indeterminate and speculative.318 Accordingly, they argue that 
administrable rules cannot be formulated that will recognise long-
term market positions.319 
 
However, the static view may be normatively limiting in so far as 
a dynamic or a long-term view might provide additional insights 
that differ from the static view. Porter criticizes the use of 
consumer welfare as a goal of antitrust law on the grounds that 
society is more concerned with the “long-term trajectory of value, 
prices and costs” than on short-term effect on prices and costs.320 
Further, Porter believes that consumer welfare measured by 
                                                
313MOTTA, id. at 21. 
314See also Carlton, supra note 311, at 157. 
315See Sidak & Teece, supra note 14, at 600. 
316See Stucke I, supra note 265, at 577 (citing ICN Survey, supra note 2, at 45). 
317See Kerber, supra note 279, at 100. 
318See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 891, 897 (1976). 
319See Areeda & Turner, id. at 897. 
320Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: Towards a Productivity-Based 
Approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ventures, 46 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 919, 923 
(2001).  
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short-run prices does not measure product quality, features and 
services. According to Porter, the only way of achieving 
sustained productivity in the market is through innovation 
because innovation provides products and services of value to 
consumers as well as ways of producing products more 
efficiently.321 
 
As evolutionary economists argue, dynamic processes such as 
innovation are better understood from a long-term perspective 
and play a key role in industry and firm life-cycles.322 Sidak and 
Teece use literature from evolutionary economics, behavioural 
theory of the firm and strategic management to argue that 
dynamic competition should be favoured over static competition 
in antitrust law, particularly in the context of innovation-driven 
industries.323 They further argue that static competition does not 
offer a suitable analytical or normative paradigm for competition 
law, it does not provide a good description of the economy and it 
does not offer a paradigm that competition law should aspire 
to.324 Moreover, using static analysis in dynamic market 
conditions may not go far towards meeting the goal of improving 
consumer welfare.325 
 
Adopting a standard for consumer welfare that includes dynamic 
efficiencies can incorporate innovations that benefit consumers 
into the concept of consumer welfare. However, due to the 
uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in the process of 
innovation, dynamic efficiencies are difficult to quantify and it is 
problematic to determine their impact on competition.326  Further, 
unlike with static efficiency, there are no clear normative criteria 
for determining dynamic efficiency since in many cases 
                                                
321See Porter, id. at 923. 
322See Nelson, supra note 75, at 294. 
323See Sidak & Teece, supra note 14, at 600. 
324See Sidak & Teece, id. at 603. 
325See Sidak & Teece, id. at 585. 
326See Stucke I, supra note 265, at 584. 
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innovations may not be successful or research may not have 
desired effects.327 From an institutional perspective, the problem 
with balancing static and dynamic efficiencies is that courts are 
not competent or well equipped to undertake trade-offs between 
short-term and long-term benefits to consumers.328 
 
The problem of balancing static and dynamic efficiencies in the 
notion of consumer welfare may be resolved if the normative 
criterion adopted is that of satisfying consumer preferences rather 
than maximizing consumer surplus.329 If consumer welfare is 
taken to mean the fulfilment of consumer preferences, then both 
lower prices and innovation contribute to increasing consumer 
welfare.330 However, this needs to be further developed as a 
normative concept.  
 
To summarise, while consumer welfare seems to be more widely 
accepted as the objective of competition law, it is by no means 
undisputed or considered an ideal normative basis for 
competition law. The larger problem according to Orbach is that 
the ambiguity in the term “consumer welfare” can be used to 
promote ideas that have questionable economic merit.331 Many 
different views prevail about how the consumer welfare standard 
can be improved to make it distributionally just, fair, 
institutionally and normatively appropriate, consistent and 
certain.332 The ambiguity and conceptual inconsistencies 
surrounding the meaning of the term ‘consumer welfare’ need to 
                                                
327See Kerber, supra note 279, at 98.  
328See Stucke I, supra note 265, at 589. 
329See Kerber, supra note 279, at 100. 
330See Kerber, id. at 100.  
331See Orbach, supra note 297, at 133. 
332For instance, Lianos suggests that the consumer welfare standard can be broadened 
to include not just consumer surplus but the negative effect of wealth transfers from 
consumers to producers. See Lianos, supra note 282, at 39-40. Kerber discusses adding 
to the consumer welfare standard certain rights of producers so that the normative 
standards of competition law are not representative of only a subset of the population 
from a constitutional economic perspective. See Kerber, supra note 279, at 113. 
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be clarified before it can form a suitable normative basis for 
competition law. The static perspective of consumer welfare 
further limits its normative suitability. Finally, a solely consumer 
welfare approach, it has been argued, is normatively asymmetric 
because in such an approach competition law is only about the 
protection of consumers, and the interests of firms including 
other firms in the market are ignored.333 While consumer welfare 
gives preference to consumers over producers, the total welfare 
standard at least treats these groups equally.334 The following 
section discusses the total welfare standard in brief. 
 
4. Total Welfare 
 
Under the total welfare standard, competition law steps in to 
penalize conduct only when the aggregate of consumer welfare 
and producer welfare is reduced, without regard to any wealth 
transfers.335 Since this is an aggregate measure, total welfare can 
increase even if the welfare of one group such as consumers or 
producers declines. Accordingly, losses to consumers under this 
standard are overlooked if there are compensating gains to 
producers in the form of cost savings through increased 
efficiency.336 In contrast, efficiencies must be passed on to 
consumers to count under the consumer welfare standard.337 
 
Supporters of the economic approach to competition law 
generally consider the appropriate standard of competition law to 
be total welfare. The goal of total welfare is based on the more 
mainstream economic view that efficiency is the only proper goal 
of competition law and distributional concerns should be 
                                                
333See Kerber, id. at 113. 
334See Carlton, supra note 311, at 158. 
335See Salop, supra note 299, at 336. 
336See Salop, id.at 336. 
337See Salop, id.at 337. 
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addressed through other mechanisms.338 Thus, scholars who 
consider that wealth transfers from consumers to producers 
should not be actionable under competition law endorse the total 
welfare standard. This view is most popular in the US and finds 
support among members of the Chicago school.339 In addition, 
some scholars argue that the total welfare standard is better than 
the consumer welfare standard because it can better incorporate 
the long-term interests of consumers.340 
 
An important difference between consumer welfare and total 
welfare is that by definition the total welfare standard takes into 
account injury to competitors, which is not relevant to the 
consumer welfare standard unless consumers are also harmed.341 
In fact, conduct should fall afoul of the total welfare standard 
even when consumer welfare increases if harm to competitors is 
sufficiently severe, or benefit to consumers is not sufficient to 
outweigh competitors’ welfare losses.342 Since US law does not 
consider injury to competitors as equally injurious as consumer 
harm and follows the rule that antitrust laws should be for the 
protection of consumers and not competitors, Salop argues that 
US does not follow a total welfare standard.343 
 
The total welfare standard has been questioned from a normative 
perspective for not considering distributional effects arising from 
market conduct, as long as there is a sufficient increase in 
                                                
338See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (in this seminal 
article Kaplow and Shavell were the first to propose that the goal of redistribution of 
income could be more efficiently achieved through the tax system than by law); see 
also Elyse Dorsey & Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusionary Conduct in Antitrust, 89(1) 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 101, 108-109 (2015), 
http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6707&context=lawrevie
w. 
339See Salop, supra note 299.  
340See Carlton, supra note 311, at 157. 
341See Salop, supra note 299, at 337-38. 
342See Salop, id. at 343. 
343See Salop, id. at 345-46. 
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producer surplus.344 The problem with this is that ffocusing 
merely on surplus without attention to how that surplus is 
allocated may further enhance social inequalities.345 Additionally, 
people’s preferences are a function of a starting distribution of 
wealth, which may already reflect existing monopoly power and 
thus, the efficient outcome at a point in time may already 
contravene principles of social justice.346 Thus, the normative 
basis for the total welfare standard has been questioned because it 
allows uncompensated redistributions between individuals and 
firms and ignores inequities in existing resource allocations. 
 
5. Protecting Economic Freedom and the 
Competitive Process 
 
Another objective of competition law with more of a socio-
economic basis than efficiency-based approaches is protecting 
economic freedom and the competitive process. Freedom in the 
context of competition has been described as economic liberty 
and dispersal of economic power to enable unhindered 
participation in markets.347 For instance, merger policy has been 
used as a tool for dispersing economic power by preventing 
concentrations.348 The goal of economic freedom and protecting 
the competitive process has historically been associated with the 
Ordoliberal approach. 
 
5.1 The Ordoliberal Approach 
 
Ordoliberalism has played an important role in shaping 
competition jurisprudence in the EU. It was first developed by 
                                                
344See Kerber, supra note 279, at 101-02. 
345See Lianos, supra note 282, at 10. 
346See Lianos, id. at 9-10. 
347See Lee, supra note 292, at 3. 
348See Lee, id. at 12. 
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German economists belonging to the ‘Freiburg School’ in the 
1930’s and later played a significant role in shaping German 
competition law after World War II.349 Ordoliberal thought also 
found a place in the Rome Treaty, as Ordoliberal scholars were 
involved in founding the EU and drafting the EU constitutional 
treaties.350 The economist Walter Eucken and the lawyer Franz 
Böhm are considered to be some of the most prominent 
representatives of the Ordoliberal tradition.351 
 
Ordoliberal thought cannot be easily integrated into standard 
economic approaches to competition.352 Ordoliberals believe that 
the market can have a positive impact only if the state establishes 
a strong institutional framework within which market processes 
function.353 Consequently, competition law is necessary to 
protect consumers from abuses of economic power and arbitrary 
employment of political power in the economy.354 Thus, the 
proper purpose of competition law is to act as a constraint on the 
exercise of private and state power in the economic sphere.355 
Ordoliberals considered market power as the main threat to a free 
economic order. The Ordoliberal ideal is a market without 
economic power where competition is on the merits 
(Leistungswettbewerb).356 Early Ordoliberals strongly believed 
                                                
349See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: 
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 266-284 (Clarendon Press, 1998) (describing the historical 
influence of Ordoliberalism in the evolution of German competition law); ROGER J. 
VAN DEN BERGH & PETER D. CAMESASCA, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 65 (2d, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006). 
350See GERBER, id. at 263-264 
351 VAN DEN BERGH & CAMESASCA, supra note 349, at 65. 
352See Kerber, supra note 279, at 107. 
353See Massimiliano Vatiero, Dominant Market Position and Ordoliberalism, INT’L 
REV ECON.5 (2015), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12232-015-0246-
8#/page-1 (published online: Sept. 5, 2015). 
354Vatiero, id. at 5. 
355Vatiero, id. at 5 (citing Vickers II, infra note 813, at F246). 
356See Pierre Larouche & Maarten P. Schinkel, Continental Drift in the Treatment of 
Dominant Firms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS 153, 161 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., vol. 2, Oxford University 
Press, 2015).  
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that market power had to be attacked and dissolved at its root and 
that merely policing abuse of dominance would be insufficient to 
achieve a free economic order.357 This can be contrasted with the 
traditional efficiency-based approach, which considers that the 
state should only intervene in the market when prices are 
increased or output is restricted to the detriment of consumers. 
 
Rather than seeking efficiency or maximizing some measure of 
welfare, Ordoliberals aim to protect individual freedoms and a 
free market.358 This is because Ordoliberals believe that the 
efficiencies arising from competition cannot be precisely 
measured ex ante and instead should be measured by the degree 
of freedom available to market participants.359 The freedom of 
producers and consumers to make choices in the market is the 
focus of the modern version of Ordoliberalism.360 In the words of 
Behrens, “competition [in Ordoliberal thought] is understood as a 
dynamic system (process) of interaction between choice making 
individuals who by making their choices reveal their preferences 
and produce the kind of information that other individuals need to 
make their choices.”361 From here arises the Ordoliberal belief in 
maintaining the compeitive process and economic freedom.362 
 
Another interesting aspect of Ordoliberal discourse is that it 
distinguishes performance competition from hindrance or 
impediment competition. Performance competition occurs when 
firms compete by improving their offering to consumers, for 
                                                
357See Larouche & Schinkel, id. at 162. 
358Vatiero, supra note 353, at 6. 
359See Peter Behrens, The Ordoliberal Concept of “abuse” of a Dominant Position and 
its Impact on Article 102 TFEU, 22 (Working Paper Presented at 10th Annual 
Conference of the Annual Society of Competition Law (ASCOLA), May 2015, Japan), 
http://ascola-tokyo-conference-
2015.meiji.jp/pdf/ConferencePapers/General%20Session%201/Peter_Behrens_The_ord
oliberal_concept_of_abuse.pdf; Vatiero, id.at 6. 
360See Behrens, id. at 11. 
361See Behrens, id. at 11. 
362See Behrens, id. at 22. 
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instance, by reducing prices or improving product quality and 
features. This is also known as competition on the merits. 
Impediment competition occurs when firms compete by 
impeding the performance of competitors. Performance 
competition is considered a legitimate form of competition and 
hindrance competition is considered abusive and detrimental.363 
The idea of competition on the merits is based on the Ordoliberal 
conception that only the quality of performance and not market 
power should determine market success. Consequently, 
Ordoliberals developed the ‘as if’ standard to encourage 
performance competition and discourage impediment 
competition.364 The ‘as if’ standard required firms with market 
power to act as if they were subject to competition.365 Thus, 
dominant firms should not take any actions that they would not 
have been able to take if they had no market power. However, 
according to Behrens, Ordoliberals have criticised and abandoned 
the ‘as if’ standard.366 Instead, present-day Ordoliberals recognise 
that monopoly power should not be punished if it is a result of 
performance competition and market success.367 Rather than 
attacking the presence of market power, present Ordoliberals 
believe that dominant firms should not be allowed to increase 
market concentration through mergers or by employing 
exclusionary practices because this will drive rivals out of the 
market by means other than competition on the merits, at the 
expense of consumers’ choice.368 
 
                                                
363See Larouche & Schinkel, supra note 356, at 164; Vatiero, supra note 353, at 5 
(citing GERBER, supra note 349, at 252-53). 
364See Vatiero, id. at 6. 
365See Vatiero, id. at 5. 
366See Behrens, supra note 359, at 18. 
367See Behrens, id. at 13. 
368See Behrens, id. at 13. 
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5.2 Freedom to Compete as Objectives of EU and US 
Competition Law 
 
Even in the US, before welfare-based approaches dominated the 
normative thinking in competition law, preserving economic 
freedom and the freedom to compete were historically considered 
relevant goals of US competition law.369 The US Supreme Court 
had previously stated that the objective of antitrust is to preserve 
economic liberty through free and fair competition.370 Other US 
courts have similarly held that the purpose of antitrust law is to 
protect the competitive process.371 For instance in NCAA v. 
Board of Regents, the Supreme Court held that to judge the 
validity of a restraint under the Sherman Act, “the criteria to be 
used in judging the validity of a restraint on trade is its impact on 
competition.”372 This statement, though no longer used in 
antitrust analysis, is reminiscent of Ordoliberal thinking.  
 
In addition, Farrell, a prominent US economist with the DOJ has 
also acknowledged that protecting the competitive process is 
necessary for a well-functioning economy; therefore, competition 
should be promoted even when it is unclear as to whether it will 
benefit consumers and improve efficiency.373 As Farrell states, 
there should be a presumption in favour of competition per se 
rather than upholding it only when it benefits consumers.374 Such 
                                                
369See Stucke I, supra note 265, at 610 (citing US Supreme Court decision Associated 
Gen. Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) and United States v. Topco 
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)). 
370See Stucke I, id. at 562 (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.27 
(1984)). 
371See Stucke I, id. at 568 (citing Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 
(7th Circ., 1986)). 
372NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984); see also Daniel Zimmer, The 
Basic Goal of Competition Law: To Protect the Other Side of the Market, in THE 
GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW 486, 487 (Daniel Zimmer ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, 
ASCOLA Competition Law Series, 2012). 
373See Farrell & Shapiro Interview, supra note 16. 
374Farrell & Shapiro Interview, id. 
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an approach is contrary to the strong consequentialist approach to 
competition goals arising from the influence of welfare 
economics, where only outcomes are relevant.375 According to 
Farrell, the reasons for promoting competition are difficult to 
“pin down from a narrowly economic point of view” but are 
“probably important”.376 One reason being that since firms can 
make mistakes, more number of firms in the market can 
counteract any negative effects arising from the mistaken actions 
of individual firms.377 
 
Unlike the US, aspects of Ordoliberal thought continue to be 
relevant to EU competition law. One of the objectives of EU 
competition law is to preserve a system of undistorted 
competition as part of the internal market.378 Preserving 
undistorted competition represents the essence of present day 
Ordoliberal scholarship.379 In fact, competition on the merits and 
equality of opportunity, both key concepts in Ordoliberal 
scholarship, are aspects of the system of undistorted 
competition.380 Another more commonly described objective of 
EU competition law that is derived from Ordoliberal concepts is 
protecting the competitive process.381 
 
Further, some of the differences between EU and US law can be 
traced back to the influence of Ordoliberal thought on EU 
competition law.382 In particular, the normative underpinnings of 
EU law on abuse of dominance reflect Ordoliberal thinking 
because it emphasizes the opportunities of competitors to 
                                                
375See Lee, supra note 292, at 17. 
376Farrell & Shapiro Interview, supra note 16. 
377See Farrell & Shapiro Interview, id. 
378See Wouter P. J. Wils, The Judgment of the EU General Court in Intel and the So-
Called More Economic Approach to Abuse of Dominance, 37(4) WORLD COMPETITION 
405, 417 (2014). 
379See Behrens, supra note 359, at 29. 
380See Wils, supra note 378, at 418. 
381See Wils, id. at 418. 
382Larouche & Schinkel, supra note 356, at 159. 
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compete on the merits.383 For instance, the difference in the law 
of predatory pricing in the EU and US has been imputed to the 
Ordoliberal influence on EU law.384 Ordoliberal thought may 
have also inspired the special responsibility assigned to dominant 
firms under Article 102 TFEU.385 This is because Ordoliberals 
feel dominant firms can abuse their position by engaging in 
‘impediment competition’ and therefore should be specially 
monitored so as to prevent harm to competition.386 
 
EU law on abuse of dominance has sought not only to protect 
competition on the merits but also to condemn the exercise of 
market power which impairs rivals’ ability to succeed based on 
superior performance.387 In British Airways,388 the court said that 
practices having a detrimental impact on an effective competitive 
structure are contrary to Article 102 TFEU.389 The interpretation 
of Article 102 TFEU as protecting the competitive process 
reflects the Ordoliberal belief that “competition results from the 
exercise of individual rights within a system of interaction the 
workability of which rests on the protection of all market actors 
against exclusion that does not result from competition on the 
merits.”390 Previously, the test for abuse of dominance under 
Article 82 EC [now Article 102 TFEU] was the protection of 
competition against distortions arising from significant market 
power.391 This was taken to mean that competition law should 
engender a system in which superior business performance is the 
                                                
383See Thomas Eilmansberger, How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition Under 
Article 82 EC: In Search of Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anticompetitive 
Abuses, 42 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 129, 133 (2005). 
384See Behrens, supra note 359, at 21. 
385See Larouche & Schinkel, supra note 356, at 164. 
386See Larouche & Schinkel, id.at 164. 
387See Irish Sugar Plc., Commission Decision No. 97/624/EC (1997); see also 
Eilmansberger, supra note 383, at 133. 
388See British Airways v. Commission, Case C-95/04 P, E.C.R. I-2331, § 106 (2007). 
389See Schweitzer, supra note 304, at 173. 
390Behrens, supra note 359, at 21. 
391See Eilmansberger, supra note 383, at 132. 
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primary reason behind a firm’s success and the exercise of 
market power does not hinder competitors with better 
performance from succeeding.392 Thus, both old and new 
versions of the EU law on abuse of dominance reflect Ordoliberal 
thought. As an aside, it is worth noting that Article 102 TFEU 
does not adopt the early Ordoliberal proscription of market power 
because it does not intervene directly to correct market power but 
instead only polices abuses of dominance.393 
 
Further, EU law’s concern with maintaining effective 
competition is not limited to provisions on abuse of dominance. 
For instance, the wording of Article 101(3)(b) is considered to be 
an influence of Ordoliberal thought on EU competition law.394 
Article 101(3)(b) TFEU makes any efficiency gains arising from 
an anticompetitive agreement subject to the condition that it does 
not allow “the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of 
a substantial part of the products in question.”395 In addition, 
mergers are also assessed based on their ability to “significantly 
impede effective competition in the common market or in a 
substantial part of it”.396 These provisions represent the 
Ordoliberal prescription of the competitive process. 
 
                                                
392See Eilmansberger, id. at 132. 
393See Larouche & Schinkel, supra note 356, at 163 (noting that this is probably 
because the drafting of EU competition law was a result of political bargaining between 
competing visions both among and within member states. Further, they note that from 
an institutional perspective, the Ordoliberal proscription of market power may be easier 
to implement than the prohibition of abuse of dominance in Article 102 because the 
latter involves the complex task of first determining which firms can be called 
dominant and then defining what constitutes abuse, rather than the outright 
condemnation of market power.). 
394See Behrens, supra note 359, at 22. 
395See also Zimmer, supra note 372, at 487. 
396 Article 2(3), Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on The Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings, L-024 (Jan. 2004). 
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6. Behavioural Studies Support Ordoliberalism and 
Process-oriented Goals 
 
This section argues that behavioural insights support the 
normative premise of Ordoliberalism that competition law should 
seek to achieve economic freedom and maintain the competitive 
process. Early Ordoliberal thinkers emphasized the value of 
protecting competition as an end in itself regardless of whether 
any welfare-related objectives were being met.397 According to 
the traditional, Ordoliberal view, firms’ rights to pursue self-
interest in the market are constrained by the rights of other firms 
to participate in the competitive process.398 Consequently, 
conduct is judged by determining if it followed prescribed rules 
of process rather than by the market outcomes.399 The normative 
legitimacy for the process-oriented view of competition is 
derived from the idea that the result of a just process is presumed 
to be just.400  
 
However, later Ordoliberals modified the view that the 
competitive process should be maintained for its own sake and 
stated that the goal of protecting the competitive process is only 
an intermediate goal that serves to achieve final objectives such 
as consumer welfare.401 Nevertheless, Ordoliberalism is not 
concerned with market outcomes in the same way as the welfare-
based approach and is instead based on the belief that consumers 
                                                
397See Oles Andriychuk, Thinking Inside the Box: Why Competition as a Process is a 
Sui Generis Right: A Methodological Observation, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW 
95, 107-110 (Daniel Zimmer ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, ASCOLA Competition 
Law Series, 2012).  
398See Lianos, supra note 282, at 36. 
399See Lianos, id. at 37. 
400See Lianos, id. at 36 (relying on ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 
(1974)). 
401See Zimmer, supra note 372, at 490. As the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2004 
state, the competitive process should be maintained because it brings benefits to 
consumers in the form of low prices, high quality products, wider choice of goods and 
services and innovation 
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are benefited when firms are forced to take efforts to compete 
and competition on the merits is protected.402 The EU’s 
constitutional framework conceptualizes competition in a similar 
manner as a means to attain different objectives.403 
 
The idea that markets are a process assumes that the course of a 
market cannot end in a position ascertainable in advance.404 This 
understanding of markets is clearly distinct from the traditional 
idea in economics where determining outcomes is of the essence. 
Markets evolve in stages and the path that its evolution takes 
depends on various factors such as changes in technology and the 
state of knowledge of market participants.405 These factors can 
contribute to a market’s evolution in different ways. 
 
Ordoliberal ideas are particularly interesting from a behavioural 
perspective because behavioural studies caution against over-
emphasizing the end-results of competition and suggest that value 
should be placed on the competitive process.406 The traditional 
welfare-based and outcome-oriented approach to competition 
leads proponents to place strong reliance on often-untested 
theoretical predictions on the basis that the methodology used is 
able to accurately predict market outcomes. This may not always 
be the case. Several scholars have critiqued the importance given 
to outcomes in welfare-based approaches.407 One criticism is that 
                                                
402See Eilmansberger, supra note 383, at 135. 
403See Lianos, supra note 282, at 53. 
404 See LUDWIG M. LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS 5 (BASIL 
BLACKWELL, 1986). 
405 See LACHMANN, id. at 4. 
406See Maurice E. Stucke, What is Competition?, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW 
27, 45 (Daniel Zimmer ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, ASCOLA Competition Law 
Series, 2012) (“…competition…is better viewed as a process than an end-state with a 
stable equilibrium…firms and consumers make mistakes, readjust and undertake new 
strategies.”). 
407See Adrian Künzler, Economic Content of Antitrust Law: the Point of Regulating 
Preferences, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW 182, 201-02 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 
Edward Elgar Publishing, ASCOLA Competition Law Series, 2012). In the words of 
Fox, “…the outcome perspective is a crabbed perspective that was intended to and does 
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evolving scholarship using neoclassical economics has, at 
different points in time, changed its understanding of the welfare 
effects of particular market conduct. A prominent example is 
with resale price maintenance (RPM), which can be both welfare 
enhancing and welfare reducing, depending on the 
circumstances.408 RPM is the practice where manufacturers 
control the prices at which their products are sold in downstream 
distribution channels. RPM is welfare reducing because it 
facilitates cartelization and it is welfare enhancing because it 
helps to overcome retailer’s incentives to free ride and to engage 
in brand promotion and improved goodwill.409 As a result, there 
have been many differences in opinion about the welfare effects 
of RPM. The US Supreme Court took a stand on RPM in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products by changing a long-standing 
precedent holding RPM to be per se illegal to making RPM 
subject to a rule of reason analysis.410 However, this judgment 
has lead to further debate about the overall welfare effects of 
RPM. In their analysis of the Leegin judgment, Tor and Rinner 
conclude that theoretical arguments as well as empirical data 
provide support for both welfare enhancing and welfare reducing 
outcomes arising from RPM, without suggesting which outcomes 
                                                                                                       
minimize antitrust law. I argue that limiting antitrust to condemning inefficient 
outcomes and embroidering the analysis with conservative Chicago School 
presumptions (markets are robust, antitrust enforcement normally harms the market) 
shrinks antitrust law to its smallest possible scope and in doing so harms efficiency in 
the sense of undermining rivalry and forestalling dynamic change…” Eleanor M. Fox, 
The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE 
EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 78, 80 (Robert 
Pitofsky ed., Oxford University Press, 2008). 
408See Daniel M. Garrett, Michelle Burtis & Vandy Howell, Economics of Antitrust: An 
Economic Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. 3 (2008) 
(concluding that the welfare effects of RPM will be different depending on market 
conditions in specific situations); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The 
Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 28(2) J. L. & ECON. 363 (May, 1985) 
(showing the different welfare effects of the different uses of RPM and concluding that 
overall RPM is efficiency enhancing). 
409See Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to 
the Rule of Reason After Leegin, U. ILL. L. Rev. 805, 814-17 (2011). 
410See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 (2007).  
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are more likely to occur.411 Furthermore, balancing welfare 
effects is difficult and it is not always possible to do it precisely 
or scientifically. Another factor is that welfare effects of market 
conduct cannot always be definitively ascertained, as it is 
difficult to empirically test theoretical predictions of positive or 
negative welfare effects of market conduct.412 This is due to the 
fact that market environments are inherently complex and the 
outcomes arising from conduct in these environments are often 
ambiguous and unpredictable.413 
 
The emphasis on clearly predicting market outcomes in the 
welfare-based view creates an inherent tension with the 
ambiguity of outcomes in the behavioural approach. This has also 
been a source of criticism of behavioural studies’ contribution to 
competition law because behavioural scholarship is unable to 
provide a precise prediction of the direction of market 
outcomes.414 This shortcoming comes into view when 
behavioural insights are applied to understand market outcomes 
within the welfare-based framework.  
 
One of the reasons for the difficulty in empirically establishing 
the welfare effects of market conduct is that decisions taken in 
complex, market environments are often boundedly rational. As 
behavioural studies show, with time the most talented and 
efficient businesses can become complacent and unresponsive to 
changing consumer preferences,415 competitive inertia may set in 
or firm’s ‘routines’ or internal processes may impede optimal 
outcomes. Additionally, not all firms in the market are profit 
maximizing. Market success may be as much a factor of 
efficiency as of ‘business acumen’, which is the ability to ‘cut 
deals’, identify opportunities, understand consumer preferences 
                                                
411See Tor & Rinner, supra note 409, at 820-21. 
412See Künzler, supra note 407, at 203-04. 
413See Künzler, id. at 201-03. 
414Wright & Stone, supra note 17, at 865. 
415See Stucke I, supra note 265, at 581. 
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and manage internal processes. These findings challenge some of 
the assumptions of Chicago school’s welfare-based view that 
market power is a result of greater efficiency and that successful 
firms must be maximizing profits.  
 
According to the behavioural theory of the firm, firms operate by 
setting targets or aspiration levels and trying to meet them.416 
Targets are not static and are often adjusted by using external 
standards such as the performance of rival firms or benchmark 
organisations.417 Thus, more competition reduces complacency in 
firms by constantly forcing firms to readjust target levels and 
improve performance benchmarks. This finding is supported by 
literature from evolutionary economics showing that maintaining 
effective competition is beneficial because the resulting diversity 
within the market has a positive impact on firm performance.418 
Diversity is said to be an important contributor to innovation and 
long-term endurance of markets. Having a multiplicity and 
diversity of independently innovating firms can help to find new 
solutions and improve industry performance.419 Porter also 
contends that vigorous competition in a supportive business 
environment is the only way to sustain the long-term productivity 
of the economy.420 
 
This suggests that the application of behavioural insights 
strengthens the Ordoliberal, process-oriented view of competition 
by emphasizing the indeterminacy of outcomes and the 
inaccuracies in predicting outcomes, and at the same time 
highlighting the benefits of maintaining effective competition.  
 
                                                
416See Earl, supra note 59, at 98. 
417See Earl, id. at 98. 
418See Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economics and the Eclipse 
of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and 
Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOYOLA U. CHIC. L. J. 469 (2010-11). 
419See Stucke I, supra note 265, at 613-14. 
420Porter, supra note 320, at 923. 
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6.1 Dynamic Competitive Analysis Strengthens the 
Behavioural and Ordoliberal Perspective 
 
Another aspect of behavioural insights that supports the 
Ordoliberal perspective is with respect to innovation and dynamic 
competition.421 Dynamic competition, according to Sidak and 
Teece is an innovation-driven process, which emphasizes the 
introduction of new products and processes, improvements in 
productivity as well as the creation of new market 
opportunities.422 Unlike with neoclassical economics and similar 
to the behavioural theory of the firm, proponents of dynamic 
competition believe that managers and entrepreneurs play an 
important role in creating dynamic efficiencies through technical 
innovation as well as innovations in business models and 
strategies.423 
 
In dynamic competitive analysis, a firm’s internal processes are a 
significant contributor to innovation.424 Similar to the behavioural 
theory of the firm, proponents of dynamic competitive analysis 
argue that a firm’s internal capabilities are a better proxy for its 
competitive position than its market share.425 Moreover, market 
conduct of firms is said to be a result of a firm’s internal 
organization, standard operating procedures, investment 
strategies and firm routines.426 These concepts connect dynamic 
competitive analysis with the behavioural theory of the firm. 
 
Diversity in the competitive process is an important component 
of dynamic competition. Evolutionary economics takes the view 
that adaptation and learning plays a role in generating diversity 
                                                
421See Larouche & Schinkel, supra note 356, at 173. 
422See Sidak & Teece, supra note 14, at 600. 
423See Sidak & Teece, id. at 603. 
424See Sidak & Teece, id. at 610. 
425See Sidak & Teece, id. at 616. 
426See Sidak & Teece, id. at 611. 
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and innovation in firms.427 Diversity should be encouraged 
because radical innovation often takes place from firms outside 
the market and from new entrants who disrupt the market.428 
Believers in the competitive process feel that innovation occurs 
when a number of firms compete to innovate since better ideas 
are not necessarily connected to bigger firms and larger 
investments.429 Accordingly, it is better to create an environment 
where more firms stand a chance of successfully innovating 
rather than incentivising a single, dominant firm to continue to 
innovate. Since it cannot be predicted as to which among a 
number of firms will successfully innovate, all firms need to be 
incentivised to innovate.430 The idea of encouraging diversity in 
the market in dynamic competition furthers the Ordoliberal 
objective of protecting the competitive process and freedom of 
choice of market participants. 
 
It is worth noting that while dynamic competition focuses on the 
importance of innovation to competition, from an evolutionary 
perspective this may be no different from Chicago school’s 
single-minded focus on prices and costs. Evolutionary 
economists believe that systems that are highly optimised for a 
single criterion such as profits or costs will crash at some 
point.431 Policies focusing on short-term profit maximization 
encourage firms to optimise only one aspect, short-term profits. 
This may not work to the advantage of firms in the long run. 
Accordingly, evolutionary economists believe in inculcating 
adaptability and resilience in firms to changes in the market 
environment and to changing consumer preferences.432 
Innovation is not always a linear, stand-alone process; it can 
                                                
427See Sidak & Teece, id. at 608-610. 
428See Sidak & Teece, id. at 610. 
429See Larouche & Schinkel, supra note 356, at 173. 
430See Larouche & Schinkel, id. at 173. 
431See Peter M. Allen, Evolution: Complexity, Uncertainty and Innovation, 24 J. 
EVOLUTIONARY. ECON. 265, 287 (2014). 
432See Allen, id.at 287. 
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depend on many factors such as the environment and interactions 
with other firms and consumers.433 Innovation may be a part of 
the firm’s process of adapting to change but it should not be the 
sole focus of the law. All these factors seem to strengthen the 
Ordoliberal goal of promoting choice and freedom rather than 
focusing on specific outcomes because diversity may be more 
beneficial to markets in the long-term.  
 
6.2  Strategic Analysis may be Able to Provide a Long-Term 
View of Firm Behaviour 
 
It is often the case that the static view of the firm conflicts with 
the dynamic view, and here it is important for competition law to 
consider both perspectives. The problem is that dynamic 
efficiencies arise in the long-term and these are particularly 
difficult to quantify ex ante. However, it may be possible to 
assess firm decisions in the long-term through strategic analysis, 
a method commonly used in business studies to assess a firm’s 
competitive advantage. Competitive strategy studies a firm’s 
competitive advantage and how firms differentiate themselves 
from the competition or find ways to beat the competition.434 A 
firm develops its competitive strategy to create and sustain value 
for itself in the long-term.435 Accordingly, strategic analysis 
views the long-term position of the firm and studies long-term 
decision-making within the firm.436 In contrast to the long-term 
view of strategic decisions, a firm’s operational decisions reflect 
the short-term view of the firm. Static competition provides a 
                                                
433See Larouche & Schinkel, supra note 356, at 176. 
434Some of the questions asked in strategic analysis are: in which industries should a 
firm operate? Which products and services should be provided and to which 
customers? In what ways should firms compete or cooperate with other firms? See 
JAMES A. BRICKLEY, CLIFFORD W. SMITH, JR. & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, MANAGERIAL 
ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 214 (McGraw-Hill, 4th ed., 2007). 
435See BRICKLEY et al., id. at 215. 
436See BRICKLEY et al., id. at 214. 
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better understanding of operational decisions within a firm rather 
than strategic ones. The static view is particularly problematic 
when studying anticompetitive conduct such as predatory pricing 
where long-run behaviour needs to be inferred from short-run 
market conditions.437 While economists have provided various 
dynamic models of predatory pricing, courts have not readily 
adopted these, probably due to their complexity. In situations 
where anticompetitive practices need to be understood in the 
long-term, competitive strategy can provide insights into the 
long-term decisions of firms.  
 
Studying a firm’s strategy involves studying a firm’s competitive 
position in light of its capabilities, the market environment and 
competitive dynamics. To assess the likely future health of 
competition, Porter suggests that antitrust authorities employ his 
famous ‘five forces’ analysis commonly used by businesses to 
ascertain the intensity of competition when formulating 
competitive strategies.438 The five forces analysis examines the 
extent of competition in an industry through the following five 
categories: threat of entry, rivalry, buyer power, seller power and 
threat of substitutes in all relevant markets and sub-markets.439 
Since the field of competitive strategy has been influenced by 
empirical observations of firm conduct, some, though not all, of 
the literature incorporates behavioural insights. 
 
It may also be worth considering from a normative perspective 
that certain kinds of strategic positions of firms are preferable to 
others. For instance, a strategy of cost cutting that results in 
extremely low wages and harsh conditions for workers may not 
be a normatively preferable strategy. On the other hand, a 
strategy of competing by providing differentiated product or 
                                                
437See Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analysing Predatory 
Pricing Policy, 89(2) YALE L. J. 213, 222 (1979). 
438See Porter, supra note 320, at 936. 
439Porter, id. at 937-38. 
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service offerings based on higher quality may be normatively 
preferred.440 
 
7. Normative Individualism and Ordoliberal Goals 
 
Determining the normative basis of competition law is essentially 
a political rather than a legal or economic issue that is unique to 
each country. This chapter does not attempt to determine which 
competition objectives should take precedence over others as this 
falls within the ambit of constitutional economics. However, the 
discussion here outlines some of the issues that have been raised 
in this respect within the constitutional economics literature.  
 
Constitutional economics provides tools for assessing normative 
questions. One of these tools is normative individualism - the 
idea that all normatively relevant values in society should be 
derived from the preferences of the individual members of 
society.441 The goal of competition should thus be a normative 
decision of the citizens of a country and should derive from the 
preferences of the citizens.442 One method that can help to 
appreciate citizen’s normative preferences from a constitutional 
perspective is through instituting ‘competition of competition 
laws’ or regulatory competition, which will allow citizens to 
choose the competition regulations that they most prefer.443 
                                                
440This is supported by Michael Porter, the leading strategy scholar, who advocates for 
using product differentiation as a competitive strategy to achieve sustained competitive 
advantage instead of price competition. Porter distinguished between ‘good 
competitors’ and ‘bad competitors’. Good competitors are ones that “reinforce 
desirable industry characteristics” and bad competitors “undermine existing industry 
structure, seek to obtain market share through price competition, and contribute to the 
commodification of the industry.” MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: 
CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 208, 214, 217 (The Free Press, 
1985); Waller, supra note 3, at 321-22. 
441See Kerber, supra note 279, at 100. 
442See Kerber, id. at 111. 
443 See Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver Budzinski, Towards a Differentiated Analysis of 
Competition of Competition Laws, 4 ZWeR – J. COMPETITION L. 411 (2003). 
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Assuming that different jurisdictions have different normative 
paradigms, if citizens are allowed to choose the jurisdiction 
whose competition law they prefer and if they have similar 
preferences, regulatory competition between jurisdictions could 
possibly make certain jurisdictions with a particular, more 
appealing normative paradigm more popular than others and 
cause less popular jurisdictions to ‘learn’ from these experiences 
and change their normative framework to accord with citizen’s 
preferences.444 
 
Moreover, normative individualism can be used to examine the 
normative basis of competition law by examining to what extent 
competition goals represent the preferences of individuals in 
society. For instance, the question of whether to give more 
importance to static or dynamic efficiencies can be resolved by 
empirically determining which one is more preferred by the 
citizens.445 
 
Using normative individualism, citizens may reject a total 
welfare standard because as consumers themselves, they may 
want to be protected against redistributions arising from firms 
with market power.446 From this perspective, citizens may have a 
greater preference for consumer welfare over total welfare since 
all citizens are ultimately also consumers. However, citizens who 
are owners of firms and factors of production will also want to 
protect their interests as producers. Thus, it is difficult to justify a 
competition system that only recognises the interests of 
consumers as the normative basis of competition law and does 
not recognise the rights of other market participants.447 
                                                
444 See Roger Van den Bergh, Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for 
Regulatory Competition in Europe, 53 KYKLOS 435 (2000) (providing a detailed 
discussion about the benefits and drawbacks of regulatory competition for satisfying 
citizen’s preferences). 
445See Kerber, supra note 279, at 111-112. 
446See Kerber, id. at 113. 
447See Kerber, id. at 116-117.  
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Extending the tools of normative individualism to 
Ordoliberalism, if citizens prefer competition on the merits, it can 
also form the normative basis of competition law. Thus, 
normative individualism might also provide an argument for 
Ordoliberalism in the normative structure of competition law. To 
describe this idea further, the central tenets of Ordoliberalism are 
to protect the economic freedom of consumers and firms.448 It 
can be argued that citizens may prefer to have the freedom to 
decide what to consume, what to produce and when to enter a 
market, even if interfering with these freedoms may increase 
consumer or total welfare.449 Citizens also have preferences about 
which business practices are meritorious and which ones are 
unacceptable because they infringe rights of competitors, buyers 
or sellers. In fact citizens often have strong views about when 
firms rightly deserve their profits. For instance, profits earned 
from creating new and better or more innovative products and 
reducing costs through better technology are preferred to profits 
earned from lobbying for protective measures, or through market 
power or competitive strategizing.450 Competitors should have 
the freedom to offer a good performance and consumers should 
then have the freedom to decide the relative quality of 
performance so that only firms with the better performance will 
move ahead.451 Such considerations “might be legitimate 
arguments in the discussion of the goals of competition policy 
from a constitutional economics perspective.”452 This is in line 
with the Ordoliberal view that only the quality of performance or 
competition on the merits should determine success in the 
market.453 In addition, with respect to the Ordoliberal mistrust of 
market power, Kerber argues that citizens also own firms or get 
                                                
448See Kerber, id. at 107. 
449See Kerber, id. at 114-115. 
450See Kerber, id. at 115. 
451See Kerber, id. at 115. 
452Kerber, id. at 115. 
453See Kerber, id. at 116. 
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wages from them and may view profits arising from the re-
distributional effects of market power to be normatively 
undesirable.454 
 
Thus, by employing normative individualism, a case can be made 
for Ordoliberal ideas to be included into the normative principles 
of competition law. It may also be that total welfare is 
normatively rejected under such an approach. However, such an 
analysis is still to be conducted and its results remain 
unconfirmed. Till then, the welfare-based approach is the 
dominant normative basis of competition law and no mechanism 
exists that allows Ordoliberal concepts to be integrated into the 
welfare-based approach. 
 
8. Illustrating the Impact of Differing Goals: The 
Google Case 
 
As discussed above, the normative basis of competition law is 
different in the US and EU. These differences can have an effect 
on the way in which competition law is enforced in these 
jurisdictions. The case on abuse of dominance against Google in 
the US and EU illustrates how the goals of competition laws 
affect the way in which competition authorities perceive 
competition issues and take decisions.   
 
The US FTC first investigated the allegations that Google was 
taking advantage of its dominance to give unfair preference to its 
own content on the Google general search results page and 
selectively demoting the content of competitors, in violation of 
section 5 of the FTC Act’s prohibition against unfair methods of 
competition and section 2 of the Sherman Act’s prohibition of 
monopolization or attempt to monopolize. Google was also 
charged with manipulating its search algorithm to demote 
                                                
454See Kerber, id. at 114. 
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websites that competed directly against Google’s comparison 
shopping services.455 While US and EU authorities have agreed 
on the material facts of the case, their conclusions have so far 
differed as the complaint has been dismissed in the US whereas 
in Europe a preliminary report has been issued against Google.  
 
In its investigation, the FTC questioned “whether Google 
changed its search results primarily to exclude actual or potential 
competitors and inhibit the competitive process, or on the other 
hand, to improve the quality of its search product and the overall 
user experience.”456 The FTC found that Google’s conduct was 
motivated by a desire to improve the quality of its search results 
rather than affect competitors and that adverse impact on 
competitors “from vigorous rivalry are a common by-product of 
‘competition on the merits’ and the competitive process that the 
law encourages.”457 Further, the FTC agreed that Google’s 
actions adversely affected Google’s competitors because these 
websites experienced significant decline in user traffic. However, 
the FTC concluded that the effect on competition was not 
important as consumers were benefited by the improved quality 
of Google’s search results. The FTC found that Google’s 
evolution from a neutral information compiler to an interested 
party biasing search results in favour of its own products or 
services was pro-competitive and enhanced consumer welfare.458 
This reasoning underscores the complete orientation towards 
consumer welfare in US antitrust analysis. 
 
                                                
455Comparison shopping services allow users to search and compare different products 
sold on online shopping websites 
456Statement of the FTC Regarding Google’s Search Practices In the Matter of Google 
Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/2013/01/statement-commission-regarding-googles-search-practices 
(hereinafter FTC Statement). 
457FTC Statement, id. 
458See Daniel A. Crane, After Search Neutrality: Drawing a Line Between Promotion 
and Demotion, 9(3) J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 397, 400-01 (2014). 
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The FTC did not address in much detail the competitive 
implications of Google’s selectively demoting certain rival 
websites. The FTC’s only comment on this point being that while 
these actions were causing significant losses to competitors, they 
could also be viewed as improving the over-all quality of 
Google’s search results and was accordingly in the best interest 
of consumers.459 These statements demonstrate that the impact of 
conduct on competition in the market is not a concern of the 
FTC. The FTC did not also consider whether Google could have 
improved the consumer experience in other, less intrusive ways. 
According to Crane, Google’s promoting its own services and 
demoting the services of rivals are two sides of the same coin so 
if it is pro-competitive for Google to promote its own services, it 
cannot be anticompetitive to demote the services of rivals.460 US 
antitrust authorities have also been extremely reluctant to 
interfere with the way that Google and other companies design 
their services, particularly in dynamic markets because it can 
chill innovation.461 The FTC was aware that a ruling against 
Google would signal to other firms that they are not encouraged 
to innovate to the point of dominance, because returns from 
innovation will be constrained by the application of competition 
laws.462 The reluctance to dis-incentivise innovation by dominant 
firms highlights the normative belief that monopolies are more 
likely to produce innovation. To contrast this with an Ordoliberal 
approach, the incentives of firms competing with Google would 
also be relevant under this approach so that all firms could 
continue to innovate and the competitive process is 
                                                
459See FTC Statement, supra note 456. 
460See Crane, supra note 458, at 404. 
461See Crane, id. at 401-02. 
462See Alden Abbott, The European Commission, Google and the Limits of Antitrust, 
Truth on the Market (Apr. 21, 2015), http://truthonthemarket.com/2015/04/21/the-
european-commission-google-and-the-limits-of-antitrust. 
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maintained.463 Ordoliberals fear that competition and 
consequently, innovation will be affected if competitors are not 
able to freely compete against dominant firms such as Google.  
This position is reflected in the EU’s investigation of Google 
 
In the EU, while we are still awaiting a final resolution of the 
case against Google, the EC’s preliminary view is that Google 
was abusing its dominant position in search services under 
Article 102 TFEU by systematically favouring its own 
comparison shopping services in its general search results page 
over those of competitors; thereby causing Google’s comparison 
shopping services to grow at the expense of rivals’ services.464 
The Commission said that Google’s conduct had a negative 
impact on consumers and innovation, as consumers do not 
necessarily see the most relevant shopping results and rivals’ 
incentives to innovate are reduced because they know that 
irrespective of the quality of their services, they will not achieve 
the same prominence as Google’s competing services.465 In the 
words of the EU Commissioner in charge of competition policy, 
Margrethe Vestager, “The Commission’s objective is to apply 
EU antitrust rules to ensure that companies…do not artificially 
deny European consumers as wide a choice as possible or stifle 
innovation.”466 The Commissioner also showed apprehension that 
Google was stifling competition by giving its own services an 
unfair advantage.467 The Commissioner’s statements about 
                                                
463See Behrens, supra note 359, at 21 (stating that EU “jurisprudence is not concerned 
with the effects of below-cost pricing on consumers’ welfare but on the process of 
competition and hence on the rivals of the dominant firm”). 
464See EC Fact Sheet, Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on 
Comparison Shopping Service (Apr. 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-15-4781_en.htm (hereinafter EC Fact Sheet). 
465EC Fact Sheet, id. 
466EC Press Release, Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on 
Comparison Shopping Service, Opens Separate Formal Investigation on Android (Apr. 
15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4780_en.htm (hereinafter EC 
Press Release). 
467See EC Press Release, id. 
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consumer choice and rival’s incentives to innovate have a 
distinctively Ordoliberal flavour since they consider protecting 
economic freedom and competitors chances of succeeding 
through competition on the merits. 
 
The General Court employed a similar approach in rejecting 
Microsoft’s efficiency defense in the tying case with Windows 
Media Player.468 The court was concerned that Microsoft was 
engaging in behaviour that took choices away from consumers. 
Additionally, the application of Article 102 TFEU to protect 
competition on the merits has generally meant keeping markets 
open for potential innovators.469 From a dynamic perspective, 
competition on the merits is the ability to present new products 
and services to customers and thereby encourage innovation, not 
only in technology but also in other aspects of business such as 
marketing and business methods.470 This contrasts with the US 
approach where competition on the merits means that aggressive 
competition should not be interfered with as a natural by-product 
of the competitive process. These differences can also be 
witnessed in how the ‘efficient competitor test’ is applied to 
conduct such as predatory pricing. Thus, under traditional welfare 
approaches the efficient competitor test is more favourably 
applied to protect incumbent dominant firms. This preserves 
homogeneity in markets, which gives incumbent firms a strong 
position.471 On the other hand, if the goal is to promote dynamic 
competition, agencies will look to give a chance to non-dominant 
firms in order to increase diversity in the market and preserve the 
freedom to compete.472 
                                                
468See Larouche & Schinkel, supra note 356, at 175. 
469See Larouche & Schinkel, id. at 174. 
470See Larouche & Schinkel, id. at 174. 
471See Horton, supra note 418.  
472 In this regard it is worth noting Wils’ argument that the efficient competitor test is 
contrary to the goal of maintaining undistorted competition in Article 102 TFEU 
because it allows dominant firms to exclude others on the basis of a decision of 
competition authorities that these other firms are not as efficient instead of letting these 
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Returning to the Google case, the dynamic nature of the relevant 
market in this case has made assessing the welfare consequences 
of Google’s conduct particularly difficult. In the US, where 
competition law is concerned with consumer welfare, the FTC 
based its decision on a finding that Google’s display of search 
results was benefitting consumers in the short-term. The FTC 
prioritised benefits to consumers over actual or potential 
exclusion of competitors. In contrast, the EC was more concerned 
with whether firms competing against Google in the market had 
the freedom to compete and to innovate. The EC has not 
explicitly stated as to how consumer welfare will be harmed in 
terms of higher prices, lower output or even product variety. The 
EC assumed that consumers would be harmed if competitors 
were restricted from competing on the merits because consumer 
choice will be restricted. These differences of opinion illustrate 
the relevance of normative principles to competition agencies’ 
decisions.   
9. Conclusion 
 
The consumer welfare/total welfare standard dominates the debate 
on the goals of competition law because it provides a logical basis 
for determining market outcomes and a clear prescription of 
market conduct. Yet, it falls short of providing a sufficiently 
satisfactory normative foundation for competition policy.473 This 
may be because industrial organisation, which forms the basis of 
the economic analysis of competition law, is not a discipline 
focused on answering normative questions.474 The efficiency-
oriented perspective thus, does not meet the normative ideal. 
Nevertheless, other approaches also fall short of providing a 
                                                                                                       
firms compete freely in the market to decide which firm is most efficient. See Wils, 
supra note 378, at 430. 
473See Schweitzer, supra note 304, at 175 (citing the views of Martin Hellwig and 
Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker). 
474See Kerber, supra note 279, at 93-94. 
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suitable normative basis for competition law. Another problem is 
that it is difficult to integrate differing objectives into a single 
normative framework. For instance, consumer welfare only 
considers the short-term effects of market conduct and ignores 
dynamic efficiencies. This is particularly problematic because in 
an ideal world static and dynamic efficiencies should be balanced 
against each other. While competition authorities have recently 
taken efforts to recognise dynamic efficiencies, there is not much 
by way of guidance on what authorities should do in case of 
conflict between static and dynamic efficiencies.  
 
In this context it is worth noting that deciding what objectives 
should be pursued by competition law in a jurisdiction is 
ultimately a decision of the people of that jurisdiction, which 
often depends on prevailing cultural and social values. This can 
mean that preferences will vary among people in different 
jurisdictions and thus, the objectives of competition law can 
diverge in different countries. The goals of competition are 
important because they guide competition enforcement and can in 
some cases dictate the outcomes of competition decisions. 
Accordingly, the different nature of competition enforcement in 
different jurisdictions can be a result of differing objectives within 
a country. Any discussion of competition law must be conducted 
within the appropriate normative framework. This chapter thus 
sets the stage for the discussion on predatory pricing and mergers 
in the following chapters by outlining the normative basis in 
which such a discussion will take place. 
 
This chapter has discussed three commonly stated objectives of 
competition law and has found that Ordoliberal objectives are 
more amenable to behavioural insights. A key observation of 
behavioural studies is that firm behaviour is heterogeneous and 
cannot always be unambiguously predicted. Also, decision-
making within firms is not only motivated by profits but by a 
number of other factors as well. On the other hand, key to the 
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welfare-based approach is the ability to predict market outcomes 
by relying on certain assumptions including firm rationality. 
Behavioural insights cannot contribute much to this framework 
because they do not provide clear predictions of how market 
outcomes will change when the rationality assumption is relaxed. 
Nevertheless, as Stucke has argued, behavioural studies can more 
usefully contribute to the process-oriented view of competition. 
This chapter provides arguments for why it is easier for 
behavioural studies to contribute within the Ordoliberal 
perspective of competition. 
 
Ordoliberal objectives also further the ideas of dynamic 
competition, which shares many common principles with 
behavioural theory. In this way behavioural theory can 
additionally contribute to competition law within the Ordoliberal 
framework by providing a better perspective of dynamic 
competition. One problem is that it is not easy to assess dynamic 
efficiencies since they occur in the long-term and thus considering 
the potential impact of conduct on innovation is often difficult. 
This chapter suggests that a tool from business studies i.e., 
competitive strategic analysis can be used for this purpose. 
Competitive strategy provides a mechanism for understanding the 
competitive position of a firm over time and can help to 
understand the likely long-term decisions of firms.  
 
Ordoliberal thought is unique to European competition law and 
Ordoliberal objectives are found in EU law and not in current US 
law. Behavioural studies can thus more easily contribute to EU 
competition law than to US antitrust law. The next chapters of 
this book will further reflect on the dichotomy between US and 
EU law with respect to their openness to behavioural theories. It 
should be noted however, that making any definitive arguments in 
favour of or against any normative structure is outside the scope 
of this chapter. This chapter has merely highlighted the existing 
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debates within the field and pointed to relevant literature that 
provides support for behavioural views within Ordoliberalism.
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CHAPTER IV 
The Bounded Rationality of Firms and the 
Role of Intent in Predatory Pricing Law 
1. Introduction 
 
Predatory pricing is a form of exclusionary conduct punishable 
by competition laws under the offence of abuse of dominance in 
EU law and under the offence of monopolisation or attempt to 
monopolise in US law. Predatory pricing can be described as a 
dominant firm’s sacrifice of short-term profits in order to exclude 
competitors and increase market share in the long-term. The 
typical understanding of predatory pricing thus involves different 
stages: prices below cost in the first stage, the exit of competitors 
who can no longer make a profit in the second stage and finally, 
the predator’s charging of monopoly prices in the third stage.475 
 
This chapter asks how the insight that firms are boundedly 
rational can impact the law of predatory pricing? This question is 
relevant because the law of predation, at least in some 
jurisdictions is created on the assumption that firms are rational, 
profit-maximizers. However, as has been discussed in previous 
chapters a growing body of literature from across different 
disciplines including psychology, economics and management 
studies has questioned the rationality of firms and has shown that 
in reality firms often act in ways that are boundedly rational.476 
                                                
475Wallace v. IBM, 467 F.3d 1104, 1106 (7th Cir. 2006) (cited in DOJ Report, infra note 
480, at 67). 
476For a more detailed discussion of the application of behavioural theories to 
understanding firm conduct see Shilpi Bhattacharya & Roger Van den Bergh, The 
Contribution of Management Studies to Understanding Firm Behaviour and 
Competition Law, 37 WORLD COMPETITION 515 (2014). 
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This chapter furthers existing behavioural insights in the area of 
intent and recoupment in predatory pricing law.477 Scholars such 
as Leslie and Tor have criticised the recoupment requirement in 
US predatory pricing law on the grounds that it is based on a 
conception of firm rationality that does not reflect the reality of 
firm behaviour. On the other hand, the requirement of intent 
makes room for a more realistic understanding of firm behaviour 
and can also incorporate insights from behavioural and 
management studies. This chapter uses case studies to show how 
introducing evidence of intent can assist in clarifying the 
outcomes of predatory pricing cases. In addition, this chapter 
demonstrates how literature from behavioural and business 
studies can be helpful to understanding the behaviour of the firms 
involved in predation. 
 
The rest of this chapter is divided into the following parts. Part II 
discusses the law of predatory pricing in the US and the 
economic understanding that forms the basis for it. Part III 
discusses EU predatory pricing law and distinguishes it from US 
law. The primary point of difference between the two is that EU 
law does not require proof of recoupment. Part IV describes the 
post-Chicago scholarship on predatory pricing and highlights the 
evolution and change in the economic understanding of predatory 
pricing over time. Part V examines how the notion of the firm as 
boundedly rational can have an impact on the law of predatory 
pricing. Part VI describes the role of intent in predatory pricing 
law and the potential of behavioural theories to contribute to 
better understanding intent. The rest of the chapter conducts three 
case studies that highlight how firms’ decisions to engage in 
predatory pricing can be boundedly rational. Part VII studies 
predatory pricing by the Cardiff Bus Co. in the UK. Part VIII 
discusses the US v. American Airlines case is the US. Part IX 
                                                
477See Colm O’Grady, The Role of Exclusionary Intent in the Enforcement of Article 
102 TFEU, 37(4) WORLD COMPETITION 459 (2014). 
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discusses the potential predatory pricing behaviour of Amazon. 
The Amazon case is useful to examine what kind of price cuts 
may be benign or have an anticompetitive intent. Part X 
concludes the discussion.  
2. US Predatory Pricing Law 
 
The US law of predatory pricing was laid down by the US 
Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in Matsushita Elec. 
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.478 and Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.479 The court’s two-step 
requirement for establishing predatory pricing continues to be 
followed by antitrust agencies and courts in the US today.480 The 
test requires plaintiffs to establish that the predator is pricing 
below some measure of its cost and that the predator has a 
“reasonable prospect” under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act (as 
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act), or a “dangerous 
probability” under section 2 of the Sherman Act, of recouping its 
below-cost prices.481 
 
Before the decision in Matsushita, the US law on predatory 
pricing was quite different. In Utah Pie Co. v. Continental 
Baking Co.482 the court found declining prices along with the 
intention to harm competition sufficient for predatory pricing. At 
the time that the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936 
were enacted, selective price-cutting that harmed smaller 
competitors was considered injurious to competition because 
smaller firms were thought in need of protection against larger 
                                                
478475 U.S. 574 (1986) (hereinafter Matsushita). 
479509 U.S. 209 (1993) (hereinafter Brooke Group). 
480See Price Predation, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRICE PREDATION, COMPETITION AND 
MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 49, 59 
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.htm (hereinafter 
DOJ Report). 
481See Brooke Group, supra note 479, at 223-24 (citing Matsushita, supra note 478, at 
589). 
482386 U.S. 685 (1967). 
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firms, who had cost advantages simply because of their size.483 
However, influenced by the opinion of economists such as John 
McGee who argued that predatory pricing is extremely rare since 
rational firms will not engage in such conduct,484 the Matsushita 
court held that “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and 
even more rarely successful”.485 The change in the law of 
predation was driven by the belief that the low standards for 
competitive injury prevailing at the time did not further antitrust 
laws’ concern for consumer welfare and price competition. The 
Matsushita court felt that if it were easy to establish predatory 
pricing, this would discourage firms from engaging in price 
competition and would result in antitrust law becoming a means 
for high market prices.486 The Matsushita court did not want 
firms selling at low prices to be punished for succeeding in the 
very act that they were being encouraged to undertake.487 
Subsequently, these views were affirmed by the Supreme Court’s 
Brooke Group decision, where it was stated that low prices could 
reflect the low cost structure of a more efficient firm.488 These 
rulings have made it much harder for plaintiffs to successfully 
establish a claim of predatory pricing in the US. Moreover, 
antitrust agencies and courts are particularly skeptical of 
punishing above-cost price reductions in order to avoid 
discouraging price competition.489 
 
The price-cost threshold is an important aspect of the law of 
predatory pricing. In this regard, US courts have adopted the 
                                                
483See Dorsey & Jacobson, supra note 338, at 5. 
484See John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. L & 
ECON. 137 (Oct., 1958) (arguing that predatory pricing is not a profitable strategy for 
eliminating competitors, particularly when compared to the alternative of acquiring the 
competitor. Further, it requires the predator to already have monopoly power and is 
therefore, unlikely to be employed for monopolizing a market). 
485Matsushita, supra note 478, at 589. 
486Brooke Group, supra note 479, at 227. 
487See Dorsey & Jacobson, supra note 338, at 16. 
488Brooke Group, supra note 479, at 225-226. 
489See Dorsey & Jacobson, supra note 338, at 16. 
65A_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Competition Law and Bounded Rationality 

 
 
 
 
126 
Areeda-Turner test that prices below average variable costs are 
predatory. However, measuring costs is not easy and 
disagreements often occur about whether costs have been 
measured correctly. Further, the Areeda-Turner test has come 
under criticism from those who consider that average variable 
costs are not an appropriate threshold for predation. For instance, 
firms may cut prices below average variable costs more easily in 
markets with high fixed costs and low variable costs.490 Others 
have suggested that predatory prices need not be below cost and 
instead it is enough to show that firms are sacrificing profits, as 
the sacrifice of profits suggests that there may be some strategic 
behaviour at play worthy of further examination for its 
anticompetitive effects.491 One example of such behaviour is 
when a low cost monopolist uses its advantages strategically to 
eliminate competition without having to price below costs.492 As 
a result, the price-cost test of predation has been modified over 
time and the DOJ has more recently stated that the appropriate 
measure of cost is some measure of incremental cost, such as 
average avoidable costs.493 The DOJ considers that the measure 
of cost should reveal whether sales were unprofitable or irrational 
but for their exclusionary effect.494 Interestingly, the DOJ’s 
statement follows a logic similar to the test used to determine 
intent in EU law and could be taken as a testament to the inherent 
link between price-cost tests and intent in predatory pricing law. 
  
                                                
490See Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 48 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel 
Sokol eds., Oxford University Press, 2015).  
491See Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American Airlines Case: A Chance to 
Clarify Predation Policy, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, 
AND POLICY 502, 509 (4th ed., John Kwoka Jr. & Lawrence White eds., Oxford 
University Press, 2004), http://works.bepress.com/aaron_edlin/26.  
492See Edlin & Farrell, id. at 508. 
493 DOJ Report, supra note 480, at 60. 
494See DOJ Report, id. at 60. 
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3. EU Predatory Pricing Law 
 
EU law of predatory pricing differs from the US law discussed 
above as EU law does not have a recoupment requirement but 
rather requires establishing the intention to eliminate 
competition.495 Some commentators argue that there is no need 
for a separate recoupment requirement because the ability to 
recoup is already assumed within the conception of dominance in 
EU law.496 However, this view does not find uniform support 
among legal scholars. EU law treats predatory pricing in the 
following way: (i) if a dominant firm prices below average 
variable cost, such practice is considered abusive in itself and no 
further proof of predatory pricing is required; and (ii) if a 
dominant firm prices below average total costs but above average 
variable costs, the firm will be guilty of predatory pricing if it can 
be established that the pricing was part of a plan for eliminating a 
competitor.497 The European Commission’s Guidance Paper 
published in 2008 retains the cost and intent format for predatory 
pricing but refines the cost requirement by using average 
avoidable costs and long-run average incremental costs instead of 
average variable costs and total costs, respectively. This is 
because in the case of prices below average avoidable costs, 
predatory intent is presumed, whereas, in relation to prices below 
long-run average incremental costs but above average avoidable 
costs, the existence of a plan to eliminate competition must be 
proved.498 
 
EU law does not provide a precise approach on how costs should 
be calculated for predatory pricing. The general approach has 
                                                
495 PETIT & NEYRINCK, supra note 247, at 203.  
496See O’Grady, supra note 477, at 478-79. 
497France Télécom SA v. Commission of the European Communities, T-340/03, § 8, 
Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber, Extended Composition) (Jan. 
2007) (hereinafter Wanadoo I), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=t-340/03&td=ALL. 
498See O’Grady, supra note 477, at 484. 
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been that price-cost rules should not be applied mechanically but 
keeping in mind the broader framework of the law i.e., to prevent 
abuses by dominant firms.499 For instance, European courts are 
more likely to find prices predatory when they are reduced in 
response to new entry.500 
 
Petit and Neyrinck are of the view that EU law on abuse of 
dominance is more sympathetic to behavioural scholarship than 
US law because it does not require proof of plausible 
recoupment.501 Petit and Neyrinck even go so far as to say that 
the EU law on abuse of dominance may have “drawn inspiration 
from” behavioural economics.502 This is also because EU courts 
have found the motives of firms to be more relevant than their 
economic ability to exclude.503 The rest of this chapter furthers 
the premise of Petit and Neyrinck’s view that EU law is more 
open to behavioural insights. 
 
4. The Post-Chicago View of Predatory Pricing 
 
The law of predatory pricing described above was strongly 
influenced by prevailing economic theories propounded by 
economists belonging to the Chicago school. Nevertheless, post-
Chicago scholarship as questioned the view that predatory pricing 
is unlikely to occur. It argues that rational firms will engage in 
welfare-reducing predatory pricing more often than was 
previously anticipated in the economic literature.504 Post-Chicago 
scholarship uses game theory, which models strategic thinking by 
                                                
499See RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 830 (Oxford University 
Press, 7th ed., 2012). 
500See WHISH & BAILEY, id. at 753. 
501 PETIT & NEYRINCK, supra note 247, at 206. 
502PETIT & NEYRINCK, id. at 209. 
503PETIT & NEYRINCK, id. at 206. 
504See Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust, in 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537, 539 (Richard Schmalensee & R.D. 
Willig eds., Elsevier Publishers, vol. 1, 1989).  
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anticipating the decisions of rivals over single or multiple time 
periods (through either finite or infinitely repeated ‘games’).505 
By modeling decision-making over multiple time periods, game 
theoretic models have been able to overcome some of the 
limitations of the static models employed in neoclassical 
economics. In fact the more interesting insights from the post-
Chicago scholarship have come from relaxing unrealistic 
assumptions such as perfect information. Introducing asymmetric 
information into game theoretic models has provided insights into 
strategic firm behavior including signaling effects, reputation 
building and bluffing.506 Another interesting insight of post-
Chicago scholarship is the concept of raising rivals’ cost which 
presents the idea that dominant firms can strategically impair a 
smaller rival’s ability to compete so that its unable to constrain 
the dominant firm’s exercise of market power.507 According to 
Dorsey and Jacobson, this framework is more useful for analyzing 
exclusionary conduct than the narrow framework under which 
predatory pricing has traditionally been examined.508 
 
Game-theoretic models of predation can be divided into three 
broad categories: (i) models of asymmetric financial constraints: 
these models recognise that the incumbent firm’s better access to 
financing to fund predatory pricing can give the incumbent firm 
an advantage over rivals. An incumbent firm may have superior 
financial reserves than a smaller rival because of its larger 
operational scale, or the incumbent firm can acquire greater 
financial reserves than a smaller entrant if it is operating in other 
markets in which it already enjoys an advantage due to a superior 
market position. For these reasons, a larger incumbent with deep 
pockets can finance a predatory strategy with greater ease than its 
                                                
505See Ordover & Saloner, id. at 539. 
506See John S. Dodgson & Y. Katsoulacos, Competition, Contestability and Predation: 
The Economics of Predation in De-regulated Bus Markets, 15 TRANSPORTATION, 
PLANNING & TECHNOLOGY 263, 267 (1991).  
507See Dorsey & Jacobson, supra note 338, at 19. 
508See Dorsey & Jacobson, id. at 19. 
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smaller rival and thus, a threat of post-entry predation is more 
credible in the presence of asymmetric financial constraints.509 
(ii) Reputation-based models: these models show that a rational 
incumbent firm can use predatory pricing as an investment to 
build a reputation for aggressively fighting entry by cutting prices 
when entry occurs so that future entry into the same market or 
another market is deterred because future entrants expect that 
entry will be met with aggression by the incumbent;510 and (iii) 
signaling models: these models are based on the existence of 
information asymmetries between the incumbent and entrant with 
respect to the incumbent’s costs, market demand or other 
prevailing market parameters. As the entrant firm does not have 
complete information, by cutting prices the incumbent firm can 
signal to the entrant that it is producing at lower costs, or that 
market demand is lower than it actually is and consequently 
discourage entry.511 
 
Using this framework some members of the post-Chicago school 
have criticized the use of a price-cost framework in predatory 
pricing by arguing that the threshold level of marginal 
costs/average variable costs does not necessarily reflect an 
exclusionary level of pricing.512 Rather, a dominant firm can 
threaten competitors by pricing at a level that builds a reputation 
for aggression or signals to the rival that it should not 
enter/remain in the market. That level does not need to meet a 
price cost threshold.513 
 
In sum, the post-Chicago scholarship suggests that predatory 
pricing is more likely to occur than predicted by traditional 
models in markets where there is imperfect and asymmetric 
                                                
509See Ordover & Saloner, supra note 504, at 546. 
510See Kreps & Wilson, supra note 262, at 253-54. 
511Ordover & Saloner, supra note 504, at 546; see also Kreps & Wilson, id. at 253. 
512See Ordover & Saloner, id. at 582. 
513See Ordover & Saloner, id. at 582. 
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information, scale economies, inter-temporal and inter-market 
cost and revenue linkages and barriers to entry.514 While some of 
these concepts such as reputation-effects have been incorporated 
into the law, much of post-Chicago literature has had little impact 
on the law of predation. The limitation of post-Chicago game 
theoretic models are that while they show that under certain 
specific conditions firms will engage in predation, they do not 
rule out possible alternative explanations including efficiency 
reasons for that conduct. Lao argues that intent can be used to 
choose between alternative outcomes offered by post-Chicago 
models and to find which explanation is the more likely one.515 
Thus, intent can be a tool for overcoming some of the 
shortcomings of the application of post-Chicago theory into the 
law of predatory pricing.516 
 
5. The Bounded Rationality of Firms and Predation 
 
Decisions made by firms in strategic contexts are likely to be 
boundedly rational because in complex market contexts firms’ 
managers take decisions based on their anticipation of numerous 
variables such as changing market conditions, consumer 
preferences, evolving technology and the likely response of 
rivals. Further, cognitive limitations drive managers to rely on 
their previous experiences and take decisions based on intuition 
rather than on rational calculations of profits.517 Strategic 
decisions within firms are influenced by the vision of the firm’s 
top management such as achieving a certain level of growth 
within a specific time frame and can motivate predation. 
                                                
514Ordover & Saloner, id. at 591. 
515See Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis 
54 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 174 (2004). 
516See Lao, id. at 174.  
517On managers’ preference to use intuition rather than the answers provided by 
algorithms see Berkeley J. Dietvorst, Joseph P. Simmons & Cade Massey, Algorithm 
Aversion: People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms After Seeing them Err, 144(1) J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 114 (Feb. 2015). 
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Moreover, managers’ overconfidence can cause mistakes in their 
perception of their ability to successfully carry out predatory 
pricing. All these factors can affect the rationality of firm 
decision-making.  
 
Consequently, there is reason to argue that the assumption of firm 
rationality on which the law of predatory pricing is based may 
not be accurate. This was also the view in the dissenting opinion 
of Matsushita, which criticized the majority for not even 
considering evidence that was inconsistent with the assumption 
of rationality. Rather, the dissenting opinion argued that profit 
maximization by firms should not be assumed but should be left 
for the jury to decide. Scholars such as Leslie have also criticized 
the assumption of rationality in predatory pricing law. Leslie 
gives various examples of ‘irrational’ decision-making by firms 
such as firms’ unprofitably maintaining excess capacity, 
expanding output and destroying valuable assets without using 
them.518 One way in which firms have been characterized as 
irrational is when firms are vengeful, for instance, firms can act 
to reduce their profits when their competitors are harmed to a 
greater extent from such conduct.519 
 
The behavioural literature on firm conduct can be used to throw 
light on predatory pricing law in two ways: (i) by applying 
behavioural biases observed among people to managers of firms, 
and (ii) by studying decision-making processes within firms in 
strategic contexts to understand why firms take decisions to 
predate.520 With respect to the first point, there is sizeable 
behavioural literature illustrating how individual biases can affect 
predatory pricing decisions and outcomes. Gerla draws from 
                                                
518See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158(2) U. PENN. L. REV. 
261, 284-85 (2010). 
519See Leslie, id. at 284-85; see also Dibadj, supra note 241, at 1459. 
520See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 22, 
PREDATORY PRICING 47 (1996) (hereinafter ABA MONOGRAPH). 
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Tversky and Kahneman’s findings on framing effects and 
‘Prospect Theory’ to argue that managers in firms that are loosing 
market share to new entrants are more likely to engage in 
predatory pricing because people are loss averse or less willing to 
take risks with respect to gains than with respect to losses.521 
People have been found to prefer an uncertain but larger loss to a 
definite but lower loss and conversely, prefer a smaller but 
definite gain to a larger but uncertain gain. When applied to 
predatory pricing, Gerla argues that managers in firms loosing 
market share to new entrants will view the decision to predate as 
weighing the probabilistic but potentially larger losses from 
predation against the definite but likely smaller loss of allowing 
the entrant to continue to take market share away from them. Due 
to loss aversion, managers will take the risks of predation in order 
to avoid the definite loss of market share to new entry even 
though it is not always a rational decision.522 Interestingly, 
Gerla’s arguments that managers engage in predation to avoid 
losses from new entry makes the likelihood of predation 
dependent on whether the decision is framed as a potential gain 
or loss in the mind of the manager.523 
 
In addition, Gerla argues that managers’ decisions to engage in 
predatory pricing may be a factor of their inability to estimate 
probabilities accurately.524 Behavioural findings suggest that 
people tend to overestimate small probabilities and underestimate 
large probabilities. Managers taking decisions to engage in 
predation may subjectively overestimate their chances of success, 
even though objectively there is only a small chance of 
success.525 Further, once managers decide to engage in predatory 
pricing, they may irrationally continue pursuing the course of 
                                                
521See Harry S. Gerla, The Psychology of Predatory Pricing: Why Predatory Pricing 
Pays, 39 SW. L. J. 755,761-763 (1985). 
522See Gerla, id. at 761-763. 
523See Gerla, id. at 763. 
524See Gerla, id. at 762. 
525See Gerla, id. at 762. 
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action even if it is loss making because of self-serving biases.526 
Managers may also mistakenly assess the success rates associated 
with a campaign of predation. For example, managers might be 
overconfident in their ability to drive competitors from the 
market, or they may incorrectly believe that their target does not 
have the ability to fight a protracted and aggressive price war. A 
predator may inaccurately estimate the length of time that the 
predation will have to continue in order to succeed.527 Further, as 
Tor argues, a boundedly rational predator might underestimate 
the extent of new entry and therefore, engage in predation even 
when barriers to entry are low.528 All of these factors can affect 
the probability of successful predation. 
 
The other aspect in which the literature on firm’s bounded 
rationality can be applied to predatory pricing is by using 
literature that highlights the “flaws” or reality of decision-making 
processes within firms, which causes firm’s decisions to depart 
from rationality. Firm’s decisions are often guided by 
overarching objectives, which are not always connected to 
profits. Firms may have different goals, cultures and values. For 
instance, growing market shares is more important to Japanese 
firms than profits.529 This was a factor disregarded by the 
Supreme Court in Matsushita.530 In his critique of the case Leslie 
shows that Japanese firms commonly adopt a strategy where they 
first seek to achieve economies of scale / dominance in their 
home country (Japan) and subsequently, capitalise on the profits 
earned at home to enter international markets by selling at low 
prices.531 The reason that Japanese firms adopt this kind of 
                                                
526 Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a Behaviorally Informed Approach to Antitrust Law: 
The Case of Predatory Pricing, 18 ANTITRUST 52, 55 (2003). 
527Leslie, supra note 518, at 307. 
528See Tor, supra note 526. 
529See Steven F. Benz, Below Cost Sales and the Buying of Market Share, 42(3) STAN. 
L. REV. 695, 708 (1990). 
530See Matsushita, supra note 478, at 574. 
531Leslie, supra note 518, at 292. 
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strategy is that (as mentioned above) unlike Western firms, 
Japanese firms are more preoccupied with increasing market 
share than with increasing returns on investments.532 As Leslie 
argued, the behaviour of the allegedly predatory Japanese firms 
that the Matsushita court found to be irrational and thereby 
unlikely to have occurred exactly followed the description 
provided here of commonly adopted strategies of Japanese 
firms.533 The plaintiffs in Matsushita argued that the predators, 
who were Japanese firms, had colluded to raise prices in Japan 
and used those profits to finance a strategy of selling below cost 
in the US market in order to gain market share. The court was not 
convinced of this line of argument because the plaintiff’s theory 
of predatory conduct did not follow from that of a rational firm 
and therefore, such conduct could not have occurred at all as a 
matter of law.534 Thus, the Matsushita court ignored evidence of 
below cost pricing on the grounds that predatory pricing could 
not have occurred since rational firms would not have prioritised 
growth over profits.535 As will be discussed in greater detail 
below, firms often prioritise growth over profits in the real world. 
 
Further, the Matsushita court also reasoned that rational firms 
would be unwilling to engage in predatory pricing when the 
success of recoupment remained uncertain. This has also been 
criticised by Leslie who pointed out that firms in real life often 
operate and take decisions in extreme uncertainty where outcomes 
of decisions are only clear at later points in time.536 In the words 
of Leslie:  
“More importantly, the [Matsushita] Court’s effort to 
conflate uncertainty of outcomes with implausibility of 
attempt betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of how 
businesses function. Most business ventures require an 
                                                
532See Leslie, id.at 294. 
533See Leslie, id.at 292. 
534Leslie, id. at 268-69. 
535See Leslie, id. at 305-06. 
536See Leslie, id. at 305. 
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upfront investment that must be made without any 
assurance that the outlay will be profitable. No business 
makes an investment in new products, new distribution 
methods, or other improvements knowing for certain that 
the investment will pay off. Business is about taking 
risks.”537 
 
Consequently, the manner in which businesses actually operate 
and take decisions can be quite different from the theoretical 
assumptions of firm decision-making on which the law of 
predatory pricing is based. Since predatory pricing is part of a 
firm’s competitive strategy, understanding how businesses 
actually formulate their strategic positions may play a key role in 
understanding in what situations firms engage in anticompetitive 
pricing. This chapter consequently uses insights from 
management studies to inform predatory pricing law and in 
particular, the understanding of predatory intent.  
5.1 Business Strategy 
 
The field of business strategy in management studies is generally 
concerned with how firms achieve competitive advantage within 
an industry and is based on empirical observations of firm 
behaviour as well as the case study method of analysing specific 
business decisions.538 A firm’s strategic decisions are a reflection 
of how it intends to compete to achieve its goals based on its 
vision and values. Literature within business strategy shows that 
understanding a firm’s strategic decisions is particularly complex 
because firms can deal with competitors in many different ways 
and there are no clear prescriptions about how these decisions 
should be made or which strategic decisions are better. This is 
                                                
537Leslie, id. at 306. 
538See Michael J. Lennox, Foundations of Business Strategy (Course at the University 
of Virginia Darden School of Business, 2014), 
https://www.coursera.org/course/strategy101. 
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evident from the many strategic errors made by firms in the 
history of business. Some of the commonly made strategic errors 
include decisions to expand operations too fast, not expanding 
operations fast enough, not keeping pace with technical advances 
or changing consumer preferences and strategic inertia or sticking 
to a strategy that has worked in the past without testing its 
potential in current market conditions. 
 
Firms often formulate their competitive strategy by targeting 
particular competitors. Deciding which firms to target depends on 
the extent of a firm’s awareness of its competitors. Awareness 
refers to the extent to which competitors recognise the degree of 
their market commonality and resource similarity with other 
firms.539 A firm’s motivation to take competitive actions against 
other firms is also influenced by the degree of there market 
commonality as there is more at stake when firms share more 
market commonality i.e., they compete with each other more 
closely and in different ways.540 Further, the success of a 
competitive move targeted at another firm will depend on the 
difference in resources between the firms. If the target firm has a 
similar resource level as the attacking firm,it will be more 
difficult for the competitive move to succeed. This could also 
mean that firms will be more careful before launching a 
competitive move against a firm that has comparatively more or 
equivalent resources from its own. Internal firm capabilities are 
thus, an important aspect of competitive strategy. Competitive 
strategy is best undertaken as a firm-specific exercise and 
requires an analysis of markets as well as the internal resources 
of a firm.541 
 
                                                
539See Ming-Jer Chen, Competitor Analysis and Inter-Firm Rivalry: Towards a 
Theoretical Integration, 21(1) ACAD. MGMT. REV. 100, 110 (Jan., 1996). 
540See Chen, id. at 110-111. 
541See Chen, id. at 103. 
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For the purposes of the present analysis, the competitive 
strategies adopted by businesses can be classified into two broad 
categories: firms compete by differentiating their product 
offerings through new and innovative products and services, or 
by selling the same products and services at a price lower than 
their competitors by being unique low-cost providers.542 Within 
these broad strategic considerations firms employ certain 
standard competitive methods. Firms pursuing cost leadership, 
for instance, keep costs lower than their competitors by generally 
offering standardised products with broadly acceptable product 
features at the lowest price. Other firms keep costs low in narrow 
segments and during strategic periods such as entry into new 
markets.543 On the other hand, firms trying to differentiate 
themselves generally charge a price premium from unique 
features that customers demand. Firms can also focus on a 
particular buyer group for instance, by targeting a small, often 
premium segment of the market where customers’ willingness to 
pay is high.544 Firms prefer to compete through product 
differentiation since it can provide sustained competitive 
advantage.545 Firms can achieve product differentiation by raising 
barriers to entry, switching costs and mobility barriers.546 
 
Understanding a firm’s competitive strategy often involves 
comprehending the behavioural limitations involved in a firm’s 
decision-making rather than sticking to a predetermined 
paradigm of firm behaviour. Firms are often guided by 
behavioural biases and cognitive limitations in forming and 
defending their strategic positions. Once a strategy works, a firm 
may pursue it for longer than is optimal. It may hesitate to change 
its competitive position due to competitive inertia. Firms may 
                                                
542See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 12-14 (1985); Waller, supra 
note 3, at 320. 
543See Lennox, supra note 538. 
544See PORTER, supra note 542, at 15; Waller, supra note 3, at 320. 
545PORTER, id. at 7; Waller, id. at 321.  
546PORTER, id. at 7; Waller, id. at 321. 
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also prefer to imitate the strategies of other firms rather than take 
decisions based on rational, profit-maximization. For these 
reasons, strategic decisions are not always taken in a rational way 
and the models of predatory pricing based on the assumption that 
firms are rational decision-makers may not adequately reflect the 
reality of firm behaviour. 
 
6. Bounded Rationality and the Role of Intent in 
Predatory Pricing 
 
Intent plays an important role in predatory pricing law in the EU. 
Some commentators have even argued that intent is the only legal 
criteria in EU predatory pricing law under the ruling in AKZO 
because when prices are below average variable cost, 
exclusionary intent is presumed to exist and when prices are 
above average variable costs but below average total costs, intent 
must be proven.547 This argument considers the price-cost test as 
a proxy for anticompetitive intent. Others have argued that intent 
can serve as a useful supplement to the price-cost rule because 
costs are not always accurately measurable. Further, since pricing 
below full cost can occur for reasons other than predation, intent 
can show the presence of a predatory strategy.548 
                                                
547See Anne-Lise Sibony, Limits of Imports from Economics into Competition Law, in 
THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW 39, 49 (Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol 
eds., Stanford University Press, 2012). The reasoning of the court in AKZO v. 
Commission as stated by the ECJ in the Wanadoo decision is that, “The Court of Justice 
has held, first, that prices below average variable costs must be considered prima facie 
abusive in as much as, in applying such prices, an undertaking in a dominant position is 
presumed to pursue no other economic objective save that of eliminating its 
competitors. Secondly, prices below average total costs but above average variable 
costs are to be considered abusive only where they are fixed in the context of a plan 
having the purpose of eliminating a competitor.” France Télécom v. Commission of the 
European Communities, C-202/07P §109 Judgment of the First Chamber (Apr., 2009) 
(hereinafter Wanadoo II)  (citing AKZO v. Commission, C-62/86 §70-71 Judgment of 
the Fifth Chamber (Jul., 1991)). 
548 Douglas F. Greer, A Critique of Areeda and Turner’s Standard for Predatory 
Prices, 24 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 233, 242 (1979). 
72A_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Competition Law and Bounded Rationality 

 
 
 
 
140 
 
Scholars from the Chicago school have criticized the use of intent 
in predatory pricing because it is not objectively measurable. 
Another limitation of intent is that it is very difficult to 
distinguish between the intent to compete on the merits and the 
intent to exclude. In the famous words of Justice Easterbrook, 
“[f]irms want to grow; they love to crush their rivals; indeed, 
these desires are the wellsprings of rivalry and the source of 
enormous benefit for consumers.”549 Thus, since intent is not 
easy to define, an intent requirement can chill competition by 
punishing genuine price-cutting behaviour.550 Another problem 
with the intent requirement is that it is easy to manipulate since 
companies with good legal advisors can easily cover their tracks 
by removing any paper trail that would evidence intent, whereas 
companies without such advisors may fall into the intent trap.551 
Nevertheless, some scholars argue that intent should be made an 
element of predatory pricing law in the US, as it would add 
clarity to existing law.552 In fact, before the Matsushita opinion, 
intent was also used in US predatory pricing law to distinguish 
between exclusionary conduct and competition on the merits 
because it helped to know “why a dominant firm implemented an 
alleged exclusionary practice or what it wanted to 
accomplish.”553 The role generally given to intent is to use it to 
distinguish between healthy, competitive pricing and 
anticompetitive pricing.554 
 
                                                
549Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization: Past, Present and Future, 61 ANTITRUST L. 
J. 99, 102-03 (1992). 
550To the contrary, data from the enforcement of predatory pricing in the EU indicates 
that an intent requirement does not lead to over-enforcement of predatory pricing. See 
O’Grady, supra note 477, at 465. 
551See Sibony, supra note 547, at 47. 
552See Dustin Sharpes, Reintroducing Intent into Predatory Pricing Law, 61 EMORY L. 
J. 903 (2012). 
553 Lao, supra note 515, at 164. 
554Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113(7) COLUM. L. REV. 
1695,1754 (Nov. 2013) (hereinafter Leslie II). 
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Intent in EU predatory pricing laws most commonly understood 
as the intent to eliminate a competitor. However, it is not entirely 
clear as to what this means. Lao defines intent as a firm’s state of 
mind, characterized by (i) its motive, which is the desire or need 
that caused the firm to act, and (ii) the firm’s purpose, which is 
what the firm hoped to accomplish.555 In AKZO the ECJ noted 
that the absence of an objective justification for a firm’s conduct 
indicates that the dominant firm’s intent is exclusionary.556 
Accordingly, in EU predatory pricing law, intent is said to exist if 
the only explanation for a particular pricing practice is that it will 
eliminate a competitor so that the firm will benefit from the 
reduced competition in the market.557 Another illustration of this 
is the court’s reasoning in Tetra Pak II.558 The Commission 
examined various internal documents of Tetra Pak and the scale 
and extent of its pricing practices and concluded that Tetra Pak 
was selling cartons at predatory prices as its pricing was 
deliberately aimed at eliminating competition. Notably, the 
Commission was of the view that, “…it is difficult to conceive 
how behaviour so opposed to the logic of economic profitability 
on the part of an extremely efficient multinational company can 
possibly be the result of a simple management error…”559 Thus, 
intention tests whether the practice is capable of any other 
economic explanation other than that the dominant firm will 
profit from the exclusion of competitors.560 This logic has also 
been used to argue that prices below variable costs are punished 
                                                
555See Lao, supra note 515, at 164. 
556EIRIK ØSTERUD, IDENTIFYING EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES BY DOMINANT UNDERTAKINGS 
UNDER EU COMPETITION LAW 144 (Wolters Kluwer, 2010) (citing AKZO, supra note 
547, at § 140). 
557ØSTERUD, id. at 144 (citing Wanadoo I, supra note 497, § 107). 
558Tetra Pak v. Commission, ECR-II 755 Case T-83/91 (1994) (hereinafter Tetra Pak 
II). 
559Tetra Pak II, id. at §149. A similar argument was made by the US Supreme Court in 
Brooke Group, supra note 479, at 209, where it held that predatory conduct does not 
make business sense unless it is part of a plan to eliminate or reduce competition, and 
thus permits the costs of the conduct to be recouped through the exercise of market 
power. 
560ØSTERUD, supra note 557, at 144. 
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without proof of intent because it is assumed that the only 
objective of a dominant firm that prices at such a level is to 
eliminate competition.561 Thus, evidence that a dominant firm is 
deliberately incurring losses or foregoing profits in order to 
foreclose competition will be considered predatory behaviour in 
the EU.562 
 
In UE law intent is also identified through ‘profit sacrifice’, 
which compares a dominant firm’s prices to what it would have 
earned ‘but for’ its intention to exclude. Accordingly, the 
sacrifice of profits by dominant firms may be predatory if it leads 
to revenues lower than what could have been expected from 
reasonable alternative conduct.563 However, operationalizing this 
approach to all cases is difficult because it requires a 
determination of what the firm would have hypothetically earned 
if it was not motivated by exclusion, which is extremely difficult 
to determine.564 
 
Some factors that are relevant in assessing intent in the EU 
include the scale or degree to which price charged was below 
cost and the duration of the pricing practice.565 Below cost 
pricing over a long period of time may indicate that there could 
be no other motivation than the expectation of removing a 
competitor.566 When prices are well below what is necessary to 
compete, it may indicate an exclusionary intention. Further, 
pricing intended to exclude competitors from the market will be 
                                                
561ØSTERUD, id. at 144 (citing Wanadoo I, supra note 497, § 109). 
562See GUIDANCE ON THE COMMISSION’S ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES IN APPLYING 
ARTICLE 82 OF THE EC TREATY TO ABUSIVE EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT BY DOMINANT 
UNDERTAKINGS, C45/2 § 63 (2009) (hereinafter COMMISSION GUIDANCE). 
563See COMMISSION GUIDANCE, id. at § 65. 
564INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKBOOK: 
PREDATORY PRICING ANALYSIS 14 (Apr., 2012), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc828.pdf  
565See ØSTERUD, supra note 557, at 150. 
566See ØSTERUD, id. at 150. 
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held abusive under EU law regardless of its effect.567 The Court 
of First Instance in Wanadoo held that, “where an undertaking in 
a dominant position actually implements a practice whose object 
is to oust a competitor, the fact that the result hoped for is not 
achieved is not sufficient to prevent that being an abuse of a 
dominant position”.568 This recognizes that markets may evolve 
in a manner different from the expectation of the dominant firm 
and so even when exclusion is intended it may not always be 
achieved. Thus, intent and effect are separated in EU predatory 
pricing law. 
 
Intent can be established through both direct and indirect 
evidence. The Commission has stated that intent can be 
established from internal documents or business plans of the 
dominant firm such as a plan to sacrifice profits in order to 
exclude a rival, prevent new entry, pre-empt the emergence of a 
new market and from evidence of threats of predation.569 Sibony 
suggests that intent can be used to incorporate economic analysis 
of firm strategy into competition law.570 Strategy and intent are 
similar because both refer to the firm’s purpose,571 its objectives 
and the means it uses to reach its objectives.572 Since business 
strategy studies how firms competitively interact with each other 
in markets, it can be helpful in inferring the competitive 
intentions of firms. For instance, insights from business strategy 
demonstrate that not all market competition takes place in the 
manner suggested by Justice Easterbrook’s statement that 
competition is a ruthless process, the essence of which is to crush 
one’s rivals. To the contrary, the competitive strategy of many 
                                                
567See ØSTERUD, id. at 152. 
568Wanadoo I, supra note 497, at § 196. 
569See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON PREDATORY PRICING 25 (7th 
Annual Conference of the ICN, Kyoto, April 2008), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc354.pdf.  
570See Sibony, supra note 547, at 47. 
571Refer to the discussion above on the two components of intent: motive and purpose, 
see Lao, supra note 515, at 164. 
572Sibony, supra note 547, at 47. 
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firms is designed to create new market opportunities for 
themselves and also for other firms and to create value so as to 
avoid direct competition with rivals. Consequently, not all firms 
design their competitive strategy with the intention of excluding 
rivals. 
 
Finally, the merits of requiring intent in predatory pricing is 
premised on the normative priorities of competition law. If the 
goal is to maximize consumer surplus, low prices are good 
regardless of how they are achieved. In this situation intention 
has little relevance to predatory pricing law. Intent can only be 
relevant if completion law is concerned about protecting 
competition and disruptions to the competitive process by 
dominant firms who drive rivals from the market through means 
other than competition on quality.573 As O’Grady points out, the 
different objectives of competition law may play a role in the 
divergent attitudes towards intent in US and EU predatory pricing 
law.574 Since US antitrust law is primarily concerned with short-
term consumer welfare, exclusionary intent will only be relevant 
to it if hypothetically it can be used to prove that a firm will raise 
prices to recoup. Since intent is not very helpful in such an 
analysis it is unlikely that intent can have a role in US law. On 
the other hand, US law would be more concerned with intention 
if it wanted to correct the long-run harm to the competitive 
process arising from predation. This is more within the domain of 
EU law. This is because not all forms of price competition “can 
be considered as legitimate” in EU law since one of the 
objectives of EU law is to prevent dominant firms from 
strengthening their dominance through methods other than 
“competition on the basis of quality”.575 Thus, intent is needed to 
determine if competitors were eliminated through means other 
than competition based on quality. Moreover, EU law is premised 
                                                
573See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 520, at 48. 
574See O’Grady, supra note 477, at 466. 
575 Wanadoo II, supra note 547, §106 (citing AKZO, supra note 547, at §70). 
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on the belief that consumers are harmed by predation even if 
there is no recoupment because diminished competition by the 
elimination of rivals leads to fewer choices available to 
consumers.576 Further, since the object of EU law is to maintain 
undistorted competition, the law steps in to correct abusive 
conduct even before there is proof that a predatory strategy will 
be successful through recoupment.577 Thus, the different 
objectives of US and EU law lead to different roles for intent and 
recoupment in each jurisdiction.  
 
6.1 Recoupment and Intention 
 
The Matsushita court introduced the ‘recoupment requirement’ 
into US predatory pricing law, which changed the previous 
intent-based reasoning reflected in the US SC decision in 
Alcoa578 that a firm that intentionally acquires monopoly power 
violates section 2 of the Sherman Act.579 
 
The importance of recoupment in US law was cemented in the 
decision in Brooke Group, where despite sufficient evidence of 
the intention to act anti-competitively580 and sufficient evidence 
of below cost pricing;581 the court found that predatory pricing 
could not be established because a convincing theory of 
recoupment was not presented.582 The court held that, 
“recoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory 
pricing scheme; it is the means by which a firm profits from 
predation.”583 Further, in Brooke Group the court stated that 
recoupment should be such that the firm obtains enough market 
                                                
576 Wanadoo I, supra note 497, at §112. 
577Wanadoo I, id. at §226. 
578United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d. Cir. 1945). 
579See Dorsey & Jacobson, supra note 338, at 4. 
580Brooke Group, supra note 479, at 231. 
581See Brooke Group, id. at 231. 
582Brooke Group, id. at 232. 
583See Brooke Group, id. at 224. 
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power to set higher than competitive prices for long enough to 
recover the losses earned from below-cost pricing.584 The 
conditions for successful recoupment are that the predator has a 
large market share; its rivals are small and have limited ability to 
discipline the predator’s prices; and high barriers to entry, which 
allow the predator to raise prices without fearing entry in 
response to the increased prices.585 Also relevant is the extent and 
duration of the alleged predation because the longer the predator 
makes losses the more difficult it will be to recoup those losses. 
Interestingly, the Brooke Group court did not unanimously agree 
on the importance of recoupment as the dissent pointed out that 
recoupment was not essential to successful predation since 
section 2 of the Sherman Act does not require proof of successful 
predation; rather it punishes the “dangerous probability” of 
success.586 
 
Over time there has been much debate on the role of recoupment 
in proving predation. One purpose of recoupment is to 
differentiate between price cuts that are anticompetitive and those 
that represent ‘competition on the merits’. This was also endorsed 
by the DOJ, which called recoupment a “valuable screening 
device to identify implausible predatory pricing claims”.587 In 
other words, recoupment ensures that only unlawful price cuts are 
punished. On the contrary, Leslie argues that courts have used the 
recoupment requirement in predatory pricing as a “convenient 
filter to avoid all inquiries into intent in predatory pricing 
cases.”588 Interestingly, a similar role has also been given to 
intent as some have argued that intent is used to differentiate 
between pro-competitive price cuts and exclusionary ones. Yet, 
                                                
584See Brooke Group, id. at 225. 
585See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 490, at 48. 
586See Brooke Group, supra note 479, at 251. 
587 DOJ Report, supra note 480, at 69. 
588Leslie II, supra note 554, at 1711. 
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recoupment is more of an economic notion and does not serve the 
same purpose as the legal concept of intent.  
 
The understanding of recoupment in EU law is quite different. In 
the decision in Wanadoo, the ECJ was given the opportunity to 
introduce recoupment into EU predatory pricing law but held that 
recoupment was not a “necessary precondition” to proving 
predation.589 The court however stated that recoupment could be 
useful to assessing intent by “establishing that a plan to eliminate 
a competitor exists.”590 As Sibony argues, the relevance of 
recoupment in EU law is not connected to how predation will 
affect consumer welfare through higher prices (as with US law) 
but instead recoupment is linked in EU law to the appraisal of 
exclusionary intent.591 Thus, the Wanadoo court found 
recoupment relevant to establishing predatory intent. O’Grady 
also argues that rather than importing recoupment into EU 
predatory pricing law, the use of intent to distinguish between 
pro-competitive and anticompetitive price cuts is the better 
approach.592 
 
There are other criticisms of recoupment. It is more difficult to 
determine if recoupment will be possible in real world markets 
because in reality markets are much more complex than the 
simplified versions used in theoretical economic models. 
Recoupment can also increase uncertainty in the enforcement of 
predatory pricing law because determining the likelihood of 
recoupment requires prediction of future events, which is 
speculative.593 The test for intent in predatory pricing differs from 
the test for recoupment because to test intent competition 
authorities are not required to predict the competitive effects of 
conduct ex ante but are required instead to investigate the reasons 
                                                
589 Wanadoo I, supra note 497, §110. 
590Wanadoo I, id. at §111. 
591See Sibony, supra note 547, at 49. 
592See O’Grady, supra note 477, at 486. 
593See O’Grady, id. at 479. 
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for the firm’s conduct.594 This is simpler and provides more 
certainty than the more complex test for recoupment that requires 
assessing the future welfare-reducing effects of conduct.595 Thus, 
intent is beneficial as a requirement of predation because it helps 
competition agencies to understand the factual situation of the 
case and the reasons for the conduct in a better way than the more 
rigid enquiry envisaged by the recoupment requirement. 
Moreover, when the competitive effects of a dominant firm’s 
conduct are not clear, intent can be helpful to understand why the 
dominant firm chose a particular strategy.596 
 
The following discussion illustrates how intent can be useful to 
distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive price 
cuts in certain commonly encountered market situations. 
 
6.2 Limit Pricing and the Intention to Eliminate 
Competition 
 
When firms use price as a means of creating barriers to entry and 
market concentration, it is called limit pricing.597 Limit prices are 
prices that are set at a lower level than they otherwise would have 
been because the firm uses lower prices to limit rivals’ sales and 
weaken rivals as competitors.598 This is a monopolist’s strategy 
of discouraging entry by making it unprofitable for rivals to enter 
the market and compete at the price set by the monopolist. There 
is some debate about whether limit pricing can be called 
predatory and anticompetitive. Proponents of limit pricing argue 
                                                
594ØSTERUD, supra note 557, at 156. 
595ØSTERUD, id. at 156-7. 
596See Lao, supra note 515, at 200. 
597See Ordover & Saloner, supra note 504, at 544. 
598See B. Douglas Bernheim & Randal Heeb, A Framework for the Economic Analysis 
of Exclusionary Conduct, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS 3 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., vol. II, Oxford University Press, 
2014). 
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that limit pricing is the most efficient pricing for a monopolist 
and other argue that it can prevent efficient firms from entering a 
market.  
 
In Telex v. IBM,599 the US district court held that IBM’s selective 
price cuts on certain peripheral parts (limit pricing),600 amounted 
to predatory pricing. While this decision was later reversed by the 
Court of Appeals, it is still interesting because of the court’s 
analysis of limit pricing and IBM’s anticompetitive intent. The 
court found that IBM’s low prices influenced competitors to stay 
out of the market and accordingly was anticompetitive.601 In 
addition, the court found evidence which showed that IBM’s 
pricing decisions were not taken to meet competition but with the 
specific intention of suppressing competition.602 The court stated 
that growing competition in the market for peripheral parts 
caused IBM to worry that it would irreversibly lose market share 
to competitors and its decision to cut prices was part of a 
purposefully planned and formulated strategy to impede the 
growth and viability of its competitors.603 Thus, the court felt that 
limit pricing along with evidence of anticompetitive conduct 
amounted to predation. One commentator criticized the finding of 
predation on the ground that limit pricing was a legitimate 
response of a monopolist to competition.604 Also, IBM’s 
competitors were not driven out of the market and there was no 
evidence that IBM would subsequently raise prices to recoup any 
                                                
599367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Oklahoma 1973), rev’d, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). 
600 “Limit pricing exploits the long-run market power conferred by existing entry 
barriers to maximize long-run profits. It is a concession of the monopoly firm to the 
fact that the barriers are not high enough to allow it to price unconstrained by potential 
competitors.” Telex v. IBM: Monopoly Pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
84(3) YALE L. J. 558, 579 (Jan., 1975) (student notes) (hereinafter Telex). 
601See Telex, id. at 576. 
602See Telex v. IBM: Implications for the Businessman and the Computer 
Manufacturer, 60(5) VA. L. REV. 884, 900 (May 1974) (student notes) (hereinafter 
Telex II). 
603See Telex II, id. at 900. 
604See Telex, supra note 600, at 574. 
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losses it had incurred from predation.605 Interestingly, under EU 
law, this would probably still amount to predation since the 
evidentiary standards of intent are met and EU law does not 
consider it necessary for rivals to be driven out of the market or 
for there to be recoupment to establish predation.   
 
6.3 Economies of scale, new entry and predatory intent 
 
Economies of scale are an important strategic tool and are 
propagated in the literature on management studies because they 
can be a sustainable source of competitive advantage.606 The 
advantages from economies of scale do not depend on absolute 
size but on market share.607 As long as the smaller competitors 
can’t match the costs of the larger firm they will not achieve the 
same scale of operations. The larger firm can sell at a price that is 
above cost and profitable for it but which will nevertheless be 
unprofitable for the smaller firm which does not share the cost 
advantages arising from economies of scale to match the larger 
firm, even if it is equally efficient.608 
 
Economies of scale are particularly advantageous in industries 
with higher fixed costs and some level of customer captivity or 
consumer inertia.609 Efficient rivals are excluded by this form of 
exclusionary pricing considering that its effect can be to leave 
rivals cash starved, dependent on costly sources of external 
financing and with limited ability to raise funds, it can affect 
rivals’ cash flow by limiting their ability to make profitable sales 
and can prevent rivals from achieving necessary economies of 
                                                
605See Telex, id. at 573. 
606See BRUCE GREENWALD & JUDD KAHN, COMPETITION DEMYSTIFIED: A RADICALLY 
SIMPLIFIED APPROACH TO BUSINESS STRATEGY (Portfolio, 2005). 
607See GREENWALD & KAHN, id. 
608See GREENWALD & KAHN, id. 
609See GREENWALD & KAHN, id. 
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scale and scope to enable them to compete effectively.610 For 
these reasons the Court of First Instance has held that, 
“economies of scale and learning effects cannot therefore exempt 
that undertaking from liability under Article 82 EC.”611 
 
In summary, even prices above cost can be exclusionary when 
economies of scale are present and intent can be used to identify 
when such pricing is exclusionary. What follows are three case 
studies of predation. 
7. The Cardiff Bus Case 
 
This case is one of a series of predation cases brought against bus 
companies in the UK, starting from the 1980’s, after bus services 
were privatized in the UK (taken together the bus cases are 
hereinafter called the “bus cases”). After the bus industry was 
privatised and competition was introduced into the market, 
incumbent bus operators generally responded aggressively to 
entry.612 The most popular predatory strategy employed by 
incumbent bus companies was to unprofitably increase the 
frequency of bus services and lower prices, thereby making it 
impossible for entrants to profitably compete in the market. In 
some cases, this was also accompanied with incumbents 
operating competitive bus schedules, which would run just before 
the entrant’s buses and take customers away from entrants, a 
practice called sandwiching of bus services.613 In other cases, 
incumbents would match the entrants’ services or bus fleet with 
its own and operate them along the same routes as the entrant’s 
buses e.g. if the entrant used mini buses, the incumbent would 
also start plying mini buses on the same routes as the entrant.614 
                                                
610ROGER D. BLAIR & D. DANIEL SOKOL (eds.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 26 (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
611 Wanadoo I, supra note 497, at §217.  
612See Dodgson & Katsoulacos, supra note 506, at 269 (quoting Balcome at al.). 
613See Dodgson & Katsoulacos, id. at 269. 
614See Dodgson & Katsoulacos, id. at 269. 
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These practices continued in different bus markets over a period 
of time and continued even after some incumbents were held 
guilty of predatory pricing.  
 
Although in most of the bus cases brought before it, the UK 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) found that the market structure was 
conducive to predation, some bus companies were held guilty of 
predation and others were not. A key factor in the divergent 
outcomes in the different bus cases was the different evidence of 
intent presented in each case. According to Everton, the bus cases 
substantially contributed to developing the principles of 
predatory intent in the UK.615 For instance, in Highland Scottish 
Omnibuses, the OFT found that the incumbent had predatory 
intent because it greatly increased its services on the routes 
serviced by the entrant and because the incumbent was a well-
established and strongly financed firm who would much better be 
able to carry out a price war with the entrant.616 A finding of 
intention to predate was based on the extensive use and 
mobilization of resources for the single-handed purpose of 
responding to entry, particularly when the purported victim did 
not have the same ability to access financial resources as the 
predator. 
 
The following discussion will elaborate on one of the bus cases, 
the Cardiff Bus case and will highlight aspects of bounded 
rationality in the behaviour of the predatory company and its 
prey. 
 
                                                
615Ann Rosemarie Everton, Discrimination and Predation in the United Kingdom: 
Small Grocers and Small Bus Companies – A Decade of Competition Policy, 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY 6 (1993) (it should be noted that a majority of these 
cases were brought under the old Competition Act, 1980.). 
616See MICHAEL A. UTTON, MARKET DOMINANCE AND ANTITRUST POLICY 123 (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2003). 
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7.1 Background of the Dispute 
 
In November 2004, ‘2 Travel’, a small bus company, brought a 
complaint to the OFT alleging that Cardiff Bus had engaged in 
predatory pricing. Cardiff Bus, the primary bus company in 
Cardiff, operated a normal ‘liveried’ bus service in Cardiff for 
many years and it had a monopoly on many of the routes. In 
April 2004, 2 Travel introduced a new “no frills” bus service in 
Cardiff. 2 Travel’s no frills service operated on very few, select 
routes and timings. Cardiff Bus already operated its liveried 
service on these routes but 2 Travel’s services were fewer and 
more infrequent than Cardiff Bus’ services and ticket prices were 
cheaper.617 
 
When 2 Travel started operating its no frills services, Cardiff Bus 
also introduced its own special, no-frills service called the ‘white 
service’. The ‘white service’ was different from Cardiff Bus’s 
normal liveried service, as it did not carry the usual green livery 
identified with the normal service.618 In its complaint to the OFT, 
2 Travel alleged that Cardiff Bus acted to exclude it from the 
market by introducing the ‘white service’ on routes where it 
faced competition from 2 Travel and scheduled its buses to run a 
few minutes before 2 Travel’s services in order to minimize 2 
Travel’s passengers.619 In addition, 2 Travel alleged that Cardiff 
Bus engaged in predatory pricing by selling tickets for its white 
service at prices below 2 Travel’s prices.620 Cardiff Bus withdrew 
the white service within a few months of 2 Travel closing its 
operations in Cardiff in December 2004.621 
 
                                                
617Decision of the Office of Fair Trading, No.CA 98/01/2008 15 (Nov. 18, 2008) 
(hereinafter Cardiff Bus) (recall that this reasoning closely follows the arguments of the 
post-Chicago school on asymmetric financial constraints). 
618Cardiff Bus, id. at 16. 
619See Cardiff Bus, id. at 23. 
620See Cardiff Bus, id. at 21. 
621See Cardiff Bus, id. at 1. 
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The OFT applied the law set out in section 18(1) of the UK 
Competition Act, 1998, prohibiting abuse of dominance, also 
called the Chapter II prohibition. As per section 18(1), 2 Travel 
was required to prove the following: (i) that Cardiff Bus held a 
dominant position in the relevant market at the time of the 
infringement; (ii) that Cardiff Bus abused its dominant position; 
and (iii) that such abuse may affect trade within the UK or any 
part of it.622 The chapter II prohibition is consistent with EU 
predatory pricing law and Article 102 of the TFEU. It is also 
useful to note the elements of the offence of predatory pricing 
under the previous UK Competition Act of 1980: (i) market 
structure conducive to predatory pricing; (ii) relationship between 
prices and costs; and (iii) evidence of anticompetitive 
intention.623 The OFT used a similar structure in its analysis in 
the Cardiff Bus case. 
 
7.2 Market Structure 
 
The OFT found that Cardiff Bus was the largest operator of bus 
services in the relevant market624 and the only significant 
provider of urban commercial bus services in Cardiff.625 It 
controlled two-thirds of the network traffic. Cardiff Bus’ rivals 
were geographically fragmented and did not have sufficient 
presence on any of the routes in the relevant market to 
individually or collectively exercise significant competitive 
constraint on it. The OFT concluded that Cardiff Bus had a 
dominant position in the relevant market as it had sufficient 
market power to enable it to act independently of competitors and 
consumers.626 
 
                                                
622See Cardiff Bus, id. at 29. 
623See Dodgson & Katsoulacos, supra note 506, at 268. 
624 On both a flow-by-flow and a network basis. 
625See Cardiff Bus, supra note 617, at 2. 
626See Cardiff Bus, id. at 3. 
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Further, the existence of barriers to entry made it difficult for 
Cardiff Bus’ position to be challenged by actual or potential 
competition. One of the barriers to entry were the fixed and sunk 
costs associated with entry such as costs of hiring or renting 
buses, infrastructure for bus maintenance, employing drivers 
etc.627 The OFT considered a significant barrier to entry to be 
Cardiff Bus’ extensive network of bus services.628 The numerous 
routes on which Cardiff Bus plied and the frequency of buses on 
these routes was particularly advantageous to Cardiff Bus 
because consumers valued the combination of frequent schedules 
and extensive routes.629 Cardiff Bus’ frequency and network 
incumbency discouraged actual or potential competition in the 
relevant bus routes because it made it difficult for such entry to 
be profitable.630 Cardiff Bus also capitalised on its extensive 
network of buses by selling ‘network tickets’ that could only be 
used on its buses and not on the competitor’s buses and gave 
users the ability to use one ticket to ride on Cardiff Bus’ entire 
network of routes.631 This further discouraged consumers from 
using other bus services and made successful entry more difficult.  
 
Consequently, to avoid directly competing with Cardiff Bus, 2 
Travel decided to differentiate it’s offering and create a niche 
market for itself by providing a low cost, no frills bus service. It 
targeted a niche consumer group, i.e. senior citizens and young 
mothers travelling after school hours and operated infrequently 
on limited routes during off-peak hours to cut costs.632 As a 
result, costs and prices of 2 Travel’s no frills service were lower 
than the normal liveried service.  
 
                                                
627See Cardiff Bus, id. at 136-37. 
628See Cardiff Bus, id. at 135. 
629See Cardiff Bus, id. at 127. 
630See Cardiff Bus, id. at 81. 
631See Cardiff Bus, id. at 127. 
632See Cardiff Bus, id. at 11. 
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7.3 Bounded Rationality and Intent to Eliminate 
Competition 
 
An important aspect of the OFT’s decision was its finding that 
Cardiff Bus had acted with the intention of excluding 2 Travel 
from the market. For the finding of intent, the OFT relied on the 
UK Competition Appellate Tribunal’s (CAT) decision in 
Aberdeen Journals where, as with 2 Travel, predation occurred in 
a situation where a dominant firm faced new entry. The CAT 
held that any retaliatory measures against a new entrant going 
beyond a reasonable and proportionate response might fall under 
the Chapter II prohibition.633 Applying this rule to the present 
case, the OFT’s finding of intent was based on whether Cardiff 
Bus’ launching the ‘white services’ was out of normal 
commercial considerations, and was a reasonable and 
proportionate response to competition.634 
 
Cardiff Bus launched the white services, knowing it would result 
in its incurring losses, without any objectively justifiable reason 
for doing so other than the exclusion of 2 Travel.635 In the words 
of the OFT: 
 
“For a company to choose to launch new services that are 
likely to result in its generating losses (i.e. making lower 
profits overall than it would have done had it not launched 
those services) would not normally be commercially 
rational conduct on its part.”636 
 
The OFT concluded that the only explanation for Cardiff Bus’ 
behaviour was that it was motivated by the intention to exclude 2 
Travel by diverting passengers away from 2 Travel and was not 
                                                
633See Cardiff Bus, id. at 160. 
634See Cardiff Bus, id. at 163. 
635See Cardiff Bus, id. at 162. 
636See Cardiff Bus, id. at 164. 
80B_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Predatory Pricing 

 
 
 
 
157 
thinking about making profits.637 Cardiff Bus argued that it had 
introduced the ‘white service’ in order to test market demand for 
the no-frills service and that it had no intention of diverting 
passengers from 2 Travel’s bus services.638 It was suggested that 
if Cardiff Bus wanted to divert passengers away from 2 Travel it 
could have lowered fares on its normal services rather than start a 
more expensive and resource-consuming new bus service.  
 
Nevertheless, the OFT did not find any evidence amongst Cardiff 
Bus’ internal documents such as any office memorandums 
suggesting that Cardiff Bus had planned to launch the white 
service as a market test or that it had in any way assessed or 
determined the profitability or viability of the ‘white service’ 
both before its launch and during its operation.639 Further, not 
only did Cardiff Bus not make any preparation prior to launching 
the white service and not monitor the performance of its service 
but instead it paid close attention to the performance of 2 
Travel’s no frills service and the number of passengers that 2 
Travel was carrying on its bus service.  In the words of the OFT: 
 
“The OFT would expect that, in an organisation such as 
Cardiff Bus, a market test that had the potential to give 
rise to significant losses would be preceded by 
considerable forethought, such as documents recording 
the preparation of a business case that was signed off at a 
senior level. The OFT would also expect a market test to 
generate some contemporaneous evidence of whether or 
not it was proving to be successful. The OFT would also 
expect there to be some contemporaneous evidence to 
explain the internal thinking and assessment underlying 
                                                
637See Cardiff Bus, id. at 4. 
638See Cardiff Bus, id. at 3. 
639See Cardiff Bus, id. at 166. 
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the decision to end such a test.”640 
The only internal company document produced in evidence 
relating to the new white service was a memorandum circulated 
among Cardiff Bus’ employees a month before 2 Travel started 
its no frills operations and was titled ‘Competition Policy’.641 The 
document was intended to provide guidance to company 
employees in the face of what was termed a changing competitive 
landscape i.e., the entry of 2 Travel. The document stated that 
Cardiff Bus was responding to competition by starting an 
experimental no-frills service of its own so that “the opposition’s 
carryings [should be reduced to] the absolute minimum.”642 The 
OFT relied on this document as evidence of Cardiff Bus’ 
anticompetitive intent. As some scholars have stated, an internal 
email sent by a company executive informing employees of a 
particular business strategy and asking employees to act on it 
should be considered a highly credible piece of intent 
evidence.643 
 
Other than the ‘Competition Policy’ there were no other internal 
documents to show that Cardiff Bus was planning and preparing 
for a market test for a new no frills service. The absence of any 
preparation for launching the no frills service is particularly 
significant since the no frills segment was a complete departure 
from Cardiff Bus’ normal business model and required Cardiff 
Bus to make substantial preparations including using a different 
fleet of buses.644 A rational, profit-maximizing firm would not 
incur the costs of launching a new service, even if it was a market 
                                                
640See Cardiff Bus, id. at 178. 
641See Cardiff Bus, id. at 187. 
642See Cardiff Bus, id. at 187. 
643See Lao, supra note 515, at 210. 
644The absence of internal preparation for the launch of the white service was made 
evident when Cardiff Bus claimed that it had to withdraw the services because of driver 
shortages, a fact that would have been prevented with adequate preparation and 
planning. 
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test, without first forming a reasonable expectation of its success 
and whether such a test was likely to be worth the cost and effort 
of diverting managerial and company time and resources. 
Moreover, as a rational firm testing a new service in the market, 
Cardiff Bus did not take any effort to promote its ‘white service’ 
and instead presented a negative picture of no frills services.645 
This again does not seem consistent with the actions of a rational 
firm. 
 
The US law on predatory pricing is based on the assumption that 
as rational, profit maximizers, firms will only engage in predation 
if it is possible for them to make enough profits to at least cover 
all the losses from predation. This is a quantitative requirement, 
which assumes that firms would have estimated the costs 
involved in predation beforehand and weighed this against the 
potential gains achieved through recoupment. Since predation is 
costly for a firm, rational firms would not engage in predation 
without sound planning and internal discussion of the costs 
involved when weighed against the benefits. However, there is no 
evidence here that Cardiff Bus in any manner rationally 
determined the likely costs it would incur through the launch of 
the white service and whether it would be able to recoup those 
losses. In other words, the actions of Cardiff Bus do not seem to 
be consistent with those of a rational firm concerned with profit 
maximization.  
 
Another important factor in the OFT’s finding of intent which, 
also furthers the argument that Cardiff Bus’ actions were not 
commercially reasonable, was Cardiff Bus’ decision to operate 
on the same bus routes and times as 2 Travel, as well as the 
coincidence of timing in the introduction and withdrawal of 2 
Travel’s and Cardiff Bus’ no frills services. Cardiff Bus had been 
planning to introduce its ‘white service’ for a few months but it 
waited for 2 Travel to start its operations before introducing the 
                                                
645See Cardiff Bus, supra note 617, at 184. 
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white service.646 In addition, Cardiff Bus withdrew its white 
services shortly after 2 Travel exited the market.647 Given that 
Cardiff Bus could have launched its white service before 2 Travel 
entered the market, it did not make commercial sense for Cardiff 
Bus to wait for 2 Travel to start its operations before launching 
the white service unless its only aim was to take passengers away 
from 2 Travel. Under normal commercial circumstances, a firm 
would have started operations as soon as possible so that it could 
get an early mover advantage over the competing bus service and 
have a better chance at succeeding in the market. Further, there is 
no rational explanation for Cardiff Bus’ operating the white 
service only on those routes on which 2 Travel was also 
operating its no frills service.648 Given that 2 Travel was only 
operating on limited routes, Cardiff Bus would have a better 
chance of earning revenues from its white service if it operated 
on one of the many routes on which it did not face competition 
from 2 Travel. In addition, Cardiff Bus faced higher costs from 
operating the no frills service than 2 Travel because it was also 
facing the opportunity cost of cannibalizing consumers from its 
own, revenue generating, normal service. Many of the customers 
using the new white service were former users of Cardiff Bus’ 
normal liveried service and paid more for that service. This 
further pointed to the commercial irrationality of Cardiff Bus’ 
operation of the white service. The fact that the white service 
buses were timed to operate at or around the same time and on 
the same routes as 2 Travel’s no frills services suggested that 
Cardiff Bus intended to use the white service to take passengers 
away from 2 Travel.649 
 
The OFT concluded that Cardiff Bus incurred losses from 
operating the white services and that the ticket prices were below 
                                                
646See Cardiff Bus, id. at 197. 
647See Cardiff Bus, id. at 198. 
648See Cardiff Bus, id. at 201. 
649See Cardiff Bus, id. at 3-4. 
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its costs, calculated on the basis of average avoidable costs.650 In 
fact, the revenues generated by Cardiff Bus did not even cover 
the costs of the salaries of the bus drivers.651 Cardiff Bus’ tickets 
were also higher than 2 Travel’s because return tickets purchased 
on the white service could be used on Cardiff Bus’ normal 
service at no extra cost.652 Thus, by buying the cheaper ticket on 
the white service, passengers could access an extensive network 
of much better buses and routes at the lower prices of the no frills 
service. The inter-changeability of the tickets made it more 
attractive for customers to use Cardiff Bus’ white service. The 
decision to price tickets interchangeably made no sense if Cardiff 
Bus was trying to test the market for no frills service since it 
made it even more difficult to determine how successful the no 
frills service was in itself.653 All of these factors taken together 
established intent in the mind of the OFT. This was taken by the 
OFT as proof of exclusionary intent.  
 
7.4 Recoupment 
 
In Brooke Group, the US Supreme Court stated that recoupment 
is the ultimate object of unlawful predatory pricing. It may be 
possible to make the argument in this case that unlike the view in 
Brooke Group, Cardiff Bus did not engage in predatory pricing 
because it was motivated by recoupment. Even before 2 Travel 
entered the market and even after it exited, Cardiff Bus did not 
charge a monopolists profit-maximizing price. In the words of the 
OFT: 
 
“In any event, the fact that an undertaking cannot be 
shown to be charging high prices, generating high profits, 
or providing low quality goods or services, does not 
                                                
650See Cardiff Bus, id. at 162. 
651See Cardiff Bus, id. at 4. 
652See Cardiff Bus, id. at 203. 
653See Cardiff Bus, id. at 203. 
83A_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Competition Law and Bounded Rationality 

 
 
 
 
162 
necessarily lead to a conclusion that the undertaking does 
not have market power. As noted above, the assessment 
of dominance is based on whether an undertaking has the 
ability profitably to sustain prices above competitive 
levels, not whether it actually prices at above those 
levels.”654 
 
It can be inferred that Cardiff Bus did not engage in predation in 
order to charge monopoly prices after 2 Travel’s exit. One reason 
for this may be that because Cardiff Bus was owned by the 
Cardiff municipality and not by private shareholders, profit 
maximization was not its primary objective.655 
 
The OFT stated that Cardiff Bus wanted to have the ability to 
raise prices in the future if it wanted to and no frills operator 
would constrain Cardiff Bus’ ability to raise prices and exploit its 
dominance.656 The OFT also used the post-Chicago literature on 
reputation building and information asymmetries to explain 
Cardiff Bus’ predatory behaviour. The OFT had also made 
similar findings in the past that incumbent bus operators had the 
incentive to invest in building a reputation for toughness because 
entrants are uncertain about the reaction of incumbents to entry 
and also do not have information regarding costs faced by 
incumbents.657 In the Cardiff Bus case, the OFT found from 
interviews carried out with some of its competitors that new entry 
of bus operators in Cardiff was already restricted because of 
Cardiff Bus’ reputation of aggressively responding to entry and 
expansion.658 The OFT felt that one of the reasons Cardiff Bus 
engaged in exclusionary conduct in this case was because it 
wanted to maintain its reputation for fighting new entry, 
                                                
654See Cardiff Bus, id. at 153. 
655See Cardiff Bus, id. at 238. 
656See Cardiff Bus, id. at 171. 
657See UTTON, supra note 616, at 122. 
658See Cardiff Bus, supra note 617, at 3. 
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particularly in then frills segment.659 The OFT’s view was 
supported by the fact that no new entry had taken place in Cardiff 
from since the year 2000 with the exception of 2 Travel’s 
unsuccessful attempt.660 Thus, Cardiff Bus’ reputation could have 
acted as a barrier to entry into the bus market in Cardiff.  
 
According to the OFT, Cardiff Bus engaged in predation because 
it was concerned that once 2 Travel’s no frills service was 
successful, it would expand its operations to directly compete 
with Cardiff Bus’ liveried service.661 In fact 2 Travel entered the 
market in Cardiff with the intention of ultimately expanding its 
operations as Cardiff Bus feared. Nevertheless, Cardiff Bus’ fear 
that 2 Travel might expand and take away its market share was 
not based on a rational assessment of the factual situation before 
it. As was known to Cardiff Bus, 2 Travel could not pose a real 
competitive threat to it because it was on the verge of bankruptcy. 
In fact, given its weak financial position, 2 Travel would likely 
have exited the market even if Cardiff Bus had not introduced the 
white service.662 Thus, it can be argued that Cardiff Bus did not 
rationally estimate the competitive threat posed by the entry of 2 
Travel. Cardiff Bus overestimated 2 Travel’s ability to succeed in 
the no frills segment by not taking into account facts known to it 
regarding 2 Travel’s weak financial position and operational 
mismanagement. Alternatively, Cardiff Bus might be completely 
risk averse and unwilling to take any chances within the small 
probability that 2 Travel’s entry might be successful. Behavioural 
studies have found managers to suffer from biases, be selective 
processors of information and process information according to a 
lens of their own experience and background. This might have 
resulted in Cardiff Bus’ management placing more emphasis on 
the small chance that 2 Travel would successfully establish a no 
                                                
659See Cardiff Bus, id. at 170. 
660See Cardiff Bus, id. at 170. 
661See Cardiff Bus, id. at 171-73. 
662See Cardiff Bus, id. at 240. 
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frills service and less emphasis on the various factors preventing 
2 Travel’s success. Given 2 Travel’s extreme financial position, 
its decision to enter the market in Cardiff was not taken with a 
correct assessment of the market and in fact overestimated its 
ability to succeed. Another aspect of bounded rationality is that 2 
Travel was overoptimistic about its success in Cardiff since it 
was the first and only company to enter the market in Cardiff in 
some years, where other firms feared Cardiff Bus’ previously 
described reputation for aggression, 2 Travel either did not 
consider that Cardiff Bus would be aggressive towards it or 
thought that it would be successful despite Cardiff Bus’ 
aggression. In either case it did not rationally evaluate the market 
before entering. From the discussion above it is possible to infer 
that firms do not always behave as rational, profit-maximizers. 
Some of the decisions of Cardiff Bus and 2 Travel did not follow 
the paradigm of rationality. This evidence would probably have 
been disregarded by US courts as decisions that could not have 
been made by rational firms under the Matsushita principle. 
Further, there would be no room for such evidence in US law 
under the recoupment requirement and evidence of intent is not 
relevant to a US predatory pricing case. Accordingly, US courts 
would not have held Cardiff Bus guilty of predatory pricing 
because they would have found recoupment to be unlikely in the 
market structure for bus services since barriers to entry in this 
market are not very high so any increase in prices could lead to 
new entry. US courts would unlikely have considered evidence 
that Cardiff Bus was building a reputation of aggression since 
such evidence would require courts to admit evidence of firm 
behaviour that was not consonant with rationality. The biggest 
reason for a US courts reluctance to hold Cardiff Bus guilty of 
predation would be that it had not raised prices after 2 Travel’s 
exit. 
 
This case shows that by including evidence of intent, courts and 
competition agencies can form a better understanding of the 
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firm’s behaviour in those specific circumstances. The OFT used 
evidence of commercially irrational behaviour as proof of 
anticompetitive intent. This is under the theory that certain 
behaviour of rational firms can only be explained by 
anticompetitive intent. Here, insights from behavioural studies 
can help to explain the reasons behind some of these decisions. 
This can serve to clarify the understanding of firm behaviour in 
particular circumstances when there are departures from 
rationality. These insights are completely omitted from the 
assessment of predation in US law. 
 
The following case involving the airlines industry in the US is 
very similar to the Cardiff Bus case. In both cases the incumbents 
were responding to the entry of low cost providers. The line of 
argument adopted by the plaintiffs in both cases was also very 
similar with both using the theory that the incumbent was 
building a reputation for aggression. However, both predatory 
pricing cases had different outcomes. The difference in outcome 
may have been due to the one big difference in the facts of both 
cases – Cardiff Bus started a new bus service and American 
Airlines lowered fares on its existing service. This resulted in a 
different calculation of costs and prices in both cases, which 
turned out to be dispositive for the American Airlines case. 
However, what is more likely is that the different outcomes in 
both cases are a result of the normative differences in US and EU 
law of predatory pricing.   
8. The American Airlines Case 
 
In US v. AMR Corp.,663 the DOJ alleged that American Airlines 
(hereinafter ‘American’) engaged in predatory pricing by cutting 
prices and increasing capacity in certain hub markets where it 
enjoyed a monopoly position, in response to the entry of ‘low 
cost carriers’ also known as ‘no frills airlines’. According to the 
                                                
663335 F.3d 1109 (2003). 
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DOJ, American engaged in predatory pricing in order to create a 
reputation for driving out competitors and defending its 
monopoly position in the hub market.664 The Court of Appeals 
found in favour of American. 
 
In its case before the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the 
DOJ relied extensively on American’s internal documents 
showing the company’s significant concerns about the losses that 
it would suffer from the entry of low cost carriers.665 American’s 
initial response to the entry of low cost carriers was to match the 
entrant’s fares.666 However, according to the DOJ, subsequently 
American began to worry that these low cost carriers would 
expand their operations; even create a competing mini-hub and so 
American started a more aggressive campaign against low cost 
entrants involving reduced fares and capacity increases.667 
American’s concerns were magnified because in a parallel 
situation Delta Airlines had recently suffered significant losses of 
revenue to low cost carriers in its hub market.668 The DOJ argued 
that American’s initial response of matching the prices of low 
cost carriers was the more competitive response to entry and that 
the more extreme fare cuts and capacity expansions were the 
direct result of American’s intention to exclude low cost 
carriers.669 
 
Internal company documents also revealed that American had 
carried out an internal determination of what it would cost to 
prevent the low cost carriers from establishing a presence in its 
                                                
664A hub for an airlines is an area which is the focus of the operations of the airlines 
and from where the airline provides a majority of its connections. 
665See Edlin & Farrell, supra note 491, at 503. 
666Edlin & Farrell, id. at 503. 
667See Edlin & Farrell, id. at 503. 
668335 F.3d 1109, 1152 (2003). 
669See Edlin & Farrell, supra note 491, at 504. 
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hub market.670 In fact American had commissioned a financial 
impact study, which found that any strategy to make a low cost 
carrier unprofitable would prove to be very expensive to its short-
term profitability. Accordingly, American's Chief Executive 
Officer, Crandall cautioned: “If you are not going to get them 
[the low cost carriers] out [of the market] then [there is] no point 
to diminish profit” by implementing the strategy.671 In addition 
American conducted other studies and set up a “DFW Strategy 
Task Force” to determine the actions it would take to render entry 
of low cost carriers at its hub unprofitable.672 This shows that 
American had carried out the necessary analysis and 
implemented this strategy knowing the short-term costs.673 
Unlike Cardiff Bus, American had conducted a more thorough 
market analysis before taking any action. Nevertheless, the 
intention of both companies was to drive new entrants from the 
market by making it unprofitable for them to compete.  
 
Further, the DOJ argued that Americans’ strategy succeeded in 
preventing low cost carriers from creating a hub in the relevant 
market and this in turn allowed American to recoup by earning 
monopoly profits in its hub market. Moreover, the DOJ 
demonstrated that based on reasonably quantified estimates, 
American expected that it would be able to recover the losses 
arising from its predation through future sales.674 Indeed the DOJ 
showed that once low cost carriers had been driven out of the 
market, American had reduced flights and increased ticket prices. 
Finally, the DOJ argued that American engaged in predation in 
order to establish a reputation for predation, which would deter 
future entry.675 The DOJ also claimed that American did establish 
                                                
670USA v. AMR Corp., Brief of Appellant USA in the US Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, No.01-3202, pages 7-10 [hereinafter Brief of Appellant]. 
671Brief of Appellant, id. at 10. 
672Brief of Appellant, id. at 13-14. 
673See 335 F.3d 1109, 1150 (2003). 
674Brief of Appellant, supra note 670. 
675See Edlin & Farrell, supra note 491, at 517. 
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such a reputation, as there was not much subsequent entry into 
the relevant markets. However, the court did not agree with the 
DOJ’s recoupment theories because it found that barriers to entry 
in the relevant markets were low and American would not be able 
to sustain supra-competitive prices.676 
 
The Court of Appeals dismissed the DOJ’s claim of predatory 
pricing based on a different calculation of costs from the DOJ’s, 
which lead the court to find that American was not pricing below 
its cost. The court held that the DOJ was wrong to focus on the 
profitability of American’s capacity increases since such a test 
would make any pricing or capacity decision that reduced a 
firm’s profits illegal.677 However, the court’s method for 
quantifying costs was criticized by Edlin and Farrell because in 
their view, the court did not recognise that American had 
significant cost advantages which allowed American to profitably 
price at a level which entrant’s found extremely difficult to 
match. The significance of these cost advantages meant that 
entrants needed to operate at the same scale as the incumbent to 
be able to challenge it effectively.678 However, it is not realistic 
to expect entrants to be able to operate at such a large scale 
immediately given practical considerations of starting a new 
business, perfecting the business model and difficulties faced by 
a new firm in financing such large-scale operations.679 This 
illustrates the reason why scholars disagree about the method for 
quantification of costs in the price-cost test of predatory pricing 
and the need to consider the realities of market operations when 
considering cost figures and pricing levels in predatory pricing 
claims. In such situations intent can help to determine the 
exclusionary nature of price cuts.  
 
                                                
676See Edlin & Farrell, id. at 519. 
677See 335 F.3d 1109, 1202 (2003). 
678For a discussion of the role of scale economies in predation, see section [6.3]. 
679See Edlin & Farrell, supra note 491, at 514. 
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From a behavioural perspective, the analysis of American’s 
internal documents revealed that they were fearful of loosing 
revenues to low cost carriers because Delta Airlines had suffered 
a similar fate. As was stated by the DOJ, “American was 
seriously worried about the effect than an LCC [low cost carrier] 
hub at DFW would have on its profits, observing that ‘[Delta] has 
lost $232 [million] in annual revenue. Clearly we don’t want this 
to happen to American…’”680 It may be possible to argue that 
this recent example before American’s management may have 
caused an availability bias and amplified the threat posed by low 
cost carriers and the likelihood that these low cost carriers would 
also succeed in taking away market share just as it happened with 
Delta. This motivated them to take the risk of engaging in 
predation even when recoupment was uncertain. Another reason 
could be that American’s management was loss averse and thus, 
more fearful of the losses that could be caused to them by low 
cost carriers, even though these losses were not certain.  
 
Further, in behaviour similar to Cardiff Bus, American focused 
on “drying up” their rivals’ business, ignored their own profits 
and carefully studied the effect of its actions on rivals’ 
profitability.681 Interestingly, the DOJ’s arguments, without 
explicitly using the term ‘intention’ very much followed a similar 
line of reasoning i.e., showing American’s exclusionary 
behaviour by highlighting the actions it would have taken if it 
was only competing to meet competition and the actions it 
actually took because it wanted to drive out the competition.682 
For instance, American added much more capacity to routes 
where it wanted to prevent its rivals from establishing a 
presence.683 This illustrates that American was not competing on 
the merits or based on the quality of its services but was relying 
                                                
680Brief of Appellant, supra note 670, at 7. 
681See Brief of Appellant, id. at 12. 
682See Brief of Appellant, id. at 8-9, 12-14. 
683See Brief of Appellant, id. at 13. 
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on its market position to exclude competitors, a factor that would 
have held strongly against it in an assessment of predation under 
EU law. It may be possible to argue that, based on the finding of 
intent and the manner of American’s engagement with 
competitors, it is likely that it would have been guilty of 
predation under EU law. 
 
9. The Amazon Case 
 
This study examines Amazon’s allegedly predatory price cuts and 
other exclusionary practices in the sale of books and ebooks in 
USA from the perspective of intent and business strategy. 
Amazon is presently the single largest seller of books in USA.684 
In addition, Amazon has diversified its retail presence into other 
markets such as audio and consumer goods and more recently 
into new markets such as online grocery sales. Amazon has 
followed a strategy similar to Wal-Mart by positioning itself as a 
discount retailer and establishing a reputation for price 
leadership. Further, as with Wal-Mart, Amazon has been accused 
of unfairly acquiring a dominant position through predatory 
pricing.685 
 
The first hurdle to proving predatory pricing is establishing that a 
dominant firm’s prices are below an appropriate measure of cost. 
Prices and costs are hard to accurately measure, particularly in 
the retail industry since pricing techniques are complex, variable 
and often based on volumes of sales and it is difficult to establish 
conclusively that pricing is below cost. In this case, it is possible 
to make an argument that Amazon was pricing part of its books 
and ebooks below cost based on various media reports which use 
                                                
684See Christopher Matthews, Will Amazon Take Over the World?, TIME MAGAZINE 
(Jul. 16, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/07/16/will-amazon-take-over-the-world/. 
685See Nate Hoffelder, Amazon, Bullying and Antitrust: Part 607, THE DIGITAL READER 
(Oct. 10, 2013), http://the-digital-reader.com/2013/10/10/amazon-bullying-anti-trust-
part-607. 
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publisher’s list prices and retailer’s discounts to show that 
Amazon was buying new books at an average wholesale price of 
approximately $12 and selling them for approximately $9.99.686 
In fact Amazon’s retail prices did not change even after 
publishers increased their wholesale prices for e-books. It has 
also been stated in the academic literature that Amazon was 
consistently pricing e-books at a lower price than its competitors 
and at least a certain percentage of its e-books were priced below 
cost.687 Accordingly, if it is assumed that Amazon was pricing 
below cost, the second requirement of predatory pricing is to find 
a theory of recoupment. Given the structure of the retail market 
for books and ebooks with low barriers to entry, recoupment is 
considered unlikely. Further, Amazon’s 65% market share in the 
ebook market and the presence of competitors such as Apple 
makes the ebook market competitive rather than concentrated, 
making predation unlikely.688 Moreover, Amazon’s low prices 
are seen as benefiting consumers and given the emphasis on 
consumer welfare in US antitrust law, US authorities are unlikely 
to punish Amazon for actions that are beneficial to consumers.689 
On the other hand, if Amazon were to be charged with predatory 
pricing in the EU, there is a greater chance of it being held guilty 
because as discussed in previous sections of this chapter, EU 
competition law requires proof of intention to eliminate 
competition rather than recoupment.690 Thus, if intention is 
proved it may be possible to hold Amazon guilty of predation in 
the EU. 
 
                                                
686See Keith Gessen, The War of the Words, Vanity Fair (Dec. 2014), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/2014/12/amazon-hachette-ebook-publishing# 
687See Babur De los Santos & Matthijs R. Wildenbeest, E-book Pricing and Vertical 
Restraints 5 (NET Institute Working Chapter No. 14-18, Oct. 2014). 
688Erin Fuchs, Why the Justice Department Won’t Go After Amazon Even Though Paul 
Krugman Thinks it’s Hurting America, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-justice-department-probably-wont-go-after-
amazon-2014-10 (citing Herbert Hovenkamp). 
689Fuchs, id. 
690Fuchs, id. 
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The purpose of this study is to further explore whether Amazon’s 
pricing was motivated by exclusionary intent. Another objective 
of this study is to see how intent can be used to better understand 
when pricing practices can be called anticompetitive. This study 
uses literature from management studies and business strategy to 
help in the analysis of the nature of Amazon’s price cuts. From a 
normative perspective intent is relevant because consumers are 
harmed when rivals are eliminated by means other than 
competition based on quality. Within this perspective, 
management studies can be particularly useful in understanding 
when firms intend to compete by improving quality and when 
they are competing using purely exclusionary tactics.  
 
9.1 Amazon as a strategic competitor 
 
Amazon’s strategy is to sell at the lowest prices in the market. 
Business analysts who have studied Amazon believe that 
Amazon has the best-designed business strategy, even when 
compared to companies such as Apple, Google and Microsoft.691 
Amazon’s belief in prioritizing long-term goals over short-term 
profits as stated in its Annual Reports is another indication of its 
commitment to pursuing its long-term strategies.692 Amazon’s 
competitive strategy has played a significant role in its growth 
and as business analysts believe, has facilitate edits capture of 
markets such as the ebook market without producing significant 
technological innovations.693 According to one analyst, “Unlike 
the other big companies that symbolize our times — Google, 
Apple, Facebook and Microsoft — Amazon did not rise to power 
by inventing a new product or service. It came to power by 
                                                
691See Venkatesh Rao, Why Amazon is the Best Strategic Player in Tech, FORBES (Dec. 
14, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/venkateshrao/2011/12/14/the-amazon-
playbook/. 
692See ANNUAL REPORT OF AMAZON.COM (2013), available at 
http://www.annualreports.com/Company/1755 
693Although Kindle is certainly a significant innovation. 
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systematically taking down an entire existing industry.”694 More 
than one commentator has described Amazon’s actions in dealing 
with competition as a game of chess with each move planned in 
advance.695 In other words, Amazon is a company guided 
strongly by its competitive strategy and its strategy has played a 
significant role in its current market position. 
 
Further, as described by commentators, Amazon excels not just 
in its design of competitive strategy but also in its execution. It 
succeeds in executing its strategy by aligning its own capabilities 
to tackle the weaknesses of its competitors.696 Amazon’s 
systematic strategy to eliminate competition and the manner of its 
execution may be illustrated through Amazon’s acquisition of 
Quidsi, a fast growing online retail company providing special 
products such as ‘Diapers.com’ and ‘Soap.com’. Quidsi’s 
growing popularity and increasing sales made it an acquisition 
target for Amazon as well as Wal-Mart.697 When Quidsi’s 
management showed reluctance to sell to Amazon, Amazon 
launched an aggressive price campaign to drive down the price of 
diapers in the market. Quidsi found it hard to match Amazon’s 
low prices since it did not have the same financial resources and 
it lost market share to Amazon quickly.698 During the acquisition 
negotiations with Quidsi, Amazon launched ‘Amazon Mom’, a 
package of services including a free one year subscription to two-
day Amazon Prime699 shipping and an additional thirty percent 
discount on diapers that were already selling at discounted prices; 
on the condition that customers subscribed to a service for regular 
                                                
694See Rao, supra note 691. 
695See Dan McGinn, How Jeff Bezos Makes Decisions, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 
BLOG (Oct. 18, 2013), blogs.hbr.org/2013/10/how-jeff-bezos-makes-decisions/ 
696See Rao, supra note 691. 
697See BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF AMAZON 295 
- 298 (Random House Group, 2013). 
698STONE, id. at 297. 
699As an Amazon Prime shipping member a consumer pays an annual fee to receive 
unlimited free two-day shipping on purchases. 
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monthly deliveries of diapers from Amazon.700 Quidsi could not 
compete against this package. The total ‘Amazon Mom’ package, 
according to executives of Quidsi would have incurred Amazon a 
loss of US $100 million in three months just on the sale of 
diapers.701 The launch of ‘Amazon Mom’ proved to be a catalyst 
in Amazon’s acquisition of Quidsi as Quidsi was unable to 
compete with Amazon Mom.702 However, the FTC approved 
Amazon’s acquisition of Quidsi and did not find its conduct to be 
anticompetitive.703 Nevertheless, Amazon strategically eliminated 
Quidsi through an aggressive strategy that exploited Amazon’s 
superior financial strength and other internal resources rather than 
through improved quality of performance.  
 
In order to evaluate the intentions behind Amazon’s actions it is 
relevant to understand the environment in which it operates. The 
following discussion describes the retail industry. 
 
9.2 The structure of the retail industry 
 
The strategic position of firms in the retail market is affected by 
the changing structure of the retail industry. The retail industry in 
the US and Europe is highly concentrated.704 The scale of 
operations has increased over time as larger companies have 
taken away market share from independently owned smaller 
                                                
700See STONE, supra note 697, at 297. 
701STONE, id. at 298. 
702“So the Quidsi executives stuck with Amazon largely out of fear…the money-losing 
Amazon Mom program was obviously introduced to dead-end Diapers.com to force a 
sale, and if anyone at the time had doubts about that, those doubts were quickly 
dispelled by Amazon’s subsequent actions. A month after it announced the acquisition 
of Quidsi, Amazon closed the [Amazon Mom] program to new members.” STONE, id. at 
299. 
703See Official Communication of the Federal Trade Commission, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/amazon.com-
inc./quidsi-inc./110323amazonthomas.pdf 
704See JOACHIM ZENTES et al., STRATEGIC RETAIL MANAGEMENT, 1-2 (Gabler, 2d. ed. 
2007). 
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retailers.705 As a result, firms have significant market power, 
large turnovers, many employees and an extensive network of 
operations.706 This has made retail operations increasingly 
significant, as manufacturers are dependent on retailers for a 
larger share of their turnover.707 Retailers are also gaining control 
of distribution channels.708 With retailers increasingly taking over 
delivery and other parts of the supply chain resulting in vertical 
foreclosure thereby, making it harder for new entrants to compete 
against established players in the retail industry.  
 
Another important feature of the retail sector is price competition. 
Due to the significance of sales volumes to profitability, the 
pricing strategy adopted by a retail firm can significantly increase 
profits earned by the firm. Manufacturers typically play a limited 
role in setting retail prices. Certain sections of the retail market 
are characterised by aggressive price competition. Other retail 
players compete by differentiating their products and exploiting 
consumers’ different willingness to pay.709 Various pricing 
techniques such as ‘loss leaders’ are used to reduce prices and 
attract buyers. This technique has been used successfully by 
companies such as Wal-Mart who have gained large market share 
due to their low prices. The loss leader technique is an important 
part of the retail industry and makes price-cost tests harder to 
calculate and measure.710 
 
The online segment of the retail market (also called e-commerce) 
shares many features of the retail industry highlighted above, but 
is also different in some respects. E-commerce is a fast-growing 
industry.711 Price competition is even more aggressive in this 
                                                
705See ZENTES et al., id. at 1. 
706See ZENTES et al. id. at 1. 
707See ZENTES et al. id. at 2. 
708See ZENTES et al. id. at 2. 
709See ZENTES et al. id. at 254-56. 
710See ZENTES et al. id. at 254-55. 
711See ZENTES et al. id. at 1. 
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market because it is easier to compare prices of products online. 
Prices on the Internet generally form a reference point for 
consumers, even when they are shopping in physical stores even 
though physical retailers find it difficult to match the prices of 
Internet retailers because of additional costs of renting store 
space, employees etc.712 In this way e-commerce is 
advantageously positioned to exploit retail markets. 
 
All the features of the retail industry discussed above have 
contributed to Amazon’s growth and success. Its presence as an 
Internet retailer gives it cost advantages and its strategy of 
prioritizing market share over profits has helped to achieve the 
necessary volume of operations and market power that is 
essential for success in the retail market.  
 
Amazon has also made important contributions in shaping the 
market for books. It has made books more affordable and 
accessible to consumers through low prices and its online retail 
format. It also has an online market for used books and a 
professional portal for competing booksellers called ‘Fulfillment 
by Amazon’ as well as ‘Amazon Advantage’ for other 
businesses. Amazon has also innovated in the ebook segment by 
introducing the ebook reader, Kindle. In addition, Amazon has a 
presence in publishing; it has a self-publishing business, which 
helps Amazon to develop relationships with authors directly.713 
Amazon has maintained its reputation for aggressive pricing 
through programmes such as a controversial ‘price comparison’ 
application it once introduced where customers were encouraged 
to send prices of books in competing bookshops to Amazon so 
that Amazon could keep prices lower than competitors. Amazon 
                                                
712See ZENTES et al., id. at 257. 
713See Jennifer Rankin, Amazon and Hachette Feud Could Re-write the Book on 
Publishing, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/25/amazon-hachette-publishing-
future-ebooks. 
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has largely acquired market share by driving out physical 
bookstores from the market because bookshops find it impossible 
to compete with Amazon’s low prices.714 An example is the exit 
of the large chain of bookstores; Borders in 2011 after it went 
bankrupt because it was unable to compete with Amazon’s 
prices. Independent book shops have also significantly borne the 
brunt of Amazon’s pricing and have closed down in large 
numbers. 
 
9.3 Bounded Rationality, Competitive Strategy and 
Anticompetitive Intent 
 
Amazon has consistently kept ebook prices below its profit 
maximizing level and states that it does not plan to raise prices 
much beyond its $9.99 price point for ebooks, even if it could 
profitably do so. In fact, relative to print books, Amazon 
discounts ebooks more deeply from the list prices than the 
comparative discounts in ebooks sold by its competitors.715 This 
makes no commercial sense because Amazon has more market 
share in ebooks than in print books, which gives it more 
incentives and ability to raise prices and increase revenues in the 
sale of ebooks. In fact, Amazon was selling its ebooks at a price 
lower than its profit maximizing price and it could have 
profitably increased the price at which it was selling ebooks. 
Even Amazon’s competitors, including companies such as Apple 
have publicly stated that they find Amazon’s ebook prices to be 
unprofitable and unsustainable.  
 
Amazon’s pricing of ebooks should be considered in conjunction 
with its history of pursuing aggressive strategies against its 
competitors such as Quidsi. This is an integral aspect of 
Amazon’s competitive strategy. Another example of Amazon’s 
                                                
714See Rankin, id. 
715See De los Santos & Wildenbeest, supra note 687, at 27. 
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aggressive approach to comptetition as described by Stone in his 
book, ‘The Everything Store’ was the ‘Gazelle project’ – a code 
name for Amazon’s strategy of agressively pushing small 
publishing companies for better terms, so called because, in the 
words of its CEO, Amazon “should approach these small 
publishers the way a Cheetah would pursue a sickly gazelle.”716 
 
Amazon’s strategy has also been to leverage the competitive 
advantage from the Internet by growing quickly and acquiring a 
large captive customer base through low prices and schemes such 
as ‘Amazon Prime’ that offers significant discounts to locked-in 
customers.717 Amazon has also built and sustained its customer 
base by creating relationships with its customers for instance, by 
introducing consumer ratings and product reviews.718 Customer 
lock-in helps Amazon sustain its competitive advantage and grow 
further.719 This operates as a barrier to entry for Amazon’s 
competitors. Once engaged in the Amazon virtual community 
few customers switch to rival online booksellers.720 Amazon also 
has more data on books, authors, reviews and prices than any 
other online bookseller, which Amazon uses to improve its own 
presence in the market as well as by leveraging it to build its 
other businesses.721 This is particularly relevant as firms are 
increasingly using consumer buying behaviour and data to obtain 
competitive advantage.  
 
Amazon has, through the strategies described above, succeeded 
in achieving a size of operations that puts pressure on its rivals 
                                                
716David Streitfeld, A New Book Portrays Amazon as Bully, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/a-new-book-portrays-
amazon-as-bully/?r=4. 
717See COLIN COMBE, INTRODUCTION TO E-BUSINESS: MANAGEMENT & STRATEGY 357 
(Elsevier, 1st ed., 2006). 
718See COMBE, id. at 359. 
719See COMBE, id. at 357. 
720COMBE, id. at 360. 
721COMBE, id. at 360. 
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who do not have the same size and cost advantages.722 In the 
market for ebooks where competition is essentially on price, it is 
very difficult for new firms to compete with Amazon. In fact 
according to commentators in the publishing industry, “…many 
feel Amazon is now focused on driving its competitors out of 
business.”723 Amazon has a significant share of the market, a 
reputation for aggression and the capabilities to execute its 
strategy of offering the lowest prices. It may be argued that the 
implication here is that even though there is entry in the market, 
it is unlikely to significantly impact Amazon’s market position 
because new entrants will very unlikely challenge Amazon’s 
pricing or engage in direct competition with Amazon.  
 
Amazon’s ebook prices are consistently lower than other retailers 
and a certain percentage of ebooks are priced below cost as part 
of Amazon’s strategy to acquire and retain consumers within its 
‘ecosystem’. Amazon has arguably a vast breadth and depth of 
product variety on its website and can sell other, more profitable 
products to its consumers after attracting them to its ebook 
store.724 Amazon generally sells bestselling books below cost 
suggesting that Amazon is using these books as loss leaders.725 
Others argue that Amazon’s permanently sub-cost prices for 
popular books cannot be called a loss leader strategy in the 
conventional sense since it is more than an introductory strategy 
to attract customers and deserves to be evaluated for its possible 
predatory intent and effect.726 Amazon’s pricing of ebooks may 
                                                
722See De los Santos & Wildenbeest, supra note 687, at 31. 
723See Much at Stake in Amazon-HBG Fight, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (May 12, 2014), 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-
news/article/62254-much-at-stake-in-amazon-hbg-fight.html. 
724See De los Santos &Wildenbeest, supra note 687, at 5. 
725See De los Santos & Wildenbeest, id. at 27. 
726Albert A. Foer & Tyler Patterson, E-books and Amazon: The Need to Hear Two 
Hands Clapping, COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT 8, 9 (Jul., 2012), 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/e-book-case-and-amazon-need-hear-two-
hands-clapping-analysis-bert-foer-and-tyler-patterson. 
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be part of a broader strategy to control the market for books. 
According to a report produced by the Codex Group,  
 
“competing with Amazon, even to carve out a slice of the 
market, is a daunting task. The company has a number of 
obvious advantages: scale, resources, and a diverse 
product line that can let the company treat books as loss 
leaders. The company, as has been well documented, is 
also focused on driving prices as low as possible. The 
perception of Amazon as the cheapest place to buy books, 
enhanced by its combining books with high ticket items 
with free shipping, gives the company a tremendous 
advantage over both online and physical bookselling 
competitors.”727 
 
Amazon’s insistence on low prices and its pressuring of 
publishers to keep prices low could well be a self-defeating 
strategy. In the words of Foer & Patterson, “This may seem to be 
against Amazon’s own interest, but there are reasons why a self- 
defeating strategy might be followed – for example, an excessive 
focus on the short run, uncertainty about the supplier’s real costs 
or a desire to obtain an input cost advantage over other 
buyers.”728 Amazon’s dogged pursuit of a strategy to keep prices 
low suggests possible behavioural biases such as competitive 
inertia. The literature from management studies shows us that 
low prices are not the only way to compete and create value for 
consumers. 
 
Amazon may want the market for ebooks to grow from a long-
term, strategic perspective because it has a larger share of the 
ebook market than the print book market and more potential to 
                                                
727See Jim Milliot, BEA 2014: Can Anyone Compete with Amazon?, PUBLISHERS 
WEEKLY (May 28, 2014), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-
news/bea/article/62520-bea-2014-can-anyone-compete-with-amazon.html 
728See Foer & Patterson, supra note 726, at 10. 
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grow its market share in ebooks. Amazon also has a large share 
of the market for ebook readers through its Kindle device. 
Amazon argues that lowering the prices of ebooks will increase 
volumes of sales and lead to higher revenues and profits because 
ebooks are highly price elastic.729 For that reason Amazon has 
said it wants to maintain its US$ 9.99 price point for ebooks. 
Amazon’s pricing also reflects its desire to become vertically 
integrated in the publishing industry through the launch of 
Amazon Publishing in 2009.730 Once ebooks become more 
popular, Amazon’s intention may be to encourage authors to self-
publish ebooks through its Amazon Publishing and Amazon 
Advantage programmes and this will enable its presence in the 
publishing business to grow.  
 
As Amazon has a presence at different levels of the book market, 
from publishing, to selling, to providing book recommendations, 
ebook prices have an impact on all of these different Amazon 
businesses.731 Some analysts have stated that Amazon’s low 
ebook pricing is intended as a method of cannibalising the print 
book market. The reason for this is that a growing ebook market 
helps Amazon grow its allied businesses and increase its market 
share at the cost of traditional publishers, who rely on revenue 
from the sale of print books for their profits. Once a critical mass 
of people prefer ebooks to print books, the publishing business 
will become unviable and publishers will exit the industry. 
 
9.4 The Dispute with Hachette: Control Over Ebook Pricing 
 
                                                
729See Russell Smith, The War over Ebooks Sales Resonates Widely as Amazon, 
Hachette Battle, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Aug. 15, 2014), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/books-and-media/the-war-over-e-book-sales-
resonates-widely/article20080473/. 
730See De los Santos & Wildenbeest, supra note 687, at 27. 
731Keith Gessen, The War of the Words, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 2014), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/2014/12/amazon-hachette-ebook-publishing# 
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The exclusionary intent behind Amazon’s pricing of ebooks was 
debated extensively in the media because of a much-publicized 
dispute with Hachette Book Group (hereinafter Hachette). The 
essence of this dispute is that Hachette and other publishers 
became extremely uncomfortable with Amazon’s consistently 
pricing ebooks at US $9.99 (even when it bought the ebooks from 
publishers at a higher price) because they felt that low ebook 
prices threatened not only their profit margins but more seriously, 
the business model of the publishing industry as well as the 
future of print books.732 Publishers feared that if Amazon 
controlled the pricing of ebooks, it would price ebooks low 
enough to drive publishers out of the market because people 
would only buy ebooks so publishers would not be able to make 
any profits from their primary source of revenue – the sale of 
hardbacks and paperbacks.733 This is also called the “danger of 
percentage creep”.734 Publishers also believed that Amazon’s low 
ebook pricing was eroding consumers’ perception of the value of 
books, cannibalizing hardcover sales and would cause prices of 
books to fall.735 
 
The dispute between Amazon and Hachette has its roots in the 
DOJ complaint against Apple alleging that Apple colluded to fix 
the prices of ebooks with five publishing companies: Hachette 
Book Group, Harper-Collins, Penguin, Simon and Schuster and 
Macmillan. Apple challenged the DOJ ruling arguing that 
Amazon’s pricing of ebooks was unprofitable and Amazon was 
foreclosing competition by lowering the prices of ebooks. As a 
result, to make the pricing of ebooks profitable for retailers, 
Apple felt it could only enter the ebook market as a retailer if 
publishers adopted the ‘agency model’ of pricing books when 
                                                
732See Rankin, supra note 713. 
733Gessen, supra note 731. 
734See Gessen, id. 
735See De los Santos & Wildenbeest, supra note 687, at 2. 
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selling to all retailers.736 The agency model gave control of ebook 
prices to publishers with retailers receiving a fixed commission 
on each eBook it sold. The DOJ took the view that the agency 
model was in essence a method of price fixing and the publishers 
had colluded in introducing this model. The publishers entered 
into a settlement with the DOJ, which gave Apple the unlimited 
power to discount ebooks for a time period of two-years after the 
settlement. However, the court and the DOJ knew that Apple 
would not discount the prices of ebooks, so the terms of the 
settlement were a tool for Amazon to use in its negotiations with 
the publishers over ebook pricing.737 However, the court’s order 
was only for a period of two years after which the contracts 
between Amazon and each publisher could be freely 
renegotiated. Amazon’s dispute with Hachette started when this 
two-year period was nearing completion and ebook selling 
contracts needed to be renegotiated between the parties. 
 
The agency model in fact required publisher’s to pay higher 
amounts in commission to retailers and reduced the publisher’s 
profit margins.738 The publishers introduced the agency model 
into its contracts with retailers not out of concern for profits but 
because of other considerations such as cannibalization of print 
book sales by low ebook prices and concern for the long-term 
viability of its business model. 
 
Amazon has significant market power and competitive advantage 
in ebooks through its Kindle format and it exploited these 
advantages in its negotiations with Hachette over ebook prices. 
However, Hachette was determined not to give complete control 
of prices to Amazon. So Amazon took advantage of its market 
                                                
736 See Andrew Albanese, Apple Loses: Judge Finds Price Fixing in ebook Case, 
PUBLISHER WEEKLY (Jul. 10, 2013), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-
topic/digital/content-and-e-books/article/58166-apple-loses-judge-finds-price-fixing-in-
e-book-case.html. 
737See Albanese, id. 
738 See De los Santos & Wildenbeest, supra note 687, at 4.  
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power in order to pressurize Hachette to agree to its terms by 
withdrawing many beneficial retail services from Hachette books, 
such as removing customers’ ability to pre-order books, 
introducing artificial delays on the shipping times for Hachette 
books and removing personalised recommendations of Hachette 
books from its website.739 These activities substantially reduced 
the sale of Hachette books. Authors of books published by 
Hachette were the losers from this because of fewer readership 
and resulting losses in royalty payments.740 In fact some authors 
protested Amazon’s aggressive behaviour towards Hachette by 
signing a petition that asked Amazon to end its predatory 
practices, which “unfairly threaten its competitors and the printed 
book”.741 In the past, Amazon has followed a similar strategy of 
aggressively pushing for better terms by removing essential retail 
services offered by it with other sellers including Walt Disney. 
 
Amazon’s market power played a large role in the style of its 
negotiations with Hachette. Hachette is just one of Amazon’s 
70,000 and growing number of suppliers so it makes 
comparatively little difference to Amazon if it looses Hachette’s 
business.742 On the other hand, according to research conducted 
                                                
739See Farhad Manjoo, Amazon’s Tactics Confirm its Critics’ Worst Suspicions, BITS: 
NEW YORK TIMES BLOGS (May 23, 2014), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/amazons-tactics-confirm-its-critics-worst 
suspicions/; see also Carolyn Kellogg, Amazon and Hachette: The Dispute in 13 Easy 
Steps, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jun, 3, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/books/jacketcopy/la-et-jc-amazon-and-hachette-explained-
20140602-story.html. 
740As a result 900 authors including famous authors such as Stephan King and John 
Grisham have reacted strongly including issuing a two page advertisement in the New 
York Times asking Amazon to stop its tactics of keeping books hostage in its attempt to 
win a battle against Hachette. Another 1,200 German-language authors have signed a 
similar petition criticising Amazon’s tactics against the publisher, Bonnier. On the 
other hand some 8,500 authors including many famous self-published authors have 
written in support of Amazon. See Rankin, supra note 713. 
741See David Streitfeld, Amazon Angles to Attract Hachette’s Authors to Its Side, NEW 
YORK TIMES BLOGS (Jul. 8, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/amazon-
tries-to-woo-authors-in-hachette-dispute/. 
742See Kellogg, supra note 739. 
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by the Codex Group in 2014, Hachette is much more dependent 
on Amazon for its sales and revenues since Amazon is the largest 
book and ebook seller in USA and sells the majority of 
Hachette’s books and ebooks.743 Further, Hachette does not have 
the same capabilities and is thus, more strongly reliant on 
Amazon.744 
 
The result of the Amazon-Hachette dispute was that after many 
months of negotiations Amazon finally reached an agreement 
with Hachette whose terms were not made public but according 
to media reports the agreement retained the agency model and 
gave Hachette control over ebook prices but also gave Amazon 
incentives to keep ebook prices low.745 The dispute with Hachette 
shows that Amazon aggressively sought control over ebook 
pricing even though it did not intend to increase prices after 
achieving such control but intended to use this as a tool for 
competitive advantage. The discomfort of other publishers as 
well as retailers who found it impossible to match Amazon’s 
prices also shows that Amazon’s pricing was motivated either by 
anticompetitive intent or by an over-optimistic understanding of 
the market in the future. Even if Amazon’s loss-making prices 
was motivated by the overconfident or hope that it would be able 
to recover its losses at a future date, which cannot be certain, this 
would mean that Amazon is aiming to drive out competitors from 
the market, which would be called exclusionary behaviour.  
 
                                                
743Amazon had a market share of 41% of all new book sales in the USA. See Jim 
Milliot, BEA 2014: Can Anyone Compete with Amazon?, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (May 
28, 2014), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-
news/bea/article/62520-bea-2014-can-anyone-compete-with-amazon.html. 
744See Rankin, supra note 713. 
745Mark Coker, The Amazon Hachette Dispute Comes to a Pyrrhic End, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-
coker/theamazon-hachette-disput_b_6167162.html?ir=India. 
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9.5 Amazon’s Conduct and the Normative Paradigm of 
Predation 
 
The neoclassical paradigm of predatory pricing believes that 
rational firms will not price below cost unless they know they can 
recoup the losses incurred from predatory pricing by raising 
prices once competitors are driven out. However, the study of 
Amazon reveals that Amazon has kept prices of ebooks below 
cost for a sustained period of time without any intention of 
raising them to recoup losses. This study describes various 
reasons for why Amazon has engaged in below cost pricing. 
Using tools from business strategy can help to understand why 
firms engage in below cost pricing in situations where 
recoupment is unlikely. However, these explanations work 
because firms are not assumed to act rationally. This is in contrast 
to neoclassical theory, which takes the view that since firms are 
rational, where recoupment is unlikely, predation has either not 
occurred or is irrelevant even if it has.  
 
According to Benz, firms may engage in predatory pricing in 
order to drive down their costs or as a strategic attempt to gain 
market share/dominance in the long-term.746 One of the situations 
Benz addresses is where firm’s finance predatory pricing with 
profits earned in other markets.747 Benz argues that in such 
situations even though recoupment is uncertain, the welfare 
implications of predation may not be very different from 
situations where recoupment is likely.748 Here, even though the 
alleged predator does not plan to recoup its losses in the target 
market, it takes market share away from competitors and 
strategically maintains its competitiveness through below cost 
pricing. The result is that consumers in the ‘more profitable’ 
                                                
746Steven F. Benz, Below Cost Sales and the Buying of Market Share, 42(3) STAN. L. 
REV. 695, 704 (1990). 
747See Benz, id. at 705. 
748See Benz, id. at 716-17. 
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markets from where the predation is financed pay higher prices 
(and essentially finance the buying of market share in the other 
market) while at the same time entry in the market where 
predation is occurring is inhibited due to lower prices even when 
potential entrants may be equally efficient.749 Inhibited entry can 
reduce the pace of innovation. Further, this kind of predation can 
help firms acquire dominant positions in a market where they are 
not the more efficient competitor and may in fact take market 
share away from the more efficient firms, inducing efficiency 
impairing reallocations.750 Predation can thus, weaken 
competitors and even prevent their expansion into other markets, 
which can reduce competition in multiple markets.751 This shows 
that predation can have welfare reducing implications even where 
the predator does not recoup its losses because predation can 
inhibit entry and innovation or cause price increases in other 
markets.  
 
In the context of pricing, Amazon’s deeply discounted prices of 
books and ebooks have driven many competing bookshops out of 
the market and are continuing to do so as another in a long line of 
bookshops i.e., Barnes and Noble is also currently facing severe 
financial pressure.752 The gradual disappearance of bookstores 
means fewer choices to customers and less likelihood of 
innovation. Moreover, consumers value the services provided by 
physical bookstores, such as the ability to browse books before 
buying them. In fact a survey conducted by the Codex Group 
found that a substantial percentage of book buyers at Amazon 
had already decided which book they wanted to buy before 
                                                
749Benz, id. at 718. 
750Benz, id. at 720. 
751Benz, id. at 740. 
752See e.g. Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Barnes & Noble to Split Retail Stores, Nook Digital 
Business, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jun. 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/barnes-
noble-to-split-into-two-companies-1403699838. 
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logging-on to Amazon to buy the book.753 Some of these 
consumers said they went to the local bookshop to find which 
book to buy and then bought the book on Amazon because it was 
cheaper. Bookshops allow you to browse the entire book (while 
Amazon only gives a selected preview) and to get more authentic 
and personalized recommendations by interacting with people at 
the bookshop. Bookshops are also valued as a place to meet, 
interact and have conversations with a variety of people.754 
Finally, bookshops provide an added benefit of inculcating a 
literary culture within their community, for instance by 
organising book readings and other literary events. Many authors 
have expressed concern about the dwindling numbers of 
bookstores and have encouraged book lovers to buy books from 
bookstores rather than online.755 Thus, physical bookshops 
certainly provide consumers with added value that is lost when 
they no longer exist. This is one welfare implication of Amazon’s 
pricing strategy that competition authorities should consider 
seriously.  
 
Another matter of concern is Amazon’s use of its buyer power to 
make demands from and pressurize its suppliers, in this case the 
publishers.756 Amazon’s buyer power can lead to publishers 
profits being squeezed, which can in turn reduce their incentives 
to innovate or may lead to limited or volume-based profits, which 
                                                
753See Suw Charman-Anderson, Half of Amazon Book Sales are Planned Purchases, 
FORBES (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/suwcharmananderson/2013/02/20/half-of-amazon-book-
sales-are-planned-purchases/. 
754David Rosenberg, Why Independent Bookstores are More than Just a Place to Buy 
Books, SLATE (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/behold/2014/11/19/bryan_david_griffith_the_last_bookstor
es_america_s_resurgent_independents.html 
755See Alison Flood, David Nicholls: Browsing Bookshops then Buying Online is a 
‘Genteel Form of Shoplifting’, THE GUARDIAN (Apr., 14, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/apr/14/david-nicholls-decline-indie-
bookshops-london-book-fair. 
756See Foer & Patterson, supra note 726, at 10. 
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can make the production of specialised books that cater to a 
smaller audience unviable. In other words, Amazon’s buyer 
power can be used to coerce publishers to sell at prices, which 
will result in reduced production of new book content.757 This 
may also ultimately drive publishers out of the market and help to 
cement Amazon’s dominance in the book industry. 
 
Finally, the question of whether Amazon’s price cuts can be 
called predatory will be guided by the objectives promoted by the 
law of predatory pricing. In the US where predatory pricing is 
punished very rarely and only when there is recoupment because 
consumers are benefited when prices are low; Amazon’s pricing 
is not predatory. On the other hand, in the EU where the law does 
not require recoupment because consumer interest is served when 
effective competition is maintained; Amazon is more likely to be 
held guilty of predation. This study has shown that though it is 
unlikely that Amazon will be able to recoup by raising prices, it 
could recoup to some extent through greater operational scale and 
it could be financing predation through profits in other markets. 
The reason for its predation is strategic in nature. Under US 
predatory pricing law, there is no scope to explore these reasons 
for predation since intent is not a relevant element of the law. 
However, EU law requires proof of intent, which allows plaintiffs 
to explore the reasons behind Amazon’s pricing. Here insights 
from business strategy have assisted in the analysis conducted in 
this study. The analysis has shown that Amazon is not competing 
based on quality but is competing by preventing the growth of 
competitors. Thus, if EU law intends to solely encourage 
competition based on quality and discourage competition that 
hinders other firms’ growth and evolution, then Amazon’s 
conduct will be held to be exclusionary.   
 
                                                
757See Foer & Patterson, id. at 10. 
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10. Conclusion 
 
The Matsushita court held that firm conduct that could not be 
explained within the paradigm of rationality could not have 
occurred at all as a matter of law. Thus, firms are presumed by 
the law to act rationally. Accordingly, unless recoupment is 
possible, rational firms would not engage in predation. However, 
as the three case studies in this chapter show, firm conduct often 
deviates from this understanding of rationality. Firms can engage 
in exclusionary pricing even when there is no chance of 
recoupment. This may be because they are following a long-term 
strategic vision or because they have taken an impulsive decision. 
Firms may also suffer from behavioural biases and fear the entry 
of new firms in the market. It may also be because they want to 
establish a reputation for aggression and are willing to pay a high 
price to build that reputation. Many different factors could 
motivate a decision to predate. The complexities of the strategic 
environments in which firms operate such as the entry of new 
firms and decisions involving maintaining the competitive 
position in the market, make the decisions taken in such 
environments more conducive to behavioural biases. In any 
event, these case studies show that firms do not always engage in 
a rational analysis of the costs and benefits of predation as 
believed by scholars propounding the recoupment requirement. 
EU law makes room for these considerations by requiring 
evidence of intent in predatory pricing. 
 
Accordingly, firm behaviour as understood through the lens of 
behavioural studies suggests that the recoupment requirement 
constrains the assessment of firm conduct. A more 
comprehensive understanding of firm behaviour is more likely to 
be achieved when the motivations behind firm behaviour are 
clarified. This is possible when the law requires proof of intent. 
Thus, behavioural studies encourage employing the use of intent 
in predatory pricing to better understand firm behaviour. 
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Nevertheless, incorporating such requirements into predatory 
pricing law also depends on the normative concerns of the law. If 
the law is narrowly concerned with low prices then the intention 
behind firm conduct will be of little relevance. Thus, importing 
behavioural insights into predatory pricing law will depend upon 
the objectives that the law seeks to achieve. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE BOUNDED RATIONALITY OF 
FIRMS AND MERGER LAW 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Companies engage in mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”)758 in 
order to exploit growth opportunities and efficiencies, expand 
into new markets, diversify, access a different customer base, as a 
reaction to changes in the environment or as defensive moves to 
competitors.759 M&A activity has been steadily increasing 
globally over time both in terms of volume and size. In some 
industries, one merger can trigger a wave of other mergers 
between competitors resulting in increased concentration in an 
industry. One example is the US airline industry where a spurt of 
mergers has reportedly reduced the number of major airlines in 
the US by half.760 The increase in concentration in the US airline 
industry has reduced consumer choice and arguably may have 
detrimentally impacted consumer welfare.761 M&A could thus 
potentially have a significant anticompetitive impact on a 
market.762  
 
                                                
758In this chapter the terms: mergers, acquisitions, mergers and acquisitions and M&A 
are used interchangeably. 
759 See Gunther Tichy, What do we Know about the Success and Failure of Mergers, 
1(4) J. INDUSTRY, COMPETITION & TRADE 347, 368 (Dec., 2001). 
760See Airlines in America: No Choice, THE ECONOMIST (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2015/07/airlines-america 
761See id. 
762See Tichy, supra note 759, at 379-381 (arguing that there is mixed evidence of 
mergers increasing concentration but also finding that increased concentration is likely 
to reduce consumer welfare and accordingly advocating for a more careful scrutiny of 
mergers in competition law). 
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Further, there is substantial evidence that mergers often fail to 
achieve their objectives.763 Various studies have reported a high 
rate of M&A failure with one study placing the failure rate at 
50% or more of all M&A transactions.764 An empirical study also 
reveals that only one quarter of mergers lead to improvements in 
consumer welfare.765 In approximately two-thirds of all 
acquisitions, the acquiring firm’s stock price falls immediately 
after the acquisition is announced.766 This indicates that 
shareholders are skeptical about the likelihood that the acquirer 
will be able to achieve the required efficiencies to justify the 
transaction.767 It is not difficult to find examples of unsuccessful 
mergers in the history of business.768 Popular examples include 
AOL and Time Warner, Daimler-Benz and Chrysler, Kmart and 
Sears, eBay and Skype.769 Nevertheless, it is interesting that 
mergers are still very popular among businesses and the volume 
of mergers and acquisitions is actually increasing with time.770 
 
This chapter examines what motivates M&A activity despite the 
high chances of failure. For instance, one study finds that gaining 
                                                
763See Yaako Weber, Shloma Tarba & Christina Öberg, The M&A Paradox: Factors of 
Success and Failure in Mergers and Acquisitions, in A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: MANAGING THE CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS ACROSS EVERY 
STAGE OF THE M&A PROCESS (Yaako Weber, Shloma Tarba & Christina Öberg eds., 
Financial Times Press, 2013), http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2164982; 
see also Clayton M. Christensen, Richard Alton, Curtis Rising & Andrew Waldeck, 
The Big Idea: The New M&A Playbook, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Mar. 2011), 
https://hbr.org/2011/03/the-big-idea-the-new-ma-playbook/ar/1 (stating that “Yet study 
after study puts the failure rate of mergers and acquisitions somewhere between 70% 
and 90%”). 
764See Weber et al., id.; Tichy, supra note 759, at 385. 
765 Tichy, supra note 759, at 385. 
766See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 183.  
767See HITT et al., id. at 183. 
768“Mergers are more likely to fail than marriages.” See Nine Mergers that Epically 
Failed, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/23/worst-mergers-of-all-
time_n_2720121.html 
769See id.  
770See Weber et al., supra note 763. 
99B_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Competition Law and Bounded Rationality  

 
 
 
 
195 
market dominance is a prominent factor motivating mergers that 
should be of concern to competition law.771 Another factor 
behind merger decisions is the interest of managers.772 
Managerial ambitions can cause biases in decisions to merge and 
in estimating the potential efficiencies of mergers. As the CEO of 
Daimler stated about its failed acquisition of Chrysler, 
“Obviously we overestimated the potential for synergies.”773 
Even one of the analysts who had initially praised the merger of 
Daimler-Benz and Chrysler for its potential efficiencies later 
noted that, “what once seemed like a perfect fit now just seems 
like a mistaken vision.”774 In addition, cultural differences 
between companies can also play an important role in the failure 
of the Daimler-Chrysler merger.775  
 
At the same time, competition agencies conduct merger review 
on the basis that firms are rational, profit-maximizers. Based on 
evolving economic thought, even mergers in highly concentrated 
markets are no longer challenged unless anticompetitive effects 
can be proven and barriers to entry are high enough to impede the 
exercise of market power by the post-merger firm.776 This effects 
based approach requires predictions about how a proposed 
merger will effect competition in the market. These predictions 
are inherently difficult to make and subject to considerable 
uncertainty because of the complex nature of markets.777 
Agencies predict the effects of a merger by employing 
                                                
771 See Tichy, supra note 759, at 384 
772 See Tichy, id. at 368 
773Divorce Puts Paid to Car-making Dream, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 14, 2007), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/86510ab2-0254-11dc-ac32-
000b5df10621.html#axzz3bYwA90zp. 
774Id. 
775See id. 
776See Reeves & Stucke, supra note 37, at 1553.  
777See Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger 
Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF 
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235, 257 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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sophisticated economic techniques that simulate mergers. These 
tools now play a vital role in determining the harm from a 
merger.778 However, the methodology used in these simulations 
has been criticised for being too restrictive and in some cases 
inaccurate due to data limitations.779 Further, the predictions of 
simulation models are highly dependent on the assumptions on 
which the models are based.780 The assumptions of simulation 
models may not be in accordance with actual consumer and firm 
behaviour in markets.781 Since these models are simplified 
versions of the complex reality of real world markets, they don’t 
replicate the situation of an actual merger and the predictions 
derived from them may be equally affected.782 
 
This approach to merger analysis has been criticised by 
behavioural economists. For instance, with respect to entry, it is 
argued that neoclassical economic models, can underestimate the 
likelihood of entry, or in some cases magnify the pro-competitive 
effects of entry in overcoming the exercise of market power.783 
Other behavioural antitrust scholars have critically examined the 
existence of merger efficiencies in merger assessments.784 
 
One of the insights of behavioural studies is that firm behaviour 
is heterogeneous. The concept of firm heterogeneity is 
particularly relevant to merger analysis and competition 
authorities recognise this by reviewing each merger within its 
own particular factual context. One way to study the behaviour of 
                                                
778See Werden et al., supra note 43, at 126. 
779See Avishalom Tor, Boundedly Rational Consumers: Three Challenges for 
Competition Law, 17 (The 55th Annual Meeting of the Italian Economic Association, 
Trento, Italy, 2014), http://www.siecon.org/online/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Tor-
140.pdf (last visited: Aug. 28, 2015) (hereinafter Tor IV).  
780See Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
1073, 1139 (Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., vol. 2, Elsevier, 2007).  
781See Tor I, supra note 24, at 658.  
782See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 780, at 1139. 
783See Tor I, supra note 24, at 603-05. 
784See Tor I, id. at 602. 
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firms while respecting the idea of firm heterogeneity is through 
case studies. Accordingly, this chapter uses case studies to 
examine specific mergers in detail. The purpose of the case 
studies is to use firms’ bounded rationality to better understand 
the motivations behind these mergers and to critique agencies’ 
determinations of the competitive effects of mergers or to suggest 
the possible effect of the merger on competition. As the four 
merger case studies conducted in this chapter show, decisions to 
merge can be motivated by many factors such as managerial 
biases and by fear of competitors that can show that the intention 
behind a merger was to gain market power or to eliminate a 
significant rival with an ultimately harmful effect on competition. 
Literature from business studies can help in understanding the 
role played by the merging parties in the market; to what extent 
firms exert a competitive influence on each other; and how the 
merger may affect market dynamics. The European Commission 
(the Commission) is increasingly applying some of these insights 
from business studies to merger analysis, for instance in using the 
similarity of the business models of the merging firms to 
determining the closeness of competition between the merging 
parties.785 In this way behavioural and management insights can 
help to bring merger analysis closer to reality but without 
necessitating stricter or more intrusive merger enforcement. 
 
The rest of this chapter is divided as follows. Section 2 describes 
merger law in the US and EU and highlights the specific aspects 
of merger law where behavioural and business studies can make a 
contribution. Section 3 uses the perspectives from behavioural 
and business studies to understand what motivates decisions to 
merge and how it may be possible for this literature to contribute 
to merger review. The rest of this chapter consists of four case 
                                                
785See Paul McGeown & Aude Barthélemy, Recent Developments in EU Merger 
Control 2014, 6(6) J. EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 440, 448 (June, 2015) 
(the Commission feels that parties with different business models are less likely to 
constrain each other even if they sell the same product). 
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studies that demonstrate the potential application of behavioural 
insights to actual merger cases. These cases broadly compare the 
US and EU approach to merger analysis. In particular, the cases 
studies in sections 6 and 7 provide a comparison between the EU 
and US approaches to mergers in innovation markets. Section 4 is 
a case study of the US Supreme Court’s decision in US v. Falstaff 
Brewing Corp. Section 5 studies Vodafone’s takeover of 
Mannesmann and the corresponding decision of the European 
Commission allowing the acquisition with commitments. Section 
6 is a case study of the European Commission’s decision 
allowing Facebook’s acquisition of Whatsapp. Section 7 is a brief 
study of the US FTC’s decision allowing Genzyme’s acquisition 
of Novazyme. Section 8 concludes the discussion. 
 
2. The Law of Merger Review 
 
Merger review follows a similar path in the EU and US. Prior to 
undertaking a merger or acquisition that is above a certain 
threshold amount, firms are required to notify the merger to the 
relevant competition agencies in each jurisdiction.786 Following 
the notification, competition law agencies carry out a preliminary 
review of the transaction to determine if a more detailed 
investigation of the transaction is required. A majority of mergers 
are allowed to proceed based on a preliminary review.787 In a 
minority of cases however, competition agencies may carry out a 
more detailed investigation involving the gathering of more 
information in order to determine the competitive effects of the 
transaction. Subsequently, agencies may take one of the 
following decisions: (i) the transaction could be allowed to 
proceed; (ii) the enforcement agencies may enter into a 
                                                
786See DANIEL GORE, STEPHEN LEWIS, ANDREA LOFARO & FRANCES DETHMERS, THE 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF MERGERS UNDER EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW, 8-9 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
787See GORE et al., id. at 8-9.  
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settlement with the companies; (iii) they may block the 
transaction from proceeding; or (iv) they may require that the 
transaction only be allowed to proceed subject to the fulfillment 
of certain conditions.788 
 
Competition agencies in the EU and US conduct merger review 
based on detailed merger guidelines. These guidelines are not 
mandatory but are meant to make merger enforcement more 
consistent and predictable. Competition agencies generally use 
two theories of harm to assess the competitive effects of 
horizontal mergers and acquisitions: coordinated interaction and 
unilateral effects.789 The theory behind harm from coordinated 
interaction is that an increase in the concentration of firms in the 
post-merger market will facilitate collusion.790 Competition 
agencies determine the likelihood of coordinated interaction in a 
post-merger market based on market structure and the 
concentration of firms in the relevant market. Market tests such 
as the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) are used to measure 
market concentration. If competition agencies find that market 
concentration will increase significantly post-merger, they will 
then study market characteristics such as entry barriers and 
transparency of pricing practices to determine if there are any 
redeeming reasons for why these markets may not be vulnerable 
to collusion. For instance, if entry barriers are low, it may not be 
possible for colluding firms to raise prices post-merger. 
 
The theory behind harm from unilateral effects is that the merged 
firm would gain enough market power post-merger to be able to 
single-handedly increase prices or reduce output or decrease 
quality.791 Agencies test the possibility of unilateral effects 
                                                
788In the EU, conditions are referred to as ‘commitments’. Id. at 9. 
789See Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 353 
(2011-12). 
790See Crane, id. at 353. 
791See Crane, id. at 354. 
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analysis by determining for instance, if it is possible for other 
firms to counteract the exercise of power by the merged firm.792 
 
2.1 Horizontal Merger Control in the US 
 
In the 1970s, US merger policy was aimed at maintaining low 
levels of market concentration.793 At that time the government 
successfully challenged many mergers.794 However, influenced 
by economists such as Bork, who argued that only mergers to 
monopoly or those that created a dominant position in the market 
would reduce consumer welfare, merger policy in the US has 
gradually become much more permissive.795 Accordingly, in 
conformity with the consumer welfare standard, only mergers 
that are considered to increase prices for consumers are seriously 
reviewed by US antitrust agencies.796 Bork also believed that 
mergers create efficiencies such as by the transfer of assets to 
more capable management.797 Bork was of the view that most 
horizontal mergers do not harm consumers because they allow 
successful firms to expand by better utilizing the assets of 
rivals.798 The idea that horizontal mergers in oligopolistic 
markets are unlikely to create harm and are efficiency enhancing 
has been the basis of the US merger policy.799 
 
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 1976, 
requires companies carrying out mergers or acquisitions above 
certain monetary thresholds to notify the transaction to the 
                                                
792See Crane, id. at 354. 
793Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, Did Robert Bork 
Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 
57 J. L & ECON. S67 (Aug. 2014). 
794See Ashenfelter et al., id. at S68. 
795See Ashenfelter et al., id. at S72. 
796See Ashenfelter et al., id. at S74. 
797See Ashenfelter et al., id. at S72. 
798See Ashenfelter et al., id. at S95. 
799See Ashenfelter et al., id. at S75. 
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice 
(DoJ).800 The FTC and the DoJ are the competition law agencies 
responsible for reviewing mergers in the US. Prior to the 
introduction of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, firms were not 
obliged to inform antitrust authorities of their intent to merge.801 
Consequently, antitrust authorities would often start reviewing 
mergers after the merger was completed. This created many 
problems in constructing remedies for the merged entity if a 
merger was successfully challenged.802 The introduction of the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act helped to standardise the merger review 
process in the US with the help of the methodological guidance 
provided by the merger guidelines.803 
 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 1914 provides the substantive basis 
for merger review in the US. This section prohibits mergers or 
acquisitions whose effect “may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”804 In addition, 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 prohibits 
“[un]fair methods of competition…and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”805 The FTC and the DoJ can thus block mergers 
whose effect may be to substantially lessen competition.  
 
The statutory provisions governing merger review set out the 
broad goals of merger analysis. The factors that agencies more 
particularly consider in reviewing horizontal mergers are set out 
in the DoJ and FTC’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2010 (the 
“US Merger Guidelines”).806 The Guidelines state that in 
                                                
800See Crane, supra note 789, at 353. 
801See Ashenfelter et al., supra note 793, at S75. 
802See Ashenfelter et al., id. at S75. 
803See Ashenfelter et al., id. at S76. 
80415 U.S.C. § 18 (1914). 
80515 U.S.C. § 45 (1914). 
806“The Guidelines describe the principal analytical techniques and the main types of 
evidence on which the agencies usually rely to predict whether a horizontal merger will 
substantially lessen competition” see U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
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evaluating how a merger is likely to change a firm’s behaviour, 
the focus is “primarily on how the merger affects conduct that 
would be most profitable for the firm”.807 In other words, the 
FTC and DoJ conduct merger review on the basis that firms are 
profit-maximizers. The Merger Guidelines recognise that since 
reviewing mergers is a predictive exercise, it is unlikely that 
agencies will be certain about anticompetitive effects. Certainty 
is not required to find a merger unlawful. Further, the Guidelines 
clarify that merger review does not involve the uniform 
application of a single methodology; it is described as a fact-
specific process. 
 
The agencies evaluate mergers based on their impact on prices, 
but they also consider whether a merger is likely to affect product 
quality and innovation.808 The Merger Guidelines recognise that 
mergers can have non-price effects in terms of reduced product 
quality, variety, service or diminished innovation. The Merger 
Guidelines discuss the importance of competition to innovation – 
a merger may reduce the pace of innovation by reducing 
innovation efforts below the level that would have prevailed in 
the absence of the merger. This could either reduce incentives to 
continue innovations of existing products or reduce incentives to 
initiate new product development.809 The Guidelines also state 
that the agencies will consider whether a merger combines two of 
a small number of firms with the capabilities to innovate in a 
particular direction. Further, the extent to which successful 
innovation by one of the merging firms is likely to adversely 
affect the other firm is also considered relevant. The goals of 
                                                                                                       
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) [hereinafter US Merger Guidelines], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf. 
807§1, US Merger Guidelines, id. 
808See US Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commentary on the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (Mar., 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm#5. 
809See § 6.4, US Merger Guidelines, supra note 806. 
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merger review are discussed further in subsequent sections of this 
chapter. 
 
2.2 Horizontal Merger Control in the EU 
 
The European Community Merger Regulation (ECMR) provides 
the primary substantive basis for regulating the anticompetitive 
effects of mergers and acquisitions in the EU.810 The Regulation 
governs mergers that significantly impede effective competition 
(SIEC), in particular through the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position.811 Previously, the test was whether a merger 
would create or strengthen dominance as a result of which there 
was likely to be a significant impediment to effective 
competition.812 The approach to merger review has thus, changed 
from whether a merger meets a threshold of dominance to 
whether a merger impedes competition.813 The new test for 
merger review is accordingly broader than the previous test based 
on dominance. This is in line with the change in US merger law 
from the structural approach to the effects based approach under 
the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test.814 Further, the 
substantive basis of merger review in the EU is also clarified in 
Article 2(1)(a) of the ECMR, that merger review should take into 
account, “the need to maintain and develop effective 
competition” by considering factors such as actual or potential 
                                                
810Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings, OJ L24/1 (Jan. 29, 2004) [Hereinafter, EC 
Merger Regulation]. 
811§ 15, EC Merger Regulation, id. 
812See Lars-Hendrik Röller & Miguel de la Mano, The Impact of the New Substantive 
Test in European Merger Control, 2(1) EUROPEAN COMPETITION JOURNAL 9, 10-11 
(Apr., 2006). 
813See John Vickers, Merger Policy in Europe: Retrospect and Prospect, 25(7) 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. REV. 455, 460 (July, 2004) [hereinafter Vickers I]; John 
Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 ECON. J. F244 (June, 2005) [hereinafter Vickers 
II]. 
814See Vickers II, id. at F245. 
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competition. This suggests that the EU also gives importance to 
potential competition. 
 
Mergers are reviewed in the EU by the Commissioner of 
Competition and the Director General for Competition (DG 
Comp), although certain decisions are taken by the full College 
of Commissioners.815 Similar to the US, in the EU the 
Commission is guided by the EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
2004 (the “EC Merger Guidelines”).816 Similar to the spirit of the 
US Merger Guidelines, the elements of merger review set out in 
the EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines are not “a ‘checklist’ to be 
mechanically applied in each and every case.”817 Thus, the 
Commission does not need to strictly adhere to the EC Merger 
Guidelines and may consider other factors in conducting merger 
review. 
 
Despite the flexibility in the wording of the EC Merger 
Guidelines, practically the Commission conducts merger review 
through a fairly standardised process. First, market shares are 
considered, then closeness of competition and market structure. 
Cases with high market shares are approved if the increase in 
market share from the merger is not significant.818 Mergers of 
companies with high market shares are also cleared when market 
shares are found to be declining over the years or there are other 
viable competitors.819 Mergers leading to high market sharesare 
also approved by the EC where there is countervailing buyer 
                                                
815See WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 499, at 830. 
816Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, Council Regulation (EC) No. 
139/2004, 2004/C 31/03 (Feb., 2004), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/ [hereinafter EC Merger Guidelines]. 
817§ 13, EC Merger Guidelines, id. 
818See Paul McGeown & Barthélemy, supra note 785, at 445. 
819See McGeown & Barthélemy, id. at 445.  
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power to undermine the exercise of market power by the merged 
entity.820 
 
The following discussion sets out some aspects of the merger 
guidelines in the US and EU that are of interest from a 
behavioural perspective or which may provide an opening for 
behavioural analysis to be brought into merger review. 
 
2.3 Merger Review and the Goals of Competition Law 
 
The goals sought to be achieved by merger review are important 
because for instance, if competition law is only concerned with 
consumer welfare it will only be concerned with efficiencies that 
result in lower prices for consumers whereas if maximizing total 
welfare is the goal, mergers that create efficiencies will be 
allowed even if these cost savings are not passed-on to 
consumers.  
 
US antitrust statutes do not provide clear guidance on the 
objectives of merger review.821 The ambiguity is in the wording 
of section 7 of the Clayton Act, which states that mergers that 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly are 
prohibited. This has been interpreted quite differently over time 
so that different objectives have been attributed to merger review. 
Previously, merger reviews were concerned with preventing 
market concentration. In United States v. Aluminium Corp. the 
US Supreme Court held that, “It is the basic premise [of section 
7, Clayton Act] that competition will be most vital ‘when there 
are many sellers, none of which has any significant market 
share’.”822 The Supreme Court again took a similar view in the 
case of Brown Shoe Co. where the court used section 7, Clayton 
                                                
820See McGeown & Barthélemy, id. at 446. 
821See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 780, at 1166. 
822United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964). 
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Act to fulfill the objectives of maintaining rivalry in the market 
and protecting the competitive process.823 
 
Subsequently, as the Chicago view gained prominence, the 
importance of structural factors in merger enforcement declined 
and now section 7 of the Clayton Act is interpreted as supporting 
an ‘effects based’ approach.824 The impact of this change in 
position means that even mergers to monopoly can be approved if 
they increase consumer welfare.825 However, the problem with 
the effects based approach is that it is not easy to predict what 
will be the impact of a merger on consumer welfare. Kaplow and 
Shapiro argue that there is no clear empirical evidence of the 
effect of mergers on prices or on consumers, merging parties or 
rivals.826 Further, there is a significant amount of literature 
suggesting that US merger review is not achieving its objectives. 
Some empirical studies find that US merger policy has not 
increased consumer welfare.827 In another study, Mueller and 
Yartoglu find that for every merger that increases social welfare 
there are two mergers that reduce social welfare. Increasing 
social welfare is defined as increasing efficiency and/or 
increasing profits or sales.828 They conclude that given the 
ambiguous welfare implications from mergers competition law 
should be based on a presumption against allowing mergers. 
 
                                                
823See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 780, at 1165. 
824See Baker & Shapiro, supra note 777, at 238. 
825See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 780, at 1167. 
826See Kaplow & Shapiro, id. at 1153 (this is because in many cases requisite data is 
not available and even if it is available, it is difficult to show that price changes were 
caused by the merger rather than for other reasons such as changes in industry 
conditions). 
827See Ashenfelter et al., supra note 793, at S67; Robert W. Crandall & Clifford 
Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 
17(4) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3 (2003). 
828See Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yartoglu, Efficiency vs. Market Power through 
Mergers, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION 57, 81 (Manfred 
Neumann & Jürgen Weigand eds., 2d ed., Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013) 
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Merger simulations have become central to the effects based 
approach to merger review. Simulation models have come under 
criticism because they require strong assumptions on the nature 
of competition, shape of demand and marginal cost functions, 
and statistical assumptions for consistently estimating demand, 
which can make these models unrealistic.829 In fact, some studies 
have found that these simulations do not accurately predict actual 
post-merger prices.830 For instance, Weinberg found that the 
simulations in Proctor & Gamble’s acquisition of Tambrands 
substantially under-predicted the price effects of the 
acquisition.831 In addition, behavioural scholars argue that the 
bounded rationality of consumers can impact demand estimation 
in merger simulations.832 Boundedly rational consumers can over 
or under react to post-merger price changes.833 While merger 
simulations rely on actual consumer choices and therefore, may 
already account for consumer biases, this depends on the 
availability of sufficient data about consumer choices and so, as 
Tor argues, the bounded rationality of consumers suggests 
caution in relying on the predictions of merger simulations.834 In 
addition, merger simulations do not incorporate factors such as 
consumer’s preferences for fairness, which can impact estimation 
of price elasticity of demand. To illustrate, consumers with a 
preference for fairness can discipline the exercise of market 
                                                
829See Mathew C. Weinberg, More Evidence on the Performance of Merger 
Simulations, 101(3) AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 51, 51 (2011), 
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.3.51. 
830See Weinberg, id. at 51; Craig Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger 
Simulation: Evidence from the US Airline Industry, 49(2) J. L. & ECON. 627 (Oct. 
2006). 
831See Weinberg, id. at 51. 
832See Tor IV, supra note 779, at 16-17.  
833See Tor IV, id. at 17. 
834See Tor IV, id. at 17 (citing various sources including Alison Oldale, Behavioral 
Economics and Merger Analysis, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 139 (Spring 2010), 
Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A 
Survey, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 277 (2009); Elizabeth M. Bailey, Behavioral 
Economics: Implications for Antitrust Practitioners, ANTITRUST SOURCE (June 2010) 
[Hereinafter Bailey I]). 
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power by the post-merger firm, by refusing to buy the product or 
service of the post-merger firm if they consider that it is unfair 
for the firm to exercise such market power, even if purely self-
interested consumers would buy that product.835 Conversely, 
consumers may be willing to pay high amounts for a product if 
they believe that it is fair for the combined company to raise 
prices. Other studies suggest other reasons for problems in the 
predictions made from merger simulations, such as the 
differences between actual and assumed models of firm 
conduct.836 Firm conduct may thus need to be better understood 
to be able to better predict the effects of mergers. Finally, 
simulation models also fall short by not taking into account 
objectives other than profit maximization in firms’ pursuit of 
M&A.837 
 
Simulation models do not consider important non-price effects of 
mergers such as product quality, customer service and 
innovation.838 An important objective of merger review is to 
encourage innovation. Mergers can have different effects on 
innovation.839 On one hand, mergers can improve innovation by 
saving costs or through combining assets between firms more 
efficiently. On the other hand, mergers can increase firm size and 
market concentration and reduce incentives to innovate. If more 
competition can exert pressure on firms to continue to improve 
and innovate, considerations of dynamic efficiency in merger 
review may favour the view taken by the US Supreme Court in 
Brown Shoe that preserving competition in the market is 
valuable.  
                                                
835See Bailey, supra note 10, at 360. 
836See Peters, supra note 830, at 647. 
837See Bailey I, supra note 834, at 8. 
838See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 780, at 1153. 
839See Andreas Heinemann, The Impact of Innovation: Comments on Uwe Cantner & 
Wolfgang Kerber, in COMPETITION POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH: 
FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 202, 203 (Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber & Rupprecht 
Podszun eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011). 
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The US Merger Guidelines recognise the importance of 
innovation to merger analysis. Mergers that diminish incentives 
to innovate and reduce consumer choice or quality may be 
prohibited under US law. The EC Merger Guidelines also state 
that the objective of merger review is to prevent mergers that 
would lead to increased prices, reduced output, choice or quality, 
diminished innovation or otherwise ‘influence parameters of 
competition’.840 However, while agencies have developed 
sophisticated techniques to examine the effect of a merger on 
prices, it is much more complicated for economic models to 
predict the impact on innovation. Antitrust agencies in the US 
have used the ‘innovation market analysis’ to assess the impact of 
a merger on ‘innovation markets’.841 However, innovation market 
analysis has not received universal approval and is now used 
rather infrequently in US merger analysis. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important for agencies to recognise and 
examine the impact of a merger on innovation. Innovations are a 
key source of competitive advantage and growth in dynamic 
markets. In these markets competitive advantages are not 
sustainable over long periods and time is of the essence for 
achieving a competitive advantage.842 The pace of competition in 
dynamic markets has been described as ‘frenzied’, prices fall 
very quickly and companies need to make profits rapidly from 
their innovations.843 Competitive dynamics in fast-cycle markets 
                                                
840See § 8, EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 816. In addition, Article 2(1)(b) of the 
ECMR states that the Commission should consider, “the development of technical and 
economic progress provided that it is to the consumers’ advantage and does not form an 
obstacle to competition.” 
841See Elena Cefis, Mark Grondsma, Anna Sabidussi & Hans Schenk, The Role of 
Innovation in Merger Policy: Europe’s Efficiency Defence versus America’s Innovation 
Market Approach (Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute Discussion Paper Series 
No. 07-21, Utrecht University, 2007). 
842See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 144-145. 
843See HITT et al., id. at 145. 
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often result in rapid product upgrades and innovations.844 
Consequently, managers are under pressure to make strategic 
decisions swiftly and effectively. While in markets where 
technological change is not constant and rapid, managers focus 
on protecting, maintaining and extending competitive advantages, 
in dynamic, innovation-driven markets, managers need to 
continuously and rapidly develop new and superior sources of 
competitive advantage.845 Thus, in dynamic markets firms often 
use acquisitions as a tool to gain access to new products or 
technologies and as a way of keeping-up with market trends and 
consumer preferences. Some of these acquisitions may come at 
the expense of innovation because firms replace internal 
innovation efforts with innovation already carried out by another 
firm.  
 
The discussion above suggests that while merger law uses an 
effects-based approach, it is difficult to predict welfare effects of 
mergers and the result is that merger review does not always 
fulfill its objectives. Using behavioural insights to understand the 
motives behind mergers can help to assess the impact of a merger 
on innovation and the likelihood of achieving efficiencies. 
Further, it can also help in determining to what extent the merged 
firms exerted a competitive influence on one another. 
2.4 Evidence Collected by Competition Agencies 
 
The outcome of a merger investigation can depend on the type of 
evidence that is collected by competition agencies and how 
agencies evaluate this evidence.846 In fact the US Merger 
Guidelines outline the kinds of evidence collected in merger 
investigations. Agencies in the US and EU use similar types of 
evidence in merger assessments. Competition agencies collect 
                                                
844See HITT et al., id. at 145. 
845See HITT et al., id. at 145. 
846See Tor I, supra note 24, at 654. 
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evidence from merging parties as well as from other industry 
participants and consumers in order to determine the likely 
competitive effects of a merger. Documents collected from the 
merging parties such as strategic plans and customer lists reflect 
actual business conduct and decisions. The US Merger 
Guidelines state that these documents can be informative in 
understanding the operation of the market, industry conditions 
and competitive dynamics. These documents also help agencies 
to understand the business rationale for the transaction.847 
Customer and competitor surveys are also an important aspect of 
the evidence collected by agencies and the views of customers 
can be particularly important to the investigation. For instance, 
customer surveys were used in the EU to inform the competitive 
effects of the merger in the Siemens/VA Tech, Lufthansa/SN 
Airholding and Ryanair/Aer Lingus mergers.848 
 
Further, the agencies consider the financial terms of the M&A as 
evidence of the anticompetitive intent behind the transaction. For 
instance, when a firm is acquired at a premium, agencies note 
that it could either be an indication of efficiencies or of 
anticompetitive intentions.849 In fact agencies do look at 
documents reflecting the intentions and incentives of the parties 
as evidence when assessing the effects of mergers.850 Insights 
from strategic management can be helpful in interpreting this 
evidence and to better understand the likely effects of a merger. 
 
The process of collecting and interpreting evidence in mergers is 
based on the assumption that firms are rational, profit-
maximizers. As Tor has argued, this process can be better 
                                                
847Laura Wilkinson, Guidance on Applying the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
INSIDE COUNSEL (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/04/24/guidance-
on-applying-the-2010-horizontal-merger-gu?slreturn=1450296240. 
848See GORE et al., supra note 786, at 182. 
849See § 2, US Merger Guidelines, supra note 806. 
850See Reeves & Stucke, supra note 37, at 1578. 
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informed with the help of insights from behavioural sciences.851 
Reeves & Stucke are of the view that behavioural theory can be 
used to explain evidence collected in close cases where 
neoclassical theory predicts that mergers are pro-competitive or 
competitively neutral but where evidence of how firms behave is 
not consistent with theory.852 Agencies’ consideration of practical 
aspects of firms’ conduct makes rooms for introducing 
behavioural insights to explain past and present firm behaviour.  
 
2.5 The Role of ‘Maverick Firms’ 
 
Competition agencies describe a ‘maverick firm’ as one that 
plays a disruptive role in the market to the benefit of consumers. 
A maverick firm could threaten to disrupt market conditions with 
new technology or a different business model. The EC Merger 
Guidelines state that maverick firms may refuse to cooperate with 
industry norms, or may play a role in disciplining prices by 
rapidly expanding production and refusing to follow a concerted 
practice.853 Maverick firms may have characteristics that give 
them an incentive to favour different strategic choices from their 
competitors.854 
 
Both the US and EC Merger Guidelines state that the acquisition 
of such a firm may threaten competition and reduce consumer 
welfare. According to the EC Merger Guidelines, mergers that 
remove a ‘maverick’ firm create competitive concerns even when 
they do not increase market concentration significantly because 
they make coordination between the remaining firms easier.855 A 
firm that behaves aggressively in the market may also be called a 
maverick. An interesting feature of the Commission’s recent 
                                                
851See Tor I, supra note 24, at 654. 
852See Reeves & Stucke, supra note 37, at 1581.  
853§ 2, US Merger Guidelines, supra note 806. 
854§ 20, EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 816. 
855§ 42, EC Merger Guidelines, id. 
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jurisprudence has been its increasing use of the idea of a firm as 
an “aggressive competitor” to assess the degree of competition 
that is likely to prevail or be removed by the merger.856 
 
Insights from behavioural and business studies may be applied to 
better understand maverick firms and the role played by them in 
the market. Often firms that act as mavericks consciously adopt 
strategies to keep prices low. Business strategy suggests that 
rather than different cost structures dictating a firm’s behaviour 
as a ‘maverick’, strategic positions consciously adopted by firms 
to achieve competitive advantage can be the reason for a firm 
behaving like a ‘maverick’. This can provide a different 
perspective to the role of firms characterised as ‘mavericks’ in a 
market. Further, insights from business studies can help in 
characterizing a firm as “aggressive”.  
 
2.6 Mergers with Potential Competitors 
 
Mergers may be challenged in the US and EU on a theory that it 
eliminates a ‘potential competitor’ from the market. A potential 
competitor is one who is intending to enter the market in the 
future or is on the ‘fringes’ of the market and exerting a 
competitive influence on firms in the relevant market merely by 
its presence on the fringes of the market. In such cases, the EC 
Merger Guidelines require that the potential competitor should 
exert a “significant constraining influence” or there should be a 
“significant likelihood” of the entities succeeding in exerting a 
competitive influence. The EC Merger Guidelines state that, 
“evidence that a potential competitor has plans to enter a market 
in a significant way could help the Commission to reach such a 
conclusion.”857 Competition agencies accordingly consider a 
firm’s actual behaviour and internal documentation to determine 
                                                
856See McGeown & Barthélemy, supra note 785, at 449. 
857§ 60, EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 816. 
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if it is a potential competitor. In addition, the US Supreme Court 
has recognised that potential entrants can exert a pro-competitive 
influence on competitors and acquisitions that eliminate them can 
have a negative effect on the market.858 Behavioural insights 
could be used to determine whether a firm is positioned as a 
potential competitor. This will be discussed in greater detail later 
on in this chapter.  
 
2.7 Firm’s Incentives 
 
At various places the US Merger Guidelines refer to the 
incentives of merging firms to behave anti-competitively. For 
instance, in discussing the implementation of the Hypothetical 
Monopolist Test, the US Merger Guidelines express concern only 
when the merged firm has the incentives to raise prices. Further, 
the EC Merger Guidelines state that smaller competitors may 
counteract the anti-competitive effects of mergers of firms with 
high market shares, if they have the ability and incentive to 
increase output in the market.859 Competition agencies consider 
profit maximization as the best guide to assessing firms’ 
incentives and the best predictor of the competitive effects of 
mergers.860 
 
The US Merger Guidelines use documents of the merging firms 
or data used by them to take business decisions to determine their 
incentives.861 Yet empirical evidence suggests that firms do not 
always respond to economic incentives in the manner predicted 
by traditional economic models. Findings from behavioural and 
business studies indicate that firms should not be assumed to 
always strictly respond to economic incentives in the manner 
                                                
858See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Falstaff 
Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973). 
859§ 17, EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 816. 
860 Farrell & Shapiro Interview, supra note 16. 
861§ 4.1.3, US Merger Guidelines, supra note 806. 
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envisaged by the Guidelines. Accurately predicting firm 
behaviour may require more observation of actual firm conduct 
to understand how firms respond to incentives. 
2.8 Merger Efficiencies 
 
An important aspect of merger review is balancing efficiencies 
with anticompetitive effects. Greater efficiencies are said to 
counterbalance potential anticompetitive effects from mergers. 
Mergers can generate efficiencies through economies of scale and 
scope and the sharing and redeployment of resources and 
capabilities. However, empirical evidence shows that merger 
parties’ claims of efficiencies are not always realised.862 One 
reason is that problems in the process of integrating two 
companies following a merger or acquisition can make the 
realisation of potential efficiencies difficult. Mergers create larger 
firms and managing larger firms is more complex and can make 
decision-making within a firm more bureaucratic, which could in 
turn make firms more rigid and less amenable to innovation.863 
The realisation of efficiencies from acquisitions is thus dependant 
on how managers manage the M&A process.864 
 
Further, Farrell and Shapiro find that many of the efficiencies 
claimed by parties are not merger specific.865 A problem with 
determining whether efficiencies are merger-specific is that while 
parties often claim that the efficiencies can only be realised from 
the merger, it may actually be possible to achieve these 
efficiencies through other contractual arrangements without 
necessitating a merger.866 It is also difficult for competition 
                                                
862See Baker & Shapiro, supra note 777, at 256.  
863See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 196. 
864See PHILIPPE C. HASPESLAGH & DAVID B. JEMISON, MANAGING ACQUISITIONS: 
CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RENEWAL (The Free Press, 1991).  
865See Joseph & Carl Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger 
Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 685 (2001). 
866See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 780, at 1164. 
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agencies or courts to gauge whether claimed efficiencies would 
actually materialise.867 Baker and Shapiro argue that merger 
parties’ claims that efficiencies will enhance ability and 
incentives to compete, resulting in lower prices, higher quality or 
new products should only be accepted after careful analysis and 
not solely based on their plausibility.868 They suggest that 
examining efficiencies in mergers should go beyond whether they 
are verifiable and merger-specific and should examine how 
efficiencies would lead to lower prices given the way market 
participants are thought to behave.869 
 
The US Merger Guidelines are skeptical of merger efficiencies. 
Reasons for this include: the fact that the merging parties 
themselves provide the information used in assessing merger 
efficiencies; efficiencies claimed by merging parties may not be 
realised and efficiencies may not be merger specific.870 The US 
Merger Guidelines are particularly skeptical of efficiencies 
generated outside the ‘business planning’ process. The EC 
Merger Guidelines are also skeptical of merger efficiencies. The 
Guidelines state that “it is highly unlikely” that efficiencies can 
counteract the anticompetitive effects of a merger leading to a 
position of dominance or market power.871 Merger specific 
efficiencies are not only difficult to substantiate but may also fail 
to materialise.872 
 
Kaplow and Shapiro have an interesting theory that although 
most mergers tend to raise prices slightly, yet mergers are only 
challenged when anticompetitive effects are demonstrated to be 
                                                
867See Kaplow & Shapiro, id. at 1165. 
868See Baker & Shapiro, supra note 777, at 256. 
869See Baker & Shapiro, id. at 263. 
870§ 10, US Merger Guidelines, supra note 806. 
871§ 84, EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 816. 
872Avishalom Tor, The Market, The Firm and Behavioral Antitrust, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 539 (Eyal Zamir & Doron 
Teichman eds., Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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significant, because all mergers typically generate some 
efficiencies.873 Accordingly, as Kaplow and Shapiro explain, the 
cautious approach of agencies and courts to accepting the 
efficiency defense to otherwise anticompetitive mergers is that in 
such cases efficiencies have to be not only substantial but also 
large enough to exceed the threshold level of efficiencies 
presumed to exist in mergers.874 
 
According to Crane, the EU and American competition law 
systems require disproportionately greater proof of potential 
efficiencies arising from mergers than they do of potential harms 
because they recognise and incorporate behavioural insights 
about efficiencies.875 In other words, in both the US and EU it is 
easier to establish harm to competition from mergers than to 
establish an efficiencies defense. Some of the reasons offered by 
Crane for competition authorities’ skeptical treatment of merger 
efficiencies include: the general view that mergers are more often 
due to a desire for empire building than creating shareholder 
value and that merger decisions are taken by managers who are 
often subject to overconfidence bias.876 Thus, merger law may 
already incorporate behavioural insights because it gives less 
weight to merger efficiencies than it would have if it had purely 
adopted a traditional economic approach to efficiencies. 
 
3. Applying Behavioural Insights to Merger Review 
 
Merger review requires an assessment of market structure and 
anticompetitive effects. There seems to be little room for 
behavioural insights in such an exercise. Nevertheless, EU 
merger law gives some hope because it describes market shares 
and concentration levels as providing “useful first indications” of 
                                                
873See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 780, at 1163. 
874See Kaplow & Shapiro, id. at 1163. 
875See Crane, supra note 27, at 347. 
876See Crane, id. at 350. 
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market structure and the competitive importance of the merging 
parties877 but as not determinative of the outcome of a case.878 
Further, as competition agencies in the US and EU recognise, 
merger review is an inherently predictive exercise and the 
outcomes in each case may differ based on the factual context of 
the case. This makes merger review particularly conducive to 
incorporating behavioural insights.879 
 
An important aspect of merger investigations is examining the 
conditions in the industry where the merger is taking place.880 
Each industry has its own special context that affects the 
agencies’ prediction of anticompetitive effects from mergers. 
Literature from industrial organisation argues that industry 
characteristics such as economies of scale, barriers to entry, 
diversification, product differentiation and the degree of 
concentration of firms are the primary indicators of firm strategy 
and performance.881 Other factors such as the role of advertising 
and reputation, network effects, switching costs, technological 
change and intellectual property rights may also be relevant.882 
                                                
877§ 14, EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 816. 
878See WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 499, at 868. 
879See Reeves & Stucke, supra note 37, at 1581.  
880 To illustrate the kinds of questions that competition authorities may ask when 
examining mergers, the following questions were considered relevant for the proposed 
merger of US Airways and Delta Airlines: on which routes did the two airlines compete 
directly? Would competition from rivals prevent the merged entity from profitably 
increasing prices? Given the variety of fares charged by airlines, would the merger 
have different effects on different classes of fares such as for business vs. leisure 
passengers? How do frequent flier programmes affect this analysis? Could the potential 
efficiencies generated from a merger be possible through other means such as airline 
alliances that are less intrusive to competition? If merger efficiencies reduce fares on 
some routes but reduced competition raises fares on other routes, how should these 
effects be balanced? How will the changing nature of the airline sector such as the 
growth of regional airlines and low cost carriers affect the way these predictions are 
made? How strongly would Delta Airlines be able to compete if the merger did not take 
place, given its impending bankruptcy? See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 780, at 
1169. 
881See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 13. 
882See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 780, at 1178. 
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The emphasis on industry-specific rather than firm-specific 
factors in merger review is due to the influence of industrial 
organisation literature on competition law.883 Nevertheless, 
empirical evidence and behavioural insights suggest that not only 
the external environment but also internal firm characteristics 
play a role in a firm’s decisions and performance.884 The 
following discussion will illustrate why examining firm-specific 
factors can help in merger analysis. 
 
3.1 Acquisition Decisions are often Boundedly Rational 
 
Acquisition decisions are complex. Firms need to decide firstly, 
about whether or not to undertake a merger or acquisition at all, 
next which of all possible companies is the most appropriate to 
acquire, how to structure and value the transaction and how much 
to pay for targets.885 Managers consider numerous possibilities 
and process vast amounts of information to make these decisions. 
To simplify the processing of all the variables and data involved 
in an acquisition decision, managers may use perceptual 
processes/heuristics. Thus, acquisition decisions can be subject to 
managerial biases.886 Jemison and Sitkin argue that M&A 
decisions are not outcomes of rational choices but negotiated 
results of decision-making processes.887 Formal and informal 
processes, organisational routines, political interests and 
managers’ former experiences affect decision-making within 
                                                
883See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 13. 
884See HITT et al., id. at 15. 
885Irene M. Duhaime & Charles R. Schwenk, Conjectures on Cognitive Simplification 
in Acquisition and Divestment Decision-Making, 10(2) ACADEMY MGMT. REV. 287 
(Apr., 1985). 
886See Duhaime & Schwenk, id. at 288.  
887See David B. Jemison & Sim B. Sitkin, Corporate Acquisitions: A Process 
Perspective, 11(1) ACADEMY MGMT. REV.145 (Jan., 1986).   
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firms.888 Accordingly, the outcome and likely success of an 
acquisition can depend on the process through which the 
acquisition was conducted.889 
 
The behavioral theory of the firm views the firm as a collection 
of sub-units with different and conflicting goals, resources and 
time horizons. Firm decision-making is viewed as requiring 
coalition building, bargaining and conflict resolution.890 This can 
create some of the following problems with acquisition decisions: 
(i) decisions to merge may divide a firm with some teams 
supporting and some opposing a merger, (ii) once the process of 
the acquisition starts, the momentum of completing the 
transaction can be quite strong and groups favouring the 
transaction can be more forceful in achieving outcomes than 
those against it even when it may be more prudent in the long-
term to abandon the transaction rather than complete it, (iii) 
negotiators may not pay sufficient attention to deeper issues 
associated with the acquisition, agreeing to disagree on 
differences of opinion because both sides want to complete the 
negotiation, (iv) each party may have different justifications for 
the acquisition, which may cause problems once the acquisition is 
complete, and  (v) different groups within a firm might have 
conflicting interests with respect to a merger or acquisition.891 
 
3.2 Managerial Biases Can Affect Acquisition Decisions 
 
One of the reasons that mergers do not work out as planned is 
that the managers who take the decisions to merge are subject to 
                                                
888See THOMAS STRAUB, REASONS FOR FREQUENT FAILURE IN MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS 50-51 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Deutscher 
Universitätsverlag, Gabler Edition Wissenschaft, Jul. 2007).  
889See Jemison & Sitkin, supra note 125.  
890See Thomas C. Powell, Dan Lovallo & Craig R. Fox, Behavioral Strategy, 32 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1369, 1375 (2011). 
891See HASPESLAGH & JEMISON, supra note 102. 
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managerial biases such as overconfidence bias and hubris and 
one of the consequences of this is that managers underestimate 
problems associated with mergers.892 Overconfident CEOs are 
more likely to undertake value-destroying mergers.893 In addition 
to overconfidence, CEO dominance also contributes to excessive 
merger activity as dominance increases the likelihood that a CEO 
can impose her overconfident views on the company.894 An 
empirical examination of mergers measuring the distribution of 
gains and losses across the acquiring and acquired firms found 
that there was little empirical evidence to support the hypothesis 
that mergers are carried out to achieve efficiencies and more 
empirical evidence to show that mergers are carried out because 
of managerial discretion and hubris.895 
 
Roll is considered to be the first to associate managerial hubris 
with M&A transactions.896 Since Roll’s seminal article on hubris, 
a rich literature has evolved including numerous empirical studies 
on managerial hubris in M&A transactions. This literature finds 
that even though managers are aware that mergers are risky and 
on average cause losses to the acquiring firm, they still go ahead 
with mergers because hubris leads them to believe that they are 
better than other managers at identifying and operationalising 
mergers. Managers who suffer from hubris believe that statistics 
don’t apply to them. Firms with strong current performance are 
more likely to have managers with hubris since hubris is said to 
arise from power and prestige and may lead managers to 
                                                
892See Baker & Shapiro, supra note 777, at 256. 
893See Malmendier & Tate, supra note 236, at 20. 
894See Rayna Brown & Neal Sarma, CEO Overconfidence, CEO Dominance and 
Corporate Acquisitions, 59 J. ECON. & BUSINESS 358 (2007). 
895See Dennis C. Mueller & Mark L. Sirower, The Causes of Mergers: Tests Based on 
the Gains to Acquiring Firms’ Shareholders and the Size of Premia, 24 MANAGERIAL 
DECISION ECON. 373 (2003). 
896See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59(2) J. BUSINESS 
197 (Apr., 1986). 
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undertake riskier and less successful acquisitions.897 Hubris may 
also result in managers paying too much for an acquisition 
because managers with hubris are likely to overestimate their 
ability to positively integrate and extract value from a merger or 
acquisition.898 
 
Acquisitions and the legacy attached to them, whether a success 
or failure, can have a weighty impact on a manager’s career. 
Managers’ decisions to acquire may be motivated by empire 
building, which can also explain why managers acquire 
companies despite past failures and predicted difficulties in 
undertaking M&A transactions.899 The empire building theory of 
mergers suggests that managers want to create a huge 
organisation, an empire.900 According to Marris, “managements 
are likely to see the growth of their own organization as one of 
the best methods for satisfying personal needs and ambitions, an 
attitude which is reinforced by psychological tendencies to 
identify the ego with the organization.”901 For instance, the 
former CEO of Daimler-Benz used M&A as a tool for his 
ambition to make the company into a global car manufacturer.902 
Another example of managerial egos being responsible for 
mergers is in the merger of Holcim and Lafarge, the two largest 
                                                
897See Mario Schijven & Michael A. Hitt, The Vicarious Wisdom of Crowds: Towards 
a Behavioral Perspective on Investor Reactions to Acquisition Announcements, 33 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1247, 1254 (2012).  
898STRAUB, supra note126, at 48. 
899STRAUB, id. at 48. 
900See Friedrich Trautwein, Merger Theories and Merger Prescriptions, 11(4) 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 283, 287-88 (May, 1990) (providing a critical overview of the 
different theories of mergers and the empirical and theoretical evidence motivating 
them); see also Dennis Mueller, A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, 83(4) QUART’LY 
J. ECON. 643 (1969) (putting forth a theory of mergers based on managerial growth 
maximization). 
901Robin Marris, A Model of the “Managerial” Enterprise, 77(2) QUART’LY J. 
ECON.185, 187 (May, 1963). 
902See Divorce Puts Paid to Car-making Dream, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 14, 2007), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/86510ab2-0254-11dc-ac32-
000b5df10621.html#axzz3bYwA90zp. 
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cement manufacturers in the world, as the chairman of Holcim 
was about to retire and “wanted to end [his career] on a high” 
with a successful merger.903 Yet, though the merger of Holcim 
and Lafarge was to be a merger of equals, personality and ego 
clashes between the top management of both companies ruffled 
feathers to such an extent that the success of the merger itself was 
threatened.904 
 
Some managers can become addicted to M&As leading to the 
making of too many acquisitions. This may be because of the 
thrill or prestige of M&As or because it signals managerial 
ambition. Managers can also become overly involved in making 
acquisitions. Empirical evidence shows that over-involvement in 
acquisitions can divert managerial attention from other market 
opportunities and can be harmful to the firm.905 
 
Another theory of managerial bias is that managers can have an 
illusion of control, which means they over-estimate the extent to 
which they can control the outcome of an acquisition.906 This 
results in managers not thoroughly evaluating acquisition 
candidates before deciding to acquire them. Many times 
acquisitions are made when the acquirer does not have expertise 
to manage the target or managers don’t realise that shared 
customers, markets or technical relationships are insufficient to 
ensure that the acquisition is a success, because factors that may 
make it more difficult for the acquisition to be a success are not 
considered. Illusion of control may cause managers to acquire 
companies that operate in markets in which they do not have 
expertise and then unsuccessfully attempt to manage them.907 For 
                                                
903See Sarah Gordon and Arash Massoudi, Holcim & Lafarge: A Merger of Egos, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/41d317c8-d14e-
11e4-98a4-00144feab7de.html#axzz3h6OZj8AB 
904See Gordon, id.  
905See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 195.  
906See Duhaime & Schwenk, supra note 123, at 289. 
907See Duhaime & Schwenk, id.at 293. 
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example, Clorox made a series of acquisitions after it was no 
longer a part of Proctor &Gamble (P&G) in an effort to diversify 
Clorox’s business. Many of these acquisitions were later divested 
because they were far from Clorox’s strengths and Clorox was 
not able to successfully manage these acquisitions. Clorox’s 
managers were trained at P&G and their previous experience at 
P&G was a successful one, which gave them an illusion of 
control.908 
 
Yet another managerial bias that can affect M&A decisions is 
called ‘escalation of commitment’ – managers may continue an 
M&A transaction even if it is not in the firm’s best interest to 
continue with it because they feel they have already invested 
significant time and resources on the M&A.909 In these cases 
managers are reluctant to back out once they have publicly 
committed to an M&A out of a sense of responsibility. 
 
Managerial biases are also reflected in the premiums paid for 
acquisitions. Acquisition premiums can represent the acquiring 
firm’s view of the potential for efficiencies from the transaction. 
Higher premiums would signal greater efficiencies from the 
acquisition.910 However, if acquisitions are financed with stocks 
rather than with cash, it can signal that managers are not 
confident about realising efficiencies from the acquisition 
because payments using stocks share the risk of the acquisition 
with investors and shareholders and it also indicates that 
management believe their firm to be overvalued.911 Further, there 
is empirical evidence that managers consistently overpay for 
acquisitions for reasons such as managerial hubris, escalation of 
                                                
908See Duhaime & Schwenk, id.at 290. 
909See Schijven & Hitt, supra note 897, at 1251. 
910See Schijven & Hitt, id. at 1251. 
911See Schijven & Hitt, id. at 1253. 
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commitment, cognitive biases, or for reasons of self-interest such 
as empire building.912 
 
One method used by managers to simplify decision-making is to 
use analogies.913 Reasoning by analogy involves the application 
of simple analogies and images to guide problem definition.914 
Analogies can mislead managers into an overly simplistic view of 
the situation and may lead to an acquisition designed to solve the 
wrong problem.915 For instance, a firm considering acquisition of 
a business tangential to its own may view the target as analogous 
to its existing business – failing to recognise the more complex 
and technical nature of the acquisition candidate.916 
 
In conclusion, different managerial motives can play a significant 
role in M&A transactions. Nevertheless, they cannot explain all 
mergers and acquisitions.917  
 
3.3 Strategic Reasons for M&A 
 
Haspeslagh and Jemison highlight that acquisitions are made to 
further a firm’s strategic objectives.918 Some reasons for 
executing M&As are to achieve size, growth and profitability. 
Another reason for M&A is to achieve greater market power.919 
Acquisitions may be a response to an emerging competitive 
threat, a means to enter a new market and exploit market 
opportunities or to spread risks across industries.920 Firms may 
engage in acquisitions to shift their operations from their core 
                                                
912See Schijven & Hitt, id. at 1252. 
913Duhaime & Schwenk, supra note 123, at 293. 
914Duhaime & Schwenk, id.at 288. 
915Duhaime & Schwenk, id.at 293. 
916See Duhaime & Schwenk, id.at 289. 
917STRAUB, supra note126,at 49. 
918See HASPESLAGH & JEMISON, supra note 102. 
919See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 184.  
920See HITT et al., id. at 183. 
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business into different markets. Further, acquisitions are 
sometimes used as strategies when there is uncertainty in the 
competitive landscape.921 In industries with intense competitive 
rivalry, firms may engage in acquisitions to lessen their 
dependence on one or more products or markets.922 Some 
acquisitions are made to gain capabilities that the firm does not 
possess.923 Acquiring firms with different skills and capabilities 
helps the acquiring firm to access new knowledge and remain 
competitively relevant.  
 
A company seeking to enter a new market and facing barriers to 
entry may find entry more effective by acquiring an established 
competitor than by entering the market on its own. Thus, high 
entry barriers make acquisitions attractive by offering immediate 
market access.924 Further, in dynamic markets, acquisitions may 
be less costly, faster and less risky than developing innovations 
internally.  
 
A firm has a competitive advantage when it implements a 
strategy which competitors are unable to duplicate or find it too 
costly to imitate.925 However, no competitive advantage is 
permanent, the question is of how long a competitive advantage 
will last.926 Thus, firms constantly search for opportunities to 
obtain a sustainable competitive advantage and M&A is one such 
tool in the hands of managers to obtain an advantage over 
competitors. This perspective of M&A activity as a way of 
obtaining advantage over competitors can be useful to 
competition law by contributing to the understanding of the 
                                                
921See HITT et al., id. at 183. 
922See HITT et al., id. at 190. 
923See Philip M. Rosenzweig, Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value through 
Corporate Renewal, 18(2) ACADEMY MGMT. REV. 370, 371 (Apr. 1993) (book review). 
924See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 187.  
925See HITT et al., id. at 5. 
926See HITT et al., id. at 5. 
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motivations and impact of M&A in the short-term and the long-
term.  
 
3.4 Strategic Management and Head-to-head Competition 
 
An important aspect of merger analysis is to determine whether 
the firms being merged or acquired could be called competitors. 
As §2.1.4 of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines state, a 
relevant consideration for assessing a merger is whether the 
merging firms would have been head-to-head competitors absent 
the merger. The nature of rivalry is an important consideration in 
the analysis of horizontal mergers particularly under the theory of 
unilateral effects where the merger removes a firm that affected 
an important competitive constraint to the market. Competitor 
analysis within management studies provides tools to assess the 
degree of rivalry or competition between firms in the market.927 
Here, insights from management studies can prove useful to the 
understanding of mergers in competition law. 
 
Not all firms in an industry compete to the same degree with each 
other. Some firms within an industry share more markets with 
each other than with other firms in the same industry. Competitor 
analysis in business strategy considers the extent to which two 
firms share markets and the importance of the market for each 
firm.928 This can affect the assessment of whether two merging 
firms are ‘close competitors’. Competitor analysis of firms 
involves two factors: market commonality and resource 
similarity.929 Market commonality in business strategy represents 
the number of markets in which firms and their competitors 
compete, the degree of strategic importance of the individual 
markets to each firm as well as the competitor’s strength in these 
                                                
927 Chen, supra note 539, at 100. 
928See Chen, supra note 539, at 101. 
929See Chen, id.at 105. 
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markets.930 Competitor analysis considers the extent to which two 
firms share markets and the importance of the market for each 
firm. Further, competitive positions between firms are often not 
symmetric and firms do not pose an equally grave threat to each 
other.931 It may be necessary to move beyond economic factors to 
consider why particular markets may be more important to a 
particular firm. 
 
Next, resource similarly has its basis in the resource-based theory 
of the firm – it assumes that each firm is a collection of unique 
resources and capabilities932 and a firm’s competitive advantage 
is defined by its unique resource bundle.933 Resource similarity is 
the extent to which two firms possess resource endowments 
comparable in both type and amount.934 Core competencies are 
resources and capabilities that may be a source of competitive 
advantage for the firm over its rivals. Firms need to continuously 
improve, innovate and upgrade their competencies to succeed 
over time. Firms with similar resource bundles are said to have 
similar strategic capabilities and competitive vulnerability in the 
market.935 According to the resource-based theory, firms that 
share a larger resource similarity, have fewer competitive 
advantages over each other and are likely to be closer competitors 
within a market. Consequently, not only the external market but 
also factors internal to each firm can determine to what extent 
two firms consider each other to be close competitors.  
 
                                                
930See Chen, id. at 106. 
931See Chen, id. at 101. 
932 Individual resources of a firm are formed into a capability. A capability is the ability 
of resources to perform a task or an activity in an integrated manner. See HITT et al., 
supra note 139, at 16-17.  
933See Chen, supra note 539, at 107. 
934See Chen, id. at 107. 
935See Chen, id. at 107. 
116B_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Competition Law and Bounded Rationality  

 
 
 
 
229 
4. The Falstaff Case 
 
The government challenged the acquisition by Falstaff, the fourth 
largest beer producer in the US, of Narragansett, the largest beer 
seller in the New England area of the US on the theory that 
Falstaff was a potential entrant into the New England market and 
the acquisition eliminated competition that would have existed 
had Falstaff entered the market de novo.936 This lead to the US 
Supreme Court’s judgment in US v. Falstaff Brewing Corp 
discussed below.937 
 
The district court dismissed the government’s allegations that the 
acquisition was anticompetitive by reasoning that Falstaff would 
never have entered the market in the New England area de novo, 
and since the only way that Falstaff would have entered the 
market was by acquisition, the transaction did not substantially 
lessen competition. However, the Supreme Court reversed the 
district court’s opinion on the issue of potential competition. The 
Supreme Court held that the District Court incorrectly assumed 
that because Falstaff did not intend to enter the market de novo it 
was not a potential competitor, as it exerted significant 
competitive influence in the New England market due to its 
position on the fringes of the market.  
 
The Falstaff decision was branded as an instance of “zealous” 
merger enforcement aimed at protecting smaller firms and halting 
the trend towards concentration since there was no reason to stop 
a merger that did not increase concentration in the relevant 
market.938 The following discussion illuminates Falstaff’s 
                                                
936See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 530 (1973) [hereinafter 
Falstaff]. 
937See Falstaff, id. at 526. 
938See Kenneth G. Elzinga & Anthony W. Swisher, The Supreme Court & Beer 
Mergers: From Pabst/Blatz to the DOJ-FTC Merger Guidelines, 26(3) REV. 
INDUSTRIAL ORG. 245, 250, 261 (May, 2005).  
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decision to acquire and whether it would have entered the market 
de novo.  
 
4.1 Bounded Rationality and Falstaff’s Decision to Acquire 
 
Falstaff wanted to enter the New England market because it 
wanted to position itself as a national player in the beer selling 
industry in order to more effectively compete against national 
brewing companies. The position as a national player held certain 
competitive advantages in terms of greater prestige, improved 
ability to advertise and less exposure to local problems.939 
 
Prior to taking a decision about the acquisition, Falstaff had 
commissioned a study to test the feasibility of entering the New 
England market called the ‘Little Report’. This study 
recommended that it would be more profitable for Falstaff to 
enter the New England market de novo by constructing a new 
plant to serve this region rather than enter by acquiring an 
existing firm.940 Falstaff’s management did not agree and also 
introduced substantial evidence during the trial before the court 
to show that entry by acquisition would be more profitable.941 
Falstaff’s management argued that they had learned through 
experience that a strong pre-existing network of distributors was 
essential for successful entry.942 Narragansett provided them with 
such a network of distributors in the New England market. As 
stated in its Annual Report:  
“The long-range principle benefits of this acquisition are 
many, principally the acquisition of a large, modern plant 
and a strong marketing and distributor organization which 
can provide a springboard for the introduction of Falstaff 
                                                
939See Falstaff, supra note 173, at 529. 
940See Falstaff, id. at 553. 
941See Falstaff, id. at 554, 571. 
942See Falstaff, id. at 571. 
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beer into New England as a companion brand to the 
Narragansett products in that area.”943 
 
Falstaff had in fact been attempting an acquisition in the New 
England market for the past few years but had not found a 
suitable candidate. As it turned out, entry by acquisition of 
Narragansett was not profitable for Falstaff and their market 
share in all markets fell substantially in the years following the 
case. 
 
While the complexity of markets makes it difficult to point to 
exact reasons, insights from business studies can help to 
understand why Falstaff took this decision to acquire 
Narragansett and why it did not work out as planned. This 
acquisition was a strategic decision for Falstaff rather than one 
taken to maximize profit opportunities - managers were thinking 
of the long-term growth and importance of Falstaff. Falstaff also 
used this acquisition to enter prestigious markets like New York 
in which it had no previous presence.  
 
In the 1950s Falstaff had engaged in an aggressive campaign of 
growth through numerous acquisitions. Falstaff’s annual reports 
show that its managers were confident of the success of the 
various acquisitions as they expected these to follow the path of 
previously undertaken successful acquisitions.944 However, in 
fact Falstaff’s tremendous growth through acquisitions peaked 
with the acquisition that was at issue in the present case, after 
which its market position and sales declined dramatically.945 The 
result of Falstaff’s strategy of growth through acquisitions was 
that there were significant costs on its books and managerial time 
was spent managing and restructuring these acquisitions rather 
than developing the firm’s internal capabilities to deal with the 
                                                
943FALSTAFF BREWING CORP., ANNUAL REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS (1965). 
944See id.  
945See id. 
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rapidly evolving market for beer and changing consumer 
preferences in this market.  
 
Barkema and Schijven argue that M&A activity gradually 
increases the need for organisational restructuring.946 
Organisational restructuring helps to fully realise the potential of 
the acquisition to the acquirer.947 However, firms are slow to 
undertake such restructuring because of inertia and generally will 
only begin restructuring when organisational challenges have 
become sufficiently severe to break inertia and to change the 
organisation’s belief in its existing organisational structure.948 
Further, Barkema and Schijven argue that an acquisition’s 
contribution to the acquirer’s performance depends on the 
position of the acquisition within a sequence of acquisitions.949 
Their hypothesis is that if a firm has undertaken many 
acquisitions within a relatively short period of time without 
adequately integrating these acquisitions within the firm’s 
organisational structure, later acquisitions are likely to under-
perform. Other studies show that firms are likely to perform 
better in the long-term if they grow organically than if they grow 
by making acquisitions. Moatti et al. argue that when firms grow 
through M&As, they tend to collect assets that may not easily 
generate scale economies when combined.950 The juxtaposition of 
existing assets with acquired ones may often be sub-optimal 
within a firm when compared to if the same growth was achieved 
organically because assets are acquired progressively through 
organic growth, which allows for more learning to occur over 
                                                
946See Harry G. Barkema & Mario Schijven, Toward Unlocking the Full Potential of 
Acquisitions: The Role of Organizational Restructuring, 51(4) ACADEMY OF MGMT. 
REV. 696, 702 (Aug., 2008). 
947See Barkema & Schijven, id. at 702. 
948See Barkema & Schijven, id. at 702. 
949See Barkema & Schijven, id. at 702. 
950See Valerie Moatti, Charlotte R. Ren, Jaideep Anand & Pierre Dussauge, 
Disentangling the Performance Effects of Efficiency and Bargaining Power in 
Horizontal Growth Strategies: An Empirical Investigation in the Global Retail 
Industry, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 745, 747 (2015). 
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time.951 Further, problems associated with integrating two 
companies can increase the costs and reduce efficiencies from 
acquisitions when compared to organic growth. 
 
These sentiments were echoed by the US Supreme Court in its 
decision in Philadelphia National Bank where it stated that, 
“surely one premise of an anti-merger statute such as § 7 
[Clayton Act] is that corporate growth by internal expansion is 
socially preferable to growth by acquisition.”952 
 
Elzinga and Swisher find that beer companies that engaged in 
extensive M&A did not perform very well over time and 
eventually failed.953 On the contrary companies that grew 
organically were much more successful, e.g. the largest American 
beer company, Anheuser-Busch was prevented from carrying out 
M&A by a Supreme Court decision and grew by organic 
growth.954 This further supports the above hypothesis that growth 
through internal expansion may be preferable to growth by 
M&A. In the present case, the failure of Falstaff’s acquisition of 
Narragensett may have been because its managers were 
overconfident of the success of its acquisitions and did not take 
enough effort to adequately integrate these acquisitions into its 
organisational structure. 
 
4.2 Bounded Rationality and Falstaff’s Status as an Actual 
Potential Competitor 
 
                                                
951See Moatti et al., id. at 747. 
952United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321 (1963). 
953See Elzinga & Swisher, supra note 938, at 250. 
954See Elzinga & Swisher, id. at 265.  
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In the present case the issue before the court was whether Falstaff 
could be considered a potential entrant in the New England 
market.955 In the words of Justice Marshall, the problem was that,  
 
“…in a case where the objective evidence strongly favors 
entry de novo, a firm which asks us to believe that it does 
not intend to enter de novo by implication asks us to 
believe that it does not intend to act in its own economic 
self-interest. But corporations are, after all, profit-making 
institutions, and, absent special circumstances, they can 
be expected to follow courses of action most likely to 
maximize profits.”956 
 
Falstaff could not be called an actual potential competitor in the 
relevant market if it would never have entered the market de 
novo. This is important from a competition perspective because if 
a perceived potential competitor enters a market by acquisition, it 
simply replaces the acquired firm’s competitive presence in the 
market with its own. Whereas if it enters de novo competition is 
increased because there are more firms competing in the market. 
Entry de novo of an actual potential competitor is thus, favorable 
to entry by acquisition. The court here was thus faced with a 
conundrum. On the one hand there was ‘objective evidence’ 
suggesting that Falstaff had both the capability and the incentive 
to enter the New England market de novo. On the other hand, 
there was sufficient evidence to believe that Falstaff itself was of 
the opinion that entry by acquisition would be more profitable for 
                                                
955Elzinga & Swisher note that the court ignored other more important issues in 
assessing the merger and if these issues had been examined the merger would have 
been allowed because the court would have found that it did not raise any concerns for 
competition. For instance, agencies would have used scanner data from retail sales to 
construct simulation models and measure the intensity of competition between Falstaff 
and Narragansett and would have found that the two companies were not selling 
products that were close substitutes of each other. See Elzinga & Swisher, id. at 263 
n.92. 
956See Falstaff, supra note 173,at 568. 
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it than entry de novo.957 Should the court then take Falstaff’s 
word for what it said it intended to do or rely on objective 
evidence of Falstaff’s motives and ability to enter?  
 
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court steered clear of any 
discussion about the internal decisions made by Falstaff to enter 
the market and focused on whether, given objective factors such 
as the financial condition of Falstaff and the characteristics of the 
New England market, it would be reasonable to consider Falstaff 
a potential entrant into that market.958 The Supreme Court 
criticised the district court’s decision because it felt that the 
district court was wrong to disregard objective evidence 
indicating entry de novo in favour of the subjective statements 
made by Falstaff’s management.959 It held that the testimony of 
Falstaff’s management about the actual intentions of the 
company, while not irrelevant, was not “necessarily the last 
word” in arriving at conclusions about the status of Falstaff as a 
potential entrant into the market.960 Justice Marshall took a 
slightly different view from the majority decision in his 
concurring opinion in this case. Justice Marshall stated that courts 
should presume that firm conduct is governed by objectively 
measurable market forces rather than by subjective factors.961 
This is based on the presumption that firms are rational, profit-
maximizing entities that only take decisions based on objectively 
measurable factors rather than based on the subjective 
preferences of managers.962 In this case the objective evidence 
indicated that it was in Falstaff’s best interest to enter de novo 
because it had the incentives and the capability to do soling the 
words of Justice Marshall, 
 
                                                
957See Falstaff, id. at 571. 
958See Falstaff, id.at 533. 
959See Falstaff, id. at 572. 
960See Falstaff, id. at 535-537. 
961See Falstaff, id. at 548. 
962See Falstaff, id. at 566. 
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“But where a powerful firm is engaging in a related line 
of commerce at the fringe of the relevant market, where it 
has a strong incentive to enter the market de novo, and 
where it has the financial capabilities to do so, we have 
not hesitated to ascribe to it the role of an actual potential 
entrant. In such cases, we have held that § 7[Clayton Act] 
prohibits an entry by acquisition, since such an entry 
eliminates the possibility of future actual competition 
which would occur if there were an entry de novo.” 
 
Justice Marshall is clear that the subjective statements of 
managers should not be given any credence when it contradicts 
objective economic evidence. From a neoclassical economic 
perspective, manager’s subjective statements should not be taken 
at face value because manager’s opinions can change with time 
and management can give self-serving testimony. Further, if 
managers act contrary to the interest of firms, shareholders will 
ultimately replace them for more competent managers. While 
Justice Marshall concedes that managers can make mistakes in 
their assessment of objective market forces, he also states that the 
possibility of such errors reduces with the strength of objective 
evidence, the stronger the evidence the less likely it is that such 
errors will be made.  
 
Interestingly, Justice Marshall notes that economic predictions 
are difficult and different people might reach different 
conclusions from the same objective data but does not address the 
issue in any depth.963 In fact, in the present case objective 
economic evidence regarding the profitability of entry by 
acquisition into a market was interpreted quite differently by the 
management of Falstaff, the agency commissioned by Falstaff to 
study the market and ultimately by the government and the courts 
with no consensus between them about whether entry by 
                                                
963See Falstaff, id. at 19 note 3.  
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acquisition or entry de novo was more profitable. As the literature 
from business studies shows, it is almost impossible for firms to 
know and consequently to take profit-maximizing decisions 
within market contexts. This is borne out in this case, otherwise, 
there should have been no discrepancy between the views of the 
parties about the most profitable course of action for Falstaff to 
take based on the shoring up of ‘objective’ evidence. Moreover, 
if objective evidence indicated that Falstaff should enter de novo, 
then why did Falstaff, if it was indeed taking rational decisions, 
decide to enter by acquisition? The majority opinion of the 
Supreme Court steered clear of this problem by simply not 
acknowledging it and sticking to the objective evidence on the 
record. However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall 
tried to resolve this problem by indirectly suggesting that it was 
not always necessary for a firm’s decisions to be profit 
maximizing, 
 
“Falstaff introduced a great deal of evidence tending to 
show that entry de novo would have been less profitable 
for it than entry by acquisition. I have no doubt that this is 
true. Indeed, if it can be assumed that Falstaff is a 
rational, profit-maximizing corporation, its own decision 
offers strong proof that entry by acquisition was the 
preferable alternative. But the test in §7 cases is not 
whether anticompetitive conduct is profit-maximizing. 
The very purpose of §7 is to direct the profit incentive 
into channels which are pro-competitive. Thus, the proper 
test is whether Falstaff would have entered the market de 
novo if the preferable alternative of entry by acquisition 
had been denied it. The objective evidence strongly 
suggests that such an entry would have occurred.”964 
 
Justice Marshall brushes under the carpet the issue of the 
difficulty of arriving at one correct answer to a commercial and 
                                                
964Falstaff, id. at 572. 
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business issue. As the literature discussed in this chapter has 
shown, in reality acquisition decisions are a product of many 
factors and objective economic evidence forms only part of the 
reasoning behind an acquisition decision. 
 
In fact empirical evidence of firm behavior confirms that 
managers can take very different decisions when faced with 
similar kinds of ‘objective evidence’ about market conditions. 
The dissenting opinion in this case took just such a view by 
dismissing the distinction between subjective and objective 
economic evidence and pointing out that economic decisions are 
largely subjective.965 In the words of Justice Rehnquist,  
 
“The simple fact is that any economic decision is largely 
subjective. In the instant case, Falstaff sought to prove 
why it was not in the ‘economic self-interest’ of that firm 
to enter a new geographic market without an established 
distribution system. Its explanation is as ‘objective’ as 
any of the evidence offered by the Government to show 
why a hypothetical Falstaff should enter the market. The 
question of who is an 'actual potential competitor' is 
entirely factual.”966 
 
Thus, according to the dissent, it is not possible to objectively 
determine what is in a firm’s economic self-interest and the 
reasoning of Falstaff’s management was as relevant in 
determining actual potential competition as the economic 
evidence put forward by the government.967 The idea that 
economic decisions are subjective takes into account firm 
heterogeneity and allows for the application of behavioural 
theories.  
 
                                                
965See Falstaff, id. at 575. 
966Falstaff, id. at 575-76. 
967See Falstaff, id. at 576. 
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5. Vodafone’s Takeover of Mannesmann 
 
Vodafone, a UK based multinational telecommunications 
company, acquired Mannesmann, the largest telecommunications 
company in Germany for $183 billion in February 2000 in what 
was at that time the largest M&A transaction and one of the most 
expensive ever to have taken place in history.968 The takeover 
created the largest telecommunications provider in the world. In 
England, the combined company had more than twice the market 
share of its closest competitor.969 The merger also created the 
first single Europe-wide mobile communications network. The 
scale of the takeover was such that it had the potential to 
substantially increase concentration in the telecommunications 
industry in Europe by pushing other firms to similarly 
consolidate to match Vodafone’s network.970 The Commission 
cleared the acquisition on the condition that Vodafone divest 
Orange, a company that was previously acquired by 
Mannesmann. The Commission also required that Vodafone give 
competing firms access to its telecommunications network.971 
The Commission believed that these undertakings would prevent 
the acquisition from creating a dominant position in the market. 
The Commission also believed that the acquisition would benefit 
consumers. The EU Competition Commissioner stated that, “our 
fundamental view is that this operation can bring clear benefits to 
consumers, but we should avoid creating a dominant position in 
                                                
968See Vodafone Seals Mannesmann Deal, BBC News (Feb. 11, 2000), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/630293.stm. 
969See Vodafone Airtouch / Mannesmann, Commission of the European Communities 
Decision No. M.1795, § 30 (Apr.12, 
2000),http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1795_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Vodafone / Mannesmann]. 
970See Philip Shishkin & William Boston, European Commission Approves Vodafone-
Mannesmann Merger, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 13, 2000), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB955545917864176294. 
971See Vodafone / Mannesmann, supra note 206. 
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these markets.”972 Yet, analysts felt that despite these 
undertakings, Vodafone’s size would still give it market 
dominance, which would give the company substantial 
advantages against its competitors.973 Further, the benefits to 
consumers from this transaction were not apparent and 
considered with the benefit of hindsight, did not materialise. As 
the following discussion shows, this acquisition was not 
motivated by efficiencies or any consumer benefits but was 
intended to achieve size and greater market power.  
 
5.1 Managerial Biases and the Acquisition Decision 
 
A few months before acquiring Mannesmann, Vodafone, 
acquired Airtouch and became the world’s second largest 
telecommunications company measured by subscribers and 
revenue. Other than the United States, Vodafone’s primary 
presence was in the UK and it had minority interests in other 
European countries. On the other hand, Mannesmann had a 
substantial presence in many European countries.974 A month 
before Vodafone made its first bid for it, Mannesmann acquired 
Orange; a UK based mobile phone company. This extended 
Mannesmann’s presence to the UK in addition to continental 
Europe. 
 
Both companies were valued highly but the bases of their 
financial valuations were very different. Mannesmann had higher 
sales and employment than Vodafone but Vodafone was more 
profitable because it was focused on the more profitable mobile 
phone segment of the industry.975 In contrast to Vodafone’s 
                                                
972See Shishkin & Boston, supra note 207. 
973See EU Approves Vodafone Mannesmann Deal, BBC News (Apr. 12, 2000) at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/710441.stm 
974See Martin Höpner & Gregory Jackson, Revisiting the Mannesmann Takeover: How 
Markets for Corporate Control Emerge, 3 EUR. MGMT. REV. 142, 146 (2006). 
975See Höpner & Jackson, id. at 147. 
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focused approach, Mannesmann had a diversified presence and 
provided wireless and fixed-line services and was involved with 
Internet telephony as well. 976 
 
The chief executives of both companies also had very different 
views about the possible benefits of a combination. Vodafone’s 
chief executive; Chris Gent felt that both companies were 
“natural partners” and “belong[ed] together”977 whereas 
Mannesmann’s chief executive, Klaus Esser believed that his 
company was superior to Vodafone.978 Esser thought that 
Mannesmann’s superior presence in Europe and Europe’s 
position as the world’s most advanced telecom technology region 
gave it a strategic advantage over Vodafone.979 Many analysts 
have stated that Vodafone’s lack of majority interests in its 
European assets was holding it back from achieving its full 
potential in Europe. Further, Esser believed that Mannesmann’s 
ownership of both fixed-line and wireless telephony and access to 
Orange’s brand and mobile competencies also gave it strategic 
advantages over Vodafone.980 Vodafone was slow to develop 
Internet capabilities, while Mannesmann was much further 
advanced in the provision of Internet capabilities as Europe’s 
third-largest Internet service provider.981 Accordingly, Esser felt 
that Mannesmann and Vodafone had a very different vision of the 
industry, were not like-minded and Mannesmann had little to 
                                                
976See Höpner & Jackson, id. at 147 (Manesmann also had other businesses held 
through subsidiary companies unconnected with Telecommunications). 
977Vodafone Airtouch News Release, Proposal to Create Europe’s Global 
Telecommunications Leader (Dec. 16, 1999), 
http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/media/vodafone-group-
releases/1999/press_release16_11.html 
978See Marcus Walker, Vodafone and Mannesmann: The Bid that Couldn’t Fail, 
EUROMONEY (Mar., 2000), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1007961/Vodafone-
andMannesmann-The-bid-that-couldnt-fail.html. 
979See Vodafone and Mannesmann: Endgame, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 13, 2000), 
http://www.economist.com/node/328276 [hereinafter Endgame]. 
980See Walker, supra note 215. 
981See Endgame, supra note 216. 
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gain from an alliance with Vodafone.982 Thus, the executives at 
both companies did not share the view that an alliance between 
Vodafone and Mannesmann would be beneficial.  
 
Interestingly, Gent described Esser’s behaviour in resisting the 
acquisition by Vodafone as “defensive and personal and not 
related to economics”.983 Reportedly, Esser was very much 
opposed to a takeover by Vodafone. Perhaps part of Esser’s 
negative reaction to a hostile takeover by Vodafone was for the 
reason that at that time hostile takeovers were looked-down upon 
and viewed as immoral in Germany.984 In November, 1999, 
Mannesmann rejected the unsolicited offer for a takeover by 
Vodafone at a value of £75 billion. Esser called the valuation 
“wholly inadequate” and stated that it did not find an alliance 
with Vodafone to be “strategically attractive”.985 
 
The process for the takeover of Mannesmann was acrimonious. 
An analyst described the process as, “quite a spectacle, with three 
months of punch, counter-punch and even the occasional 
insult.”986 Over a few months Vodafone repeatedly increased its 
offer for Mannesmann and ultimately paid what is considered to 
be a premium of almost 70% for the company.987 One media 
report described the amount paid as “astronomical”.988 One 
reason for Vodafone’s pursuit of Mannesmann and the premium 
paid by it may have been motivated by managerial hubris and 
                                                
982See Walker, supra note 215. 
983Mr. Boring Goes Shopping, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 25, 1999), 
http://www.economist.com/node/326858. 
984See Höpner & Jackson, supra note 211.  
985See Mannesmann Rejects Vodafone Bid, BBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 1999), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/519813.stm. 
986Bidding for the Future,The Economist (Feb. 10, 2000), 
http://www.economist.com/node/281682. 
987See Thras Moraitis & Han Smit, Pitfalls in a Serial Acquisition Strategy, CRITICAL 
EYE (2011), http://www.criticaleye.net/insights-servfile.cfm?id=2817. 
988See Vodafone: Written Down but not Out, THE ECONOMIST (May 30, 2002), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1159480. 
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escalating commitment from Vodafone’s desire to win a ‘contest’ 
with Mannesmann.989 Vodafone’s managers’ may have gained 
hubris from their previous success in acquiring Airtouch. Hubris 
resulted in Vodafone’s managers believing that the high amount 
paid for Mannesmann was justified because Mannesmann would 
perform better when managed by Vodafone. Another reason for 
the increase in price for Mannesmann may have been Esser’s 
arguably emotional and overconfident belief in the superiority of 
his company and his rejection of the initial offers from Vodafone 
at lower prices. As reported in the business press, the effect of the 
high price paid for the acquisition was that the expenses from it 
resulted in losses for Vodafone for the next decade of its 
operations.990 It has been stated that Vodafone is still carrying the 
“burden” of substantially overpaying for Mannesmann.991 The 
amount paid for the acquisition may also signal anticompetitive 
intent as some can argue that absent anticompetitive intent to 
remove a competitor from the market it made no commercial 
sense for Vodafone to pay such a large amount for Mannesmann. 
 
It may be argued that another motive behind Vodafone’s pursuit 
of Mannesmann was Gent’s desire for empire building. Apart 
from Mannesmann, Gent also undertook other large acquisitions 
within a short time that greatly increased Vodafone’s size and 
made it into one of the largest wireless companies globally. As a 
result of its many acquisitions, one analyst described Vodafone 
as, a “company that has gained an empire but not yet found a 
                                                
989See id. 
990See Ville Heiskanen & Adam Ewing, Vodafone Testing History with Second $100 
Billion-Plus Deal, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Aug. 30, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-29/vodafone-testing-m-a-history-
with-second-100-billion-plus-deal. 
991See Martin Vander Weyer, What Vodafone Should do with its Huge Windfall: Invest 
in the Next Vodafone, THE SPECTATOR (Sept. 7, 2013), 
http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnists/any-other-business/9011991/its-time-for-
vodafone-to-bet-on-the-future-again; Verizon and Vodafone, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jun. 19, 
2011). 
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role”.992 This was echoed by the former chief executive of 
Vodafone who took over as chief executive after Gent and stated 
that, “I inherited a company that was created out of a lot of 
M&A. There was no organising principle to the company.”993 
 
In addition, the acquisition process roused some emotions in the 
people involved. One example is the acrimony between 
Vodafone and Mannesmann in agreeing to the terms of the 
acquisition. In the words of one of Mannesmann’s advisors, “it 
got very ugly, very aggressive. They [Vodafone’s advisors] 
should treat people better.”994 On the other hand, Vodafone’s 
advisors called Mannesmann’s advisors “very emotional”.995 
Mannesmann felt that Vodafone was not treating its senior 
management with enough consideration and Vodafone felt that 
since they had paid such a substantial amount of money, they 
could take the decisions that they wanted to with respect to 
Mannesmann.996 Emotions may have hampered rationality in the 
decision-making of the parties. 
 
Vodafone’s publicly stated reasons for acquiring Mannesmann 
included establishing a pan-European mobile network, getting 
discounts from equipment manufacturers through increased buyer 
power and creating a globally known brand in mobile 
communications.997 On the other hand, some analysts believe that 
the real reason for Vodafone’s acquisition of Mannesmann was 
because it was competitively threatened by Mannesmann’s 
                                                
992See Vodafone’s Empire, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 7, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5a4e0bda-140e-11df-8847-
00144feab49a.html#axzz3jNaucBin. 
993Andrew Parker & Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Vodafone’s Survivor, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2007) (Interview with Arun Sarin). 
994See Walker, supra note 215. 
995See Walker, id. 
996See Walker, id. 
997See Vodafone-Mannesmann: What Next?, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 10, 2000), 
http://www.economist.com/node/329330. 
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acquisition of Orange.998 Orange was one of Vodafone’s 
significant competitors in the UK with a superior brand and 
technical and innovation capabilities. It also had a fast-growing 
customer base and it was gaining customers faster than 
Vodafone.999 When Mannesmann acquired Orange, Vodafone 
was reportedly upset that Mannesmann had chosen an alliance 
with Orange over one with itself in the UK market.1000 Gent was 
quoted in the press as saying that by acquiring Orange, 
Mannesmann had broken a “gentleman’s agreement” between the 
companies not to compete with each other in home markets.1001 
Mergers and acquisitions are said to be motivated as much by 
fear as by opportunity.1002 They are also sometimes taken as a 
reflexive reaction to competitors’ acquisitions.1003 In this case, 
Vodafone may have felt cornered because Mannesmann and 
Orange’s combined technical capabilities and superior 
geographic presence in many European markets would create a 
company that Vodafone would have difficulty competing 
with.1004 Vodafone believed that the only way forward for it was 
to acquire Mannesmann.1005 Thus, it may be possible to make an 
argument (based on facts collected from reports in the business 
media) that Vodafone acquired Mannesmann to eliminate the 
competitive threat posed by Mannesmann and as a reaction to 
                                                
998See Walker, supra note 215 (quoting Dan Dickinson, advisor to Mannesmann and 
head of European Mergers & Acquisitions at Merrill Lynch, “Mannesmann buying 
Orange really put Vodafone in a corner because it exposed Vodafone as having only a 
series of minority stakes. Their window of opportunity was to act right away.”) 
999See Endgame, supra note 216. 
1000See Walker, supra note 215. 
1001Roland Gribben & Christopher Williams, How Vodafone’s Rise to a £59bn Giant 
Started with a New Year’s Eve Phone Call, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 1, 2015), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/teleco
ms/11319237/How-Vodafones-rise-to-a-59bn-giant-started-with-a-New-Years-Eve-
phone-call.html 
1002Bidding for the Future, supra note 223. 
1003 See Tichy, supra note 759, at 373; Thomas Keil & Tomi Laamanen, When Rivals 
Merge, Think Before you Follow Suit, 89(12) HARV. BUS. REV. 25 (Dec., 2011). 
1004See Bidding for the Future, id.  
1005See Walker, supra note 215. 
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Mannesmann’s entry into the UK market through its acquisition 
of Orange. This is also supported by other evidence that few 
benefits were promised to users from the transaction.1006 It is also 
worth noting that when investigating the acquisition the 
Commission did not discuss the potential efficiencies from this 
acquisition in any detail. This is an aspect of the transaction that 
should have been examined in greater detail. 
 
All of the discussion above suggests that decision-making within 
both Vodafone and Mannesmann was motivated by managerial 
biases and people were acting at least in part out of emotion and 
ego. In such cases where ego and emotions rather than rationality 
are motivating decisions, the potential benefits and efficiencies 
from a merger should perhaps be examined in greater detail. This 
is particularly so because when parties behave acrimoniously, 
there is a good chance that personality clashes will prevent the 
parties from realising the full stated potential of the merger. In 
the present case, the acquisition may have arguably been 
motivated by the desire to remove Mannesmanna as a rival. 
 
5.2 The Effect of the Acquisition 
 
Acquiring Mannesmann did not just give Vodafone scale; it made 
Vodafone the largest telecommunications provider in the world. 
It also eliminated its most significant rival in Europe and the 
increased competition provided by the combined presence of 
Mannesmann and Orange in the UK. Prior to the acquisition, 
Vodafone and Mannesmann were rivals in Europe. The short-
term effect of the acquisition was to give Vodafone market 
power. In the long-term Vodafone’s performance suffered after 
the acquisition and it was not able take advantage of its increased 
                                                
1006See Antony Savvas, Vodafone Merger Slammed Over Lack of User Benefits, 
COMPUTER WEEKLY 6 (Feb., 2000) (stating that telecom user organisations criticised 
Vodafone for not promising any benefits to users from the acquisition). 
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size and market power or deliver many benefits to consumers 
from the transaction. There can be many reasons for the decline 
in Vodafone’s performance including its many other acquisitions 
as well as the historic bursting of the ‘dot com bubble’ and the 
consequent stock market crash that occurred shortly after its 
acquisition of Mannesmann was completed. Yet, the sheer size of 
this acquisition ensured that it was a significant contributor to 
Vodafone’s future performance.  
 
Further, analysts expressed skepticism that Vodafone’s managers 
with no previous experience of managing such a large acquisition 
and integrating a company with such a different corporate culture 
from its own would be able to realise any efficiencies from the 
acquisition.1007 Literature from business studies is also useful 
here because the manner in which the transaction is structured in 
terms of the degree of restructuring and integration required 
between the acquiror and acquiree can impact the realisation of 
efficiencies from the transaciton. There can be three categories of 
acquisitions based on the degree of integration required: (i) 
absorption acquisitions – here one company is absorbed into 
another and there is more interdependance and less organisational 
autonomy; (ii) preservation acquisitions – here the acquired 
company is allowed to operate more independantly and there is 
greater organisational autonomy; and (iii) symbiotic acquisitions 
– here both companies are benefited by the other and there is high 
degree of interdependance and organisational autonomy between 
the two.1008 Each type of acquisition exemplifies different 
challenges for managers and different implications. Generally, 
the concerns with absorption acquisitions are the blending of two 
different firms with different cultures and resources.1009 In 
preservation acquisitions the challenge is for the acquiror to 
                                                
1007See Mr. Boring Goes Shopping, supra note 210; Vodafone-Mannesmann: What 
Next?, supra note 234. 
1008See Rosenzweig, supra note 159, at 371. 
1009See Rosenzweig, id.at 372. 
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respect the boundaries between itself and the acquired firm and at 
the same time develope new organisational capabilities without 
sacrificing existing sources of strength.1010 Symbiotic 
acquisitions are the most complicated from an integration 
perspective because the acquirer needs to achieve strategic 
interdependance while maintaining the autonomy of the acquired 
firm.1011 
 
In this case, one of the reasons for Vodafone’s poor post-merger 
performance could be that the effort needed to integrate 
Vodafone and Mannesmann’s operations slowed Vodafone’s 
ability to respond to changing market conditions and consumer 
preferences in an industry where change was critical to 
success.1012 The speed of innovations occurring in the 
telecommunications industry at the time, particularly from the 
growth of wireless services and the tremendous potential of the 
Internet resulted in a highly uncertain environment. Firms would 
need to be able to quickly respond to changes occurring in the 
environment.1013 The acquisition made it more difficult for 
Vodafone to quickly respond to the changes in its environment 
and altering consumer preferences because the company was now 
much larger. Consequently, the acquisition made it more difficult 
for Vodafone to meet consumer needs. 
 
In its decision conditionally allowing the acquisition, the 
Commission stated that, “the merged entity would be the only 
mobile operator able to capture future growth through new 
customers, because new customers would be attracted by the 
services offered by Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmann on its own 
network.”1014 With the benefit of hindsight, it can be argued that 
                                                
1010See Rosenzweig, id.at 372. 
1011See Rosenzweig, id.at 372. 
1012See Vodafone-Mannesmann: What Next?, supra note 234. 
1013See Vodafone-Mannesmann: What Next?, id. 
1014See Vodafone / Mannesmann, supra note 206, at § 5. 
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the Commission did not assess the merged entities future 
performance very well. Nonetheless, the Commission was correct 
in its emphasis on the importance of a “seamless pan-European 
mobile telecommunications services”.1015 However, the 
Commission did not consider other aspects of competition in the 
market that might also be affected by the acquisition, such as 
innovation. With respect to innovation, the Commission 
acknowledged that many services would be provided to mobile 
users in the future through access to the Internet. These include 
services that we now take for granted but which were at the 
forefront of technology in the year 2000 such as access to emails 
from mobile phones, video telephony and mobile ecommerce.1016 
The Commission only considered how having an integrated 
network would make it easier for companies to provide these 
services. However, other than through access to an extensive 
network, the Commission did not address in any detail how 
competition for the provision of these services and for innovation 
in the industry would be affected by the acquisition. Further, 
assessing the internal factors required for the smooth functioning 
of the post-merger firm may have given the Commission a better 
insight into predicting the likely contribution and relevance of the 
post-merger firm to the market. 
 
The primary condition imposed by the Commission for approving 
the acquisition was for Vodafone to divest Orange. Orange was 
then bought by France Telecom to create the second largest 
telecommunications company in Europe in another large and 
expensive acquisition that further increased concentration in the 
industry. The divestiture of Orange did not, in all likelihood, 
restore competition in the market. Simply requiring the 
divestiture of Orange did not address the competitive gaps arising 
from the acquisition. Perhaps the Commission should also have 
take into consideration the competition that would have been 
                                                
1015See Vodafone / Mannesmann, id. at § 42. 
1016See Vodafone / Mannesmann, id. at §§ 15-17. 
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provided by Mannesmann as an independent entity after it 
combined with Orange and how this might have pushed 
Vodafone to improve its performance. Mannesmann and France 
Telecom’s different strategic vision and perspectives of the future 
made each company value the assets it acquired through Orange 
in a different way. The Commission only really considered 
Orange’s role in the acquisition when assessing how competition 
would be affected in the UK geographic market. However, it 
should have considered the possibly more significant future role 
that the combined presence of Mannesmann and Orange would 
have provided in other geographic markets and how this could 
have been beneficial to competition throughout Europe had it not 
combined with Vodafone.  
 
Interestingly, the Commission carried out a more detailed 
analysis with respect to the provision of an integrated pan-
European telecom network. The Commission found that it would 
be difficult for third parties to replicate the merged entity’s 
network in the near future.1017 The Commission considered 
whether competitors would be able to compete by achieving a 
similar pan-European scale through strategic alliances or through 
mergers and acquisitions.1018 The Commission found that this 
would take at least three to five years and would not happen 
immediately. Recognizing that it would be hard for competitors 
to replicate the “giant global footprint” of Vodafone-
Mannesmann in the short term, the Commission mandated the 
combined company to open its international network to 
competitors for three years. Further, the Commission pointed out 
discrepancies between what Vodafone’s statements were in 
communications with the Commission and what it had stated to 
shareholders in its offer document for the takeover of 
Mannesmann. For instance, the Commission noted that Vodafone 
had stated to it that it did not believe that a single interconnected 
                                                
1017See Vodafone / Mannesmann, id. at § 40. 
1018See Vodafone / Mannesmann, id. at § 41. 
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pan- European network would develop imminently while stating 
in its own offer document of December 23, 1999 that the merged 
entity “would be able to provide a global platform by mid-2000 
that will provide messaging services, location-based content and 
mobile e-commerce in a uniform manner on a global basis.”1019 
Here, the Commission’s deeper investigation into the conduct of 
Vodafone suggests that it could have followed a similar style and 
questioned the companies’ statements in other aspects of the 
investigation as well, such as the claims of efficiencies arising 
from the transaction.  
 
To conclude, Vodafone’s acquisition of Mannesmann, one of the 
largest in history, was not a success. It limited Vodafone’s ability 
to please consumers; it increased concentration and accelerated 
consolidation in the industry. On balance any benefits to 
consumers from the transaction are unclear while the reduced 
competition could be detrimental to consumers.  
 
6. Facebook’s Acquisition of Whatsapp 
 
“Gavin Belson [CEO of fictional Google-type 
company Hooli]: Let me acquire you. 
 
Richard Hendricks [CEO of fictional start-up 
company Pied Piper]: What? No way. 
 
Gavin Belson:...It’s the perfect fit. You get my 
infrastructure, I get your speed, and I get it today 
rather than in a month or two. What’s the 
downside? 
  
                                                
1019See Vodafone / Mannesmann, id. at § 37. 
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Richard Hendricks: The downside is that 
everything I’m building becomes the property of 
your giant, soulless corporation. 
 
Gavin Belson: And what exactly do you think 
you’re building? You’re out there trying to get 
funding so you can hire people, scale up, roll out a 
product, IPO, and eventually become a publicly-
traded what? Corporation. 
 
Richard Hendricks: We would be different. 
 
Gavin Belson: I see. I suppose once Pied Piper is 
a billion-dollar company, you’ll seek out your 
competitors and help them. Please…you think 
you’re building something different? No.”1020 
 
 
This dialogue takes place in the TV sitcom ‘Silicon Valley’ 
which follows the path of a young entrepreneur, Hendricks as he 
tries to establish a disruptive technology start-up company. This 
dialogue between Belson, the chief executive of a large 
conglomerate and Hendricks provides an interesting perspective 
on the acquisition of Whatsapp by Facebook. In this fictional 
setting the large company tries to imitate the disruptive product 
of the small start-up company but fails to do so. It then tries to 
acquire the smaller company. As the CEO of the large company 
tells the CEO of the small company, the small company can give 
the bigger one faster access to its innovative technology and the 
bigger company can give the smaller one access to better 
infrastructure. These were some of the reasons for the acquisition 
by Facebook of Whatsapp, a company with a better product in 
messaging that Facebook found difficult to replicate in the short-
                                                
1020Silicon Valley: Runaway Devaluation (HBO Entertainment, Apr. 19, 2015). 
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term. Interestingly, in the fictional setting in the TV show the 
offer of the acquisition is rejected because the young and 
idealistic chief executive believes he wants to build a company 
that would be “different” from a “giant soulless corporation”. The 
older and more experienced chief executive effectively calls this 
belief that he will be different, the hubris of the younger man. 
 
In October, 2014, Facebook, an online social networking service, 
completed its acquisition of Whatsapp, a mobile communications 
service, for a landmark amount of US $19 billion in a transaction 
that was famously formed after Whatsapp’s founder Jan Koum 
was invited to spend a few days at the home of Facebook’s CEO 
Mark Zuckerburg and was sealed with a bottle of ‘Jonnie Walker’ 
scotch, highlighting the informal nature of the negotiations and 
the important role that the personalities heading these companies 
played in this acquisition decision.1021 
 
This acquisition raised competitive concerns, at least in the EU 
because market data collected by the Commission suggested that 
the parties had a high combined market share of 30% to 40% in 
messaging services in iOS and Android smart phones while 
competitors in this market had a much smaller share of the 
market.1022 In addition, the Commission noted that the market 
shares of Facebook and Whatsapp were calculated based on the 
data given by the parties and may have underestimated their 
actual market positions but the Commission did not have 
sufficient data to independantly measure the competitive 
importance of the parties to the acquisition.1023 However, the 
                                                
1021See Parmy Olson, Facebook Closes $19 Billion Whatsapp Deal, FORBES (Oct. 6, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/10/06/facebook-closes-19-
billion-whatsapp-deal/. 
1022See Facebook / Whatsapp, Commission of the European Communities Decision 
No.M.7217 (Oct. 3, 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_396
2132_EN.pdf [hereinafter Facebook / Whatsapp].  
1023See Facebook / Whatsapp, id.at § 97. 
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Commission felt that large market shares may not be sustainable 
for a long period of time in the fast-growing and dynamic market 
for communication apps and were not an indication of market 
power and thus, may not cause a lasting damage to 
competition.1024 However, in other Internet-related sectors such 
as travel websites, a trend towards consolidation has been found 
to increase concentration in the market as it matures and so the 
Commission should not have so readily assumed that because 
markets are dynamic, it is not possible to achieve market power 
through acquisitions.1025 
 
The critical issue in Facebook’s acquisition of Whatsapp was 
whether Facebook and Whatsapp were ‘close competitors’ in the 
relevant market. In fact McGeown & Barthélemy describe the 
Commission’s decision in this case as providing “interesting 
insights into its thinking on closeness of competition”.1026 In 
order to understand the degree and extent of the competition 
between the two it is relevant to understand why Facebook 
acquired Whatsapp and why it paid such a significant amount for 
the acquisition. Another related issue of concern to competition 
from this acquisition was the impact of the acquisition on 
innovation. Further, a matter of concern was that given the 
potential for reduced competition and innovation from the 
merger, the Commission did not discuss the possible efficiencies 
from the transaction at any length. In fact it is not clear as to what 
the possible efficiencies arising from this acquisition are and this 
makes it even more crucial to understand why the acquisition was 
made. 
 
                                                
1024See Facebook / Whatsapp, id. at § 99. 
1025See Eat or Be Eaten, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21650559-wave-consolidation-prospect-
americas-big-internet-firms-look-set-divide. 
1026See McGeown & Barthélemy, supra note 785, at 448. 
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It is also important to note that the Commission and US antitrust 
authorities both cleared the merger after an investigation and 
while agencies in both jurisdictions were concerned about the 
acquisition; they concluded that competition would not be 
affected and consumer welfare would not reduce from the 
merger. 
 
6.1 Why did Facebook Acquire Whatsapp? 
 
High-technology companies have a history of acquiring high 
growth, start-up companies, such as Google’s acquisition of 
YouTube in 2006 and Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 
2012.1027 Often these acquisitions are criticised for being 
extravagant as a lot of money is paid for a company with an 
unproven product. Some of these acquisitions have proven to be 
very successful and this has encouraged more acquisitions to be 
made. Ultimately, many of these acquisitions are made when the 
market is still nascent and reflect manager’s intuition and beliefs 
about the future direction of growth in a market rather than on 
facts and figures. 
 
Some companies engage in M&A to stop their competitors from 
acquiring the target.1028 For instance one of the reasons Google is 
said to have acquired Waze, a community based traffic and 
navigation application, is because Facebook was interested in 
buying Waze, and it did not want Facebook to acquire Waze. 
Some analysts feel that the acquisition of Whatsapp was 
motivated by Facebook’s desire to keep Whatsapp away from 
Facebook’s competitors.1029 Google was one such key competitor 
                                                
1027See David Gelles, For Facebook, It’s Users First and Profits Later, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/for-facebook-its-users-
first-and-profits-later/. 
1028 See Peter Curwen, WhatsUpp, 16(3) INFO (2014), 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/info-02-2014-0011. 
1029See also Gelles, supra note 1027. 
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that had reportedly offered US $10 billion for Whatsapp but the 
offer was rejected by Whatsapp’s management.1030 One analyst 
argued in the context of Facebook’s acquisition of Whatsapp that 
one reason to buy start-ups is to keep competitors at bay because 
it is impossible to know which new technological innovation will 
attract consumers in a large scale.1031 The literature from business 
studies suggests that bidding wars in acquisitions occur more 
frequently in innovation-driven markets because managers 
perceive acquisitions to be less uncertain compared to the risks 
involved in developing innovations internally within the firm, 
since the performance of the acquired firm’s product or service 
can be assessed prior to the acquisition.1032  
 
Accordingly, the reasons for Facebook’s acquisition of Whatsapp 
have to be seen in the context of an industry that is characterised 
by frequent and disruptive innovation. The Commission also 
acknowledged in its review of the acquisition that the market for 
consumer communications is a new and fast-growing market, 
characterised by short innovation cycles and frequent market 
entry.1033 The pace of competitive change has increased so 
significantly in this market that it is difficult to predict how the 
structure of the market will be in a few months. As business 
scholars state, the only way to survive in such a competitive 
environment is to accept and adapt to disruptions.1034 In such an 
environment, Facebok has effectively removed a firm from the 
market that could have changed the way the communications 
market evolved. Consequently, it may be possible to argue that 
Facebook acquired Whatsapp in order to extend its domination 
                                                
1030See Gelles, id. 
1031 Curwen, supra note 1028. 
1032See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 188.  
1033See Facebook / Whatsapp, supra note 1022, at § 99. 
1034Adam Hartung, Disrupt to Thrive in 2011: Model Facebook, Groupon, Twitter (Jan. 
10, 2011), http://adamhartung.com/disrupt-to-thrive-in-2011-model-facebook-groupon-
twitter/. 
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over the market for communication services by removing a 
potential competitor of significance from the market.1035 
 
Some analysts have described Facebook’s acquisition of 
Instagram and of Whatsapp as acquiring a more popular 
product/service within its niché than Facebook’s own competitive 
offering of the same product/service. Hartung argues that 
Whatsapp with its different organisation and understanding of 
trends will help Facebook to grow in markets where it would 
have likely lost out to Whatsapp before.1036 Further, Facebook 
recognised the changing market trends making these products 
popular and decided to make these ‘disruptive’ companies such 
as Instagram and Whatsapp a part of its own organisation so that 
it would not have to compete with these companies.1037 In this 
way Whatsapp is likely to be most profitable and useful to 
Facebook through its ability to create disruptions in the market. 
 
Considered from a strategic perspective, achieving growth in 
mobile users is said to be an important objective for Facebook 
and one reason provided for the acquisition is that Facebook was 
attracted to Whatsapp’s much faster growth in mobile users.1038 
In fact Whatsapp stands out in the industry in terms of its number 
of users, growth of new users and intensity of use on mobile 
phones.1039 Further, there is speculation that Facebook was 
concerned that the changing market for communication services 
and growing consumer preferences for mobiles such as for 
sharing photographs and for chatting may erode the value of 
Facebook’s flagship platform in the future. One scholar has stated 
that Facebook’s declining user numbers made it necessary to 
                                                
1035See Hartung, id. 
1036See Hartung, id. 
1037See Hartung, id. 
1038See Matt Swider, Why did Facebook Buy Whatsapp?, TECH RADAR (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/web/what-s-up-with-facebook-buying-
whatsapp-it-s-about-the-developing-world-1226429. 
1039See Swider, id. 
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acquire new users and the easiest way to do so was via an 
acquisition.1040 One commentator went as far as to state that 
Facebook is effectively buying its way out of competing in a 
dynamic market.1041 Consequently, it may be argued that 
Facebook acquired Whatsapp in order to prevent its own product 
offering from becoming irrelevant through the growth of 
innovative services offered by Whatsapp and to defend its 
position in the market for consumer communications and social 
networks.1042 From the perspective of improving consumer 
welfare, it may be possible to contend that Facebook would have 
taken more efforts to innovate in response to the increased 
competition provided by Whatsapp if it had not acquired 
Whatsapp. On the other hand, Hartung argues that those 
companies that try to defend their market positions against the 
challenges of new entry and market shifts by trying to improve 
their own product offering are often unsuccesful and new entrants 
with a disruptive and innovative product offering win these 
battles.1043 Therefore, Facebook’s strategy of defending its 
market position by making an acquisition may be a smarter and 
more succesful strategy.1044 
 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of rationality it is worth 
questioning why Facebook paid such a significant amount i.e., 
US $19 billion for Whatsapp when Whatsapp generated only US 
$10.2 million in revenues and in fact it made a loss of US $138.1 
million in the period before the acquisition i.e., 2012-13.1045 
Moreover, the rationality of Facebook’s decision to pay such a 
large amount should also be questioned given that the market has 
                                                
1040 Curwen, supra note 1028. 
1041See Gelles, supra note 1027. 
1042See Hartung, supra note 1034.  
1043See Hartung, id. 
1044See Hartung, id. 
1045See Sarah Frier, Facebook’s $22 Billion Whatsapp Deal Buys $10 Billion in Sales, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
10-28/facebook-s-22-billion-whatsapp-deal-buys-10-million-in-sales. 
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low barriers to entry and fast-chaging consumer preferences.1046 
Rational firms would only pay such a high amount for an 
acquisition when they are certain of achieving fairly high 
potential efficiencies. However, other than access to Whatsapp’s 
large user-base, Facebook has not made clear as to what are the 
potential efficiencies from this transaction. Further, as this 
transaction was financed substantially through stocks rather than 
through cash, it may also reflect Facebook’s overconfidence in 
the value of its stock rather than any claimed efficiencies from 
the acquisition. A similar reasoning was used by the dissenting 
opinion in the FTC’s decision in the Novazyme case, discussed in 
the next section. 
 
Another interesting facet of Facebook’s acquisition of Whatsapp 
that business analysts are wondering about is how Facebook 
intends to make profits from this acquisition since at present 
Whatsapp is loss-making since it is provided free of charge in 
many jurisdictions and is free from advertising and will continue 
to be free from advertising in the near future.1047 Interviews with 
the CEO of Facebook suggest that the acquisition of Whatsapp is 
not about making profits, at least in the present, but instead is 
about gaining users.1048 Facebook has said it wants to encourage 
Whatsapp to reach the milestone of a billion users and only then 
will it monetise its investment in Whatsapp. However, this is a 
risky strategy because the dynamic nature of the market makes it 
possible that by the time Whatsapp reaches its target of one 
billion users, the market would have changed and Whatsapp may 
not be popular anymore.  
 
The discussion in this section shows that the nature of this 
acquisition may be characterized as strategic rather than profit-
                                                
1046 Curwen, supra note 1028. 
1047See Eat or Be Eaten, supra note 1025.  
1048 See Curwen, supra note 1028 (arguing that valuing the acquisition at such a high 
amount based on current or future user numbers is dangerous as it is a reminder of what 
occurred in the previous Internet bubble).  
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maximizing. A rational firm intending to maximize profits would 
likely not have paid so much for a firm that has not even 
produced profits as yet. Accordingly, insights from business 
strategy could be helpful to understand the reasons behind 
Facebook’s acquisition of Whatsapp. Whatsapp posed a threat to 
Facebook due to its fast-growing users in the sphere of social 
messaging and photo sharing in smartphones through its 
increasingly popular messaging service and given the changing 
nature of the market Facebook may have believed that Whatsapp 
would prove to be an increasingly significant competitor in the 
future.  
 
6.2 Are Facebook and Whatsapp Close Competitors? 
 
The Commission found that Whatsapp and Facebook compete in 
two different markets i.e., the market for consumer 
communications services and the market for social networking 
services. However, Facebook and Whatsapp operate the two most 
popular messaging services being used in the market right now. 
Despite this fact, the Commission did not find Facebook and 
Whatsapp to be close competitors in both markets. The 
Commission stated that the main drivers of competition in the 
market for consumer communications were: (i) the functionalities 
offered, and (ii) the extent of the network.1049 On this basis, 
Facebook and Whatsapp were found to differ in the following 
ways: (i) in the way the services are accessed and contacts are 
formed  (Facebook via membership on the Facebook social 
network and Whatsapp via phone numbers and phonebook 
contacts), and (ii) by offering different user experiences 
(Facebook’s messenger is integrated with its other services, 
which is different from Whatsapp’s phone based messenger).1050 
The Commission also found that Whatsapp competed more 
                                                
1049See Facebook / Whatsapp, supra note 1022, at § 86. 
1050See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 8. 
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closely with Viber while Facebook’s messenger services 
competed more closely with Google’s ‘Hangouts’ service and 
with Twitter.1051 The Commission observed that consumers 
generally install and use several communication apps on their 
smartphones simultaneously, and in particular, many consumers 
install and use Facebook and Whatsapp at the same time.1052 
Further, there are no unique features offered by Facebook or 
Whatsapp that are not also offered by the many other players in 
the market.1053 Thus, the Commission concluded that Facebook 
and Whatsapp do not compete directly with each other but offer 
complimentary services to users. 
 
The Commission further noted that competition between 
providers of communication apps is to offer the best 
“communication experience” which means offering better 
functionalities such as by improving reliability and offering more 
privacy.1054 However, considered from a business perspective, 
this is a rather limited view of competition in this market. For 
instance, it has been noted that first-movers may have significant 
advantages in innovation markets because they can attain above-
average returns until competitors are able to respond.1055 
Competition in technology and innovation-driven markets is thus, 
to create more innovative products and to be the first to do so. 
The competition is to create products that can disrupt the market 
and make the products of competitors irrelevant. Hence, it can be 
argued that the competition is not only to create a better 
“communication experience” but to change the very nature of the 
communication experience being offered by competitors. In the 
process, consumers can experience better and more innovative 
products. 
 
                                                
1051See Facebook / Whatsapp, supra note 1022, at § 106. 
1052See Facebook / Whatsapp, id. at § 87. 
1053See Facebook / Whatsapp, id. at § 104. 
1054See Facebook / Whatsapp, id. at § 87. 
1055See HITT et al., supra note 139, at 138. 
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With respect to the market for social networking services, the 
Commission examined whether Whatsapp was a potential entrant 
in the market for social networking services. The EC Merger 
Guidelines state that mergers with a potential competitor are 
anticompetitive only if the potential competitor already exerts a 
significant constraining influence or there is a significant 
likelihood that it will grow into an effective competitive force.1056 
This is a rather ambiguous and difficult standard where the 
potential competition is in dynamic markets. Further, in this case 
the Commission did not really examine whether or what kind of 
influence Whatsapp exerted on Facebook. This is reflected in the 
following discussion.  
 
Several third party respondents to questionnaires sent by the 
Commission were of the view that absent the acquisition 
Whatsapp would have competed with Facebook in the provision 
of social networking services; others were of the view that 
Whatsapp was already competing with Facebook in the market 
for social networking services.1057 The Commission however, 
ignored these responses and did not consider Whatsapp to be a 
potential competitor to Facebook in the market for social 
networking services because it said there was no indication that 
Whatsapp would enter the market and compete with Facebook in 
the provision of social networking services.1058 The Commission 
concluded that Facebook and Whatsapp served different markets 
and fulfilled different consumer needs.1059 Here the Commission 
was wrong to not further explore the third party responses, which 
suggested that in a way Whatsapp had already entered the market 
for social networking services by gradually providing more of the 
services that Facebook was providing on its platform, such as the 
sharing of content between groups of people. These features are 
                                                
1056See § 60, EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 816. 
1057See Facebook / Whatsapp, supra note 1022, at § 144. 
1058See Facebook / Whatsapp, id. at § 145. 
1059See Facebook / Whatsapp, id. at § 157-158. 
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gradually allowing consumers to use Whatsapp instead of 
Facebook for some kinds of social networking activities. 
Whatsapp may have continued to develop such services in 
competition to Facebook in the future. The Commission could 
have further explored the trends in the use of Facebook and 
Whatsapp over time and whether consumers were inreasingly 
using Whatsapp for activities that they usually performed using 
Facebook. The acquisition could then curtail Whatsapp’s 
developing many of these features in competition with Facebook. 
It is also worth noting that ultimately the Commission did not 
make a definite statement about whether Whatsapp was a 
competitor in social networking services. The Commission felt 
that including Whatsapp in this market would also introduce 
many other players into this market and therefore, the acquisition 
would not significantly increase concentration in this market. 
Here of course it is worth noting that the size of these other 
competitors was much smaller than Facebook and Whatsapp. 
 
This view of competition in the market in which Facebook and 
Whatsapp compete, when considered along with an analysis of 
why Facebook acquired Whatsapp suggests that Whatsapp posed 
a competitive threat to Facebook and was a close competitor in 
this market. The acquisition therefore may have had an impact on 
innovation as Whatsapp’s presence as an independent entity may 
have given Facebook more incentives to innovate and improve its 
product. The Commission should have assessed the reasons for 
the acquisition in greater detail including why Facebook paid so 
much for Whatsapp and the potential efficiencies from the 
acquisition. 
7. Genzyme’s Acquisition of Novazyme 
 
This case presents an interesting example of a merger in an 
innovation market where the FTC recognised that firms can take 
decisions that are not profit maximizing. Genzyme’s acquisition 
of Novazyme occurred in a highly specialised segment of the 
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pharmaceuticals industry.1060 This was a merger to monopoly in 
the market for the research and development (R&D) of a cure for 
a rare and fatal medical condition in infants and children called 
Pompe disease.1061 The two companies were the only ones 
developing enzyme replacement therapies for Pompe disease and 
the merger could have reduced the pace of R&D efforts to 
develop these therapies as well as potentially stopped the 
development of a second therapy for Pompe disease.1062 
Competition between Genzyme and Novazyme was important 
because the race to be the first to reach the market with a therapy 
for Pompe disease increased the pace of research to find a cure 
for the disease.1063 The first company to develop a therapy would 
be given legal protection and seven years of market 
exclusivity.1064 The law governing therapies for rare diseases 
however, allows this period of market exclusivity to be broken if 
the second therapy is superior to the first therapy.1065 However, 
after the acquisition, Genzyme had the ability and arguably, the 
incentive to terminate either its own or Novazyme’s research 
programme in Pompe disease and to prevent a second and better 
therapy for Pompe disease to be developed.1066 As such the 
merger raised serious concerns about anti-competitive effects 
                                                
1060See Bailey, supra note 10, at 363. 
1061See Federal Trade Commission Press Release, FTC Closes its Acquisition of 
Genzyme Corporation’s 2001 Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Jan. 13, 
2004), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2004/01/ftc-closes-its-
investigation-genzyme-corporations-2001.  
1062See Genzyme Corporation’s Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., File 
No. 021-0026, 4 (Jan. 13, 2004) (Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, dissenting), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-closes-its-investigation-
genzyme-corporations-2001-acquisition-novazyme-pharmaceuticals-
inc./thompsongenzymestmt.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Dissent]. 
1063See Thompson Dissent, id. at 4. 
1064See Genzyme Corporation’s Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 11 
(Jan. 13, 2004) (majority statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-closes-its-investigation-
genzyme-corporations-2001-acquisition-novazyme-pharmaceuticals-
inc./murisgenzymestmt.pdf. 
1065See Thompson Dissent, supra note 1062, at 7. 
1066See Thompson Dissent, id. at 4-5. 
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because it eliminated incentives to be the first to find a cure for 
Pompe disease as well as incentives to create a better therapy 
than the competitor.  
 
Nevertheless, in its statement allowing the merger FTC’s 
Chairman Muris argued that despite incentives to act anti-
competitively, the combined company would continue to engage 
in R&D efforts to develop therapies for Pompe disease at the 
same pace as before because of the personal interests of the 
executive managing the combined company’s Pompe disease 
programme. This manager was from Novazyme and had two 
children suffering from Pompe disease who would have died if a 
therapy was not developed in time and so he had compelling 
reasons to expedite the finding of a therapy even if it was not a 
profit maximizing strategy for the firm. This was one of the 
factors in the FTC’s decision allowing the merger. In this case the 
FTC recognised that in certain cases it is appropriate to depart 
from the economic model of rationality in favour of fact-specific, 
behavioural considerations.1067 Interestingly, the dissent pointed 
out that this executive in charge of the Pompe program whose 
powerful personal incentives could play a part in overcoming the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger, “could not exercise such 
influence over Genzyme’s operation and left the company only a 
year after the merger.”1068 This aspect of the dissenting opinion 
was not addressed in the majority decision. 
 
The FTC was thus, divided in its opinion about the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger with two separate dissenting 
opinions expressing their concerns about the impact of this 
merger on innovation in the market for Pompe therapies. The 
dissent was particularly concerned that the majority opinion did 
not place enough importance on the need to encourage innovation 
in the market in the long-term and that the precedent set by this 
                                                
1067See Bailey, supra note 10, at 364. 
1068Thompson Dissent, supra note 1062, at 10. 
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decision would allow mergers which dampened potentially 
beneficial innovation efforts. Another aspect of the dissenting 
opinion that is worth noting is that the dissent felt that Genzyme 
had demonstrated an intention to anticompetitively monopolise 
the market for the development of Pompe therapies by acquiring 
all competing efforts to develop therapies for Pompe disease over 
a period of time.1069 Moreover, the dissent felt that the large 
amount paid by Genzyme for acquiring a small company without 
a proven product such as Novazyme along with the merged 
company’s announcement that it would delay the launch date for 
Novazyme’s therapy by four years suggested that the true 
motives of the merger and its effect was anticompetitive.1070 
Finally, the dissent felt that there were no demonstrable benefits 
from the merger such as any efficiency that could not be achieved 
by the parties in the absence of the acquisition. 
 
From a legal perspective, the core of the disagreement between 
the majority and dissent in this case may have been due to 
different interpretations of the US Merger Guidelines. 
Specifically, they disagreed about whether the US Merger 
Guidelines created a presumption against a merger to monopoly 
with the majority arguing that no such presumption was 
warranted under the Guidelines and the dissent arguing to the 
contrary. The majority accordingly felt that even if it was a 
merger to monopoly, anticompetitive effects needed to be proven 
and in this case there were reasons to believe that despite the 
incentives to act anticompetitively, the acquisition would not 
have an anticompetitive effect.  
8. Conclusion 
 
More than in other aspects of competition law, merger analysis 
highlights how firms take decisions that depart from the strict 
                                                
1069See Thompson Dissent, id. at 4. 
1070See Thompson Dissent, id. at 6. 
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assumptions of rationality. This chapter has shown how decisions 
to merge can often be suboptimal and motivated by managerial 
biases such as overconfidence bias or hubris. One motivation for 
M&A activity is to remove rivals from the market. Further, in 
dynamic markets bigger firms engage in M&A to remove a 
disruptive product from the market. These mergers may not be 
undertaken to realise efficiencies. Another factor in the 
competitive assessment of acquisitions is the premium paid by 
the acquirer for the target. The substantial premiums paid for the 
acquisitions studied in this chapter are a cause to question the 
rationality of the acquisition decision.  Conducting merger review 
on the basis that firms only take profit maximizing decisions can 
thus lead to inaccuracies in understanding the effects of mergers.  
 
Current approaches to merger analysis rely on simulation models 
to predict the effects of a merger. These models do not always 
make accurate predictions because they do not adequately 
represent the complex reality of merger situations. Further, 
simulation models do not consider the effect of a merger on 
innovation or on product quality and choice. Focusing only on 
price effects in merger analysis does not provide a complete 
picture of the effect of a merger as mergers can affect markets 
and competition in different ways. Behavioural and business 
studies can help to understand the reasons for a merger, which 
can in turn help agencies to determine the likely impact of a 
merger on competition and on innovation. Further, when firms 
are competing in different markets, these tools can help to outline 
the markets in which the merger is more likely to be problematic. 
The Commission is already using tools of analysis that are 
adapted from business studies to determine the closeness of 
competition between merging parties.1071 In this way perhaps the 
                                                
1071In Crown Holdings, the Commission examined the competitive advantages of the 
merging parties vis-à-vis competitors in the market to see if the merging parties were 
close competitors. This analysis is very similar to the kind carried out in business 
strategy. See McGeown & Barthélemy, supra note 785, at 448-49 (analysing Crown 
Holdings / Mivisa, Commission of the European Communities Decision No. M.7104 
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EU is more open to incorporating tools from behavioural and 
business studies to merger review. However, the EU has a 
narrower approach to mergers in innovation markets than the US. 
With innovation mergers, it could be argued that the US is more 
open to including behavioural considerations than the EU. The 
case studies conducted in this chapter show that there is a value 
to examining the business and behavioural aspects of a merger to 
have a deeper understanding of the competitive implications of a 
merger. This work is of a descriptive nature and it is premature at 
this stage to draw any further conclusions from it. The tools used 
in this chapter do not provide any definite predictions of how a 
merger will perform in the future but provide good indications 
about the possible impact of a merger. Further work needs to be 
done to determine to what extent these insights can be 
incorporated into the existing framework of merger analysis.  
                                                                                                       
(Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7104_20140314_20212_361
2433_EN.pdf). 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Firms often take decisions that depart from rationality. The case 
studies presented in this book strengthen this conclusion in the 
context of competition law by highlighting how firms take 
decisions that do not follow the paradigm of rational, profit-
maximization. Moreover, literature from different disciplines 
shows that bounded rationality in firms is systematic rather than 
random and firms often knowingly take boundedly rational 
decisions. One reason for bounded rationality is the behavioural 
biases of managers. The discussion in this book has described 
some of the behavioural biases of managers and how these biases 
are perpetuated in the decision-making of firms. One bias that is 
particularly prevalent in managerial decisions is overconfidence 
bias. This can more particularly effect decisions to merge or enter 
new markets.  
 
The other reason for the bounded rationality of firms described in 
this book is due to flaws in the internal decision-making 
processes of firms. This can cause problems such as competitive 
inertia and strategic persistence that slow a firm’s response to 
changing market conditions and make its decision-making 
structures rigid. Firms may also have different objectives, such as 
increasing market share that cause departures from profit 
maximization. Further, bounded rationality can subsist in firms 
because market forces that are traditionally considered to correct 
departures from rationality such as learning and selection through 
competitive pressures do not always operate in the manner 
theorized. Learning is difficult because the complexity of markets 
causes feedback from actions to be ambiguous. Also, managerial 
biases can curtail effective evaluation of market situations by 
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managers. In addition, competitive pressures do not always weed 
out boundedly rational firms from the market.  
 
For the purposes of this book, management studies and the 
behavioural theory of the firm are the two principle disciplines 
from which evidence of bounded rationality has been used. The 
empirical findings of management studies serve to supplement 
the behavioural theory of the firm. The various linkages that can 
be drawn between these disciplines have been discussed in 
chapter two of this book. Both disciplines relate a firm’s internal 
processes to its competitive position in the market. Further, both 
disciplines emphasize the cognitive limitations of managers and 
the effect of organizational structures on firm behaviour. This 
understanding of firm behaviour is of relevance to competition 
law as it helps to bring the understanding of firm decision-
making studied in competition law closer to reality.  
 
Since behavioural insights do not provide a clear way to measure 
and predict how market outcomes will change when firms are 
boundedly rational, the literature on bounded rationality cannot 
normatively contribute to competition law under a total welfare 
or consumer welfare standard. This has lead scholars to question 
the normative relevance of bounded rationality to competition 
law. For bounded rationality to fit within a normative framework 
of competition law, an alternative to the welfare-based approach 
must be considered. Chapter three of this book provides a 
possible path forward. Three principal normative approaches 
were highlighted in this book. These are consumer welfare, total 
welfare and protecting economic freedom. Despite the large 
number of discussions on the goals of competition law, there is 
still no consensus about what competition law’s objectives should 
be. In the US, there is some consensus that the goal of 
competition law is to maximize consumer welfare. However, the 
meaning of consumer welfare remains unclear. It has been 
interpreted to mean different things such as lower prices, greater 
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choice, innovation and preventing wealth transfers from 
consumers to producers. Consumer welfare has also been 
criticised for its focus on short-term goals at the cost of important 
long-term objectives such as innovation.  
 
On the other hand, the goals of competition in the EU reflect its 
more complex history of political, economic and social 
objectives. Accordingly, EU competition goals are not limited to 
consumer welfare though consumer welfare has gained broad 
acceptance among EU competition law scholars.1072 Protecting 
economic freedom and the competitive process is an example of a 
competition goal that has a European heritage in the Ordoliberal 
school of thought and still finds a place in EU competition law. 
As the discussion in Chapter three suggests, behavioural insights 
could make a contribution to competition law if the normative 
basis for competition law was the Ordoliberal goal of protecting 
the competitive process. Ordoliberals argue that the objective of 
competition law should be to ensure a free market where 
freedoms of market participants are protected. This is based on 
the idea that consumers are benefited when firms are forced to 
compete with each other. Further, the process-oriented view of 
markets is formed on the understanding that market outcomes 
cannot be ascertained in advance.1073 This is because markets 
evolve over time and outcomes can change depending on how 
various factors interact with each other and with the evolution of 
technology in the market. Consequently, the goal of protecting 
the competitive process does not require a prediction of market 
                                                
1072 According to the Guidelines for Vertical Restraints published by the Commission, 
Article 101 TFEU is meant to catch only those restrictions that are likely to result in 
consumer harm. Moreover, the Guidelines on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities 
under Article 102 TFEU also state that the Commission will no longer pursue cases that 
do not result in consumer harm. See Anne C. Witt, From Airtours to RyanAir: Is the 
More Economic Approach to EU Merger Law Really about More Economics?, 49 
COMMON MARKET LAW REV. 217, 220 (2012). 
1073See LACHMANN, supra note 404, at 2. 
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outcomes and for this reason it is particularly suited to 
behavioural insights. The argument about ordoliberalism in this 
book is that behavioural insights can be inserted better in a 
normative view that protects the competitive process as such than 
in a neoclassical instrumental view focusing on welfare 
maximization. For the sake of clarity it is noted that this work in 
no way argues that existing normative frameworks in competition 
law should be replaced with the Ordoliberal goal of protecting the 
competitive process. 
 
Chapter three also highlights other advantages of the process-
oriented goal such as its ability to incorporate a dynamic view of 
competition, whereas consumer welfare focuses on static 
competition and short-term prices. Further, some of the 
differences in EU and US competition law highlighted in this 
book can be attributed to the influence of Ordoliberal thought in 
the EU. One finding of chapter three is that since Ordoliberal 
thought has influenced EU competition law, behavioural insights 
can be more easily incorporated into the framework of EU 
competition law compared to US antitrust law. Finally, an insight 
of chapter three is that competitive strategic analysis undertaken 
in business studies can be a useful tool for assessing the impact of 
firm conduct on the competitive process in the market in the 
long-term.  
 
1. Predatory Pricing 
 
The aspect of predatory pricing to which chapter four draws 
attention is the role of intention and recoupment. Traditional 
neoclassical literature from the Chicago School has dismissed 
intent evidence as of “no value” and a “fruitless enquiry”.1074 As 
Justice Easterbrook stated in the Rose Acre Farms case, the 
reason for this is that all firms “intend” to cut prices in pursuit of 
                                                
1074Waller, supra note 3, at 315. 
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business so punishing vigorous and aggressive price cuts will 
punish the forces that motivate beneficial competition.1075 As 
business strategy shows, this is not entirely true. All firms do not 
engage in price competition. Some firms also compete by 
improving the quality of their offerings or through innovation. In 
fact lower prices in the market in the short-term can come at the 
cost of long-term innovation. Another insight from business 
strategy is that firms’ decisions to predate will depend on the 
extent to which they share important markets with other firms 
and how likely they think they are to succeed in predation.  
In the context of bounded rationality, intention can be relevant 
because firms may cut prices with the intention of eliminating 
competitors even when there is little or no chance of recouping 
through higher prices. On the other hand, US law on predatory 
pricing does not even consider evidence of firm behaviour if it is 
inconsistent with rationality. Both intent and recoupment are used 
to identify which price cuts should be punished as unlawful. 
However, US law uses recoupment and EU law uses intent to 
make this distinction. The choice of intent or recoupment in 
predatory pricing law depends on the objectives of competition 
law highlighted above. EU predatory pricing law’s intent 
requirement is probably a result of its concern with protecting 
competition and the influence of Ordoliberal thought whereas US 
law requires recoupment because it wants to encourage low 
prices.  
Intent requires understanding how business decisions are taken 
and thus, provides an opening for insights from management and 
behavioural studies to be introduced into predatory pricing 
law.1076 The Commission examines the business rationale of price 
cuts to assess intent in the EU. If there is no rational business 
justification behind particular conduct other than its adverse 
                                                
1075See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1401-02 (1989). 
1076See Waller, supra note 3, at 315. 
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effect on competitors, such conduct is inferred to be 
exclusionary.1077 Business strategy can help to clarify the purpose 
and effect of business decisions from the perspective of intent.1078 
Accordingly, due to its intent requirement, EU predatory pricing 
law is more open to behavioural insights than US law. The 
following discussion summarizes the insights from the case 
studies conducted in this chapter. 
The first case study relating to predation by Cardiff Bus 
illustrates how firms can enter into a campaign of predation 
without intending to recoup the losses arising from the campaign. 
This is because excluding competitors from the market can be an 
important motivator for a firm. Cardiff Bus’ behaviour showed 
that it disregarded its own profits in order to ensure that the 
entrant was not able to establish a presence in the market. Cardiff 
Bus took commercially irrational decisions because it wanted to 
exclude a competitor without intending that once exclusion was 
achieved it would recoup its losses. Interestingly, while Cardiff 
Bus was held guilty of predation by the OFT, it would not have 
been found guilty of predation if the case was brought under US 
law because recoupment was unlikely. 
The second case study discusses the alleged predation by 
American Airlines. This case study elucidates how decisions to 
engage in predation can also arise from behavioural biases such 
as availability bias and loss aversion. In this case internal 
company documents showed that American Airlines was worried 
because it had recently observed that Delta airlines had suffered 
large losses due to a similar type of competitive entry into its hub 
market and American Airlines felt that it would suffer the same 
losses if it allowed low cost providers to establish a presence in 
its hub market.  
                                                
1077See Waller, id. at 334. 
1078See Waller, id. at 334-35. 
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The final case study on predation is connected to Amazon’s sale 
of books and ebooks. It contends that recoupment is not essential 
for predation because even when there is no recoupment a firm 
can price below cost with the intention of excluding competitors. 
This study uses business strategy to investigate Amazon’s intent 
to exclude. This involves understanding the nature of competition 
in the retail sector, the reasons for Amazon’s focus on low prices 
and market share and Amazon’s past aggressive conduct towards 
publishers and other competitors. Amazon’s behaviour can be 
explained as exclusionary when seen from the perspective of 
Amazon’s long-term interests in the book and ebook market as a 
whole and its desire to eliminate both booksellers and publishers 
and acquire dominance as a vertically integrated company in this 
sector. While Amazon would not be guilty of predatory pricing 
under US law because of the absence of recoupment, it could be 
possible to argue that Amazon acted with exclusionary intent to 
meet the requirements of EU predatory pricing law.  
2. Mergers 
 
Chapter five finds that decisions to merge are complex and 
involve the interplay of various factors. Empirical studies show 
that a majority of mergers are not carried out for efficiency 
reasons. Mergers are often a result of managerial biases such as 
hubris and overconfidence, or a product of strategic 
considerations such as a response to entry by competitors. 
Moreover, many merger decisions do not work out as planned. 
Merger analysis is particularly suited to behavioural insights 
because it requires predicting market outcomes in the long-term, 
which affords certain challenges under traditional, welfare-based 
approaches. While simulations are used to predict merger 
outcomes, various limitations to these models constrain their 
ability to provide accurate predictions that reflect market 
realities. The case studies conducted in chapter five show that 
140B_BW Bhattacharya_stand .job
Conclusions 

 
 
 
 
277 
insights from management studies pertaining to bounded 
rationality could be useful to understanding the motives behind 
mergers, particularly when these decisions are taken to eliminate 
close or potential competitors. For instance, competitor analysis 
is a tool in management studies that can be used to determine if 
merging firms are actual or potential competitors and exhibit 
rivalry. This chapter also compares US and EU merger laws and 
concludes that within the constraints of this research project, US 
merger law in innovation markets is more open to bounded 
rationality than EU merger law. The insights from each of the 
case studies conducted in this chapter are summarised below.  
In the Falstaff case, this study finds that the decision to acquire 
was taken for strategic rather than for efficiency reasons. The 
acquisition most likely failed because managers’ bounded 
rationality prevented a proper assessment of the costs involved in 
the internal reorganisation of the company post-merger. The issue 
in this case was whether Falstaff would have entered the market 
de novo if it had not been allowed to enter by acquisition. The US 
Supreme Court’s decision was that objective evidence of 
economic conditions was more relevant than the company’s 
managerial statements in determining whether the firm would 
have entered de novo. Yet, this study shows that different people 
can interpret ‘objective evidence’ differently. In complex market 
environments there are often no correct answers and even 
evidence that is characterised as objective acquires an element of 
subjectivity due to differing interpretations of the data. 
Accordingly, to predict Falstaff’s behaviour based purely on 
objective evidence while ignoring managerial factors could 
provide an inaccurate understanding of whether Falstaff would 
have entered the market de novo.  
The Vodafone case study is another example of an acquisition 
that failed probably because it was not motivated by efficiencies. 
As with Falstaff, Vodafone’s decision to acquire was not taken 
with a proper assessment of the internal organisational factors 
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involved in its successful execution. The reasons for the 
acquisition in all likelihood had more to do with managerial ego 
and hubris than potential efficiencies. One reason for Vodafone’s 
decision to acquire Mannesmann was that Mannesmann posed a 
competitive threat to Vodafone due to its superior presence in 
continental Europe and its plans of expanding its presence into 
other geographical areas where it would compete directly with 
Vodafone. Further, the large amount paid for the acquisition also 
suggests that the intention behind the acquisition was 
anticompetitive because such a large amount of money could not 
be justified by potential efficiencies from the acquisition. 
Considered from the perspective of intent, rational firms would 
not pay such large amounts of money to acquire a company 
absent anticompetitive intent. European authorities did not 
examine these aspects of the acquisition in any detail in their 
analysis of the merger.  
Similarly, the third case study argues that Facebook’s acquisition 
of Whatsapp may be characterised as the acquisition of a 
potential competitor, when observed through the tools of 
competitor analysis in business strategy. This study examined the 
likely future rivalry between both Facebook and Whatsapp given 
the extremely dynamic nature of the industry and the manner in 
which the market would evolve. This examination showed that 
Facebook’s long-term interests could have been threatened by 
Whatsapp’s activities. Accordingly, the acquisition could have 
reduced competition and innovation in the market. This view was 
strengthened by the fact that Facebook does not intend to 
monetise its interest in Whatsapp in the short-term. Absent 
anticompetitive intent, it does not make sense to make such a 
large acquisition without seeking to make profits from it. 
However, the European Commission’s analysis did not fully 
contemplate these factors and how these markets would evolve in 
the future. The Commission found that Whatsapp was not a 
potential competitor of Facebook because there was no indication 
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that Whatsapp would compete with Facebook in the future. 
Nevertheless, if the Commission had considered Facebook’s 
motivations for acquiring Whatsapp, it may have reached a 
different conclusion.  
The final case study on Genzyme shows how the US FTC 
considered firms’ bounded rationality relevant when examining 
an acquisition in an innovation market. The FTC used bounded 
rationality to argue that despite incentives for the post-merger 
firm to act anti-competitively, it was unlikely to do so. This case 
took a broader perspective to mergers in a dynamic market, when 
compared to the European Commission’s more narrow approach 
in the previous case study. 
3. Future Research 
 
There is still much to be done to understand the role of 
behavioural insights in competition law. An important area of 
further empirical research is with respect to determining whether 
and to what extent behavioural studies can provide a clear 
understanding and prediction of welfare consequences for 
markets. This is necessary so that it is possible to clarify the 
potential scope of the contribution that behavioural economics 
can make within the existing normative framework of 
competition law. This requires further empirical research, not 
only to investigate how firms are likely to behave in certain 
situations but also whether such behaviour is consistent and 
predictable. Until further work is done it will remain unresolved 
as to whether it is possible at all for behavioural insights to 
provide a theoretical framework of firm behavioural that is 
comparable to rational choice theory. This thesis has served as an 
introduction into the relevance of firm bounded rationality to 
competition law and much research needs to be done to refine 
this work to understand how definite policy conclusions can be 
drawn from it.  
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Another avenue for future research is to explore to what extent 
competition laws in other jurisdictions are open to behavioural 
insights. This thesis has examined the applicability of 
behavioural insights to US and EU competition laws. It will be 
interesting to see to what extent competition laws in other 
jurisdictions are amenable to behavioural insights. Connected to 
this, another interesting aspect will be to compare the similarities 
and differences in various jurisdictions with respect to their 
receptivity to behavioural insights.  
A further avenue of future research is to apply behavioural 
insights to other aspects of anticompetitive conduct such as 
vertical restraints or price fixing. While some research has been 
done on this before, further work needs to be done to identify 
specific cases of anticompetitive conduct where firms have 
clearly taken decisions that depart from rationality. It would also 
be interesting to see what kinds of firm conduct is more likely to 
be boundedly rational.  
Finally, this thesis has only looked at the potential contribution of 
business strategy to competition law. A vast amount of literature 
within other fields of management studies such as marketing 
could be tapped into to further explore the potential contribution 
of management studies to competition law. 
To conclude, as Tor states, “the behavioural approach already 
offers valuable antitrust lessons but cannot and should not replace 
traditional competition law and economics.”1079 This statement 
nicely summarizes the conclusions of this thesis. 
                                                
1079Tor I, supra note 23, at 581. 
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323 
SUMMARY 
 
Firm rationality plays a role in several aspects of competition 
law. Yet, the conception of the firm as a rational, profit 
maximizing entity has been disputed in different disciplines such 
as the behavioural theory of the firm, and in management studies. 
This literature shows that the neoclassical assumptions on which 
competition law is based can fall short of explaining the full 
range of observed firm behaviour. Accordingly, an alternative 
conception of the firm as boundedly rational can impact the 
understanding of firm conduct in competition law.  
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Behavioural insights can be more relevant to competition law 
within the Ordoliberal view of competition, which considers the 
goal of competition law to be maintaining economic freedom and 
the competitive process. This is because the Ordoliberal view is 
not based on an ex ante determination of market outcomes, which 
fits well with behavioural insights since this literature does not 
provide clear predictions of market outcomes. As the Ordoliberal 
view continues to find a place in EU competition law, EU law is 
arguably more open to behavioural insights than US antitrust law. 
 
This work examines the application of behavioural insights to 
two aspects of competition law - predatory pricing and mergers. 
It uses the case study method to individually examine firm 
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behaviour in these situations. This thesis finds that, if firms are 
taken to be boundedly rational, intention can be relevant to 
predatory pricing because firms may cut prices with the intention 
of eliminating competitors even when there is little or no chance 
of recouping through higher prices. This is in contrast to the 
understanding of predatory pricing in US law, where firms are 
said to engage in predatory pricing only when recoupment is 
possible. Intent requires understanding how business decisions 
are taken and thus, provides an opening for behavioural insights 
to be introduced into predatory pricing law. Accordingly, due to 
its intent requirement, EU predatory pricing law is more open to 
behavioural insights than US law. 
 
Merger analysis is particularly suited to behavioural insights as 
mergers are often either a result of managerial biases or a product 
of strategic considerations such as a response to entry by 
competitors. Moreover, merger analysis affords challenges under 
welfare-based approaches because it is difficult to accurately 
predict the long-term welfare consequences of a merger. This 
thesis finds that insights from management studies could be 
useful to understanding possible anticompetitive motives behind 
mergers, particularly when these decisions are taken to eliminate 
close or potential competitors. In these situations agencies should 
examine potential efficiencies more critically. 
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SAMENVATTING
Bedrijfsrationaliteit speelt bij verschillende aspecten van 
mededingingsrecht een rol. Toch is en wordt de voorstelling van de 
onderneming als een rationele, winst maximaliserende entiteit 
bestreden in verschillende disciplines, bijvoorbeeld in de gedrags-
theorie van de onderneming en in managementonderzoek. Uit deze 
literatuur blijkt dat de neoklassieke vooronderstellingen waarop het 
mededingingsrecht is gebaseerd, tekort kunnen schieten als het gaat om 
een volledige beschrijving van het waargenomen ondernemingsgedrag.
Dientengevolge kan een alternatieve voorstelling van de onderneming 
als beperkt rationeel het begrip van ondernemingsgedrag in het 
mededingingsrecht beïnvloeden.
De gedragsliteratuur beschrijft twee verschillende bronnen van 
beperkte rationaliteit in ondernemingen. Ten eerste zijn er verschillende 
soorten gedragsbias van managers, zoals overconfidence bias, die de 
besluitvorming in een bedrijf kunnen beïnvloeden, met name rond 
zaken als concentraties. Ten tweede worden ondernemingen beperkt in 
hun besluitvormingsprocessen door factoren als strategische volharding 
en organisatiestructuren en –kaders. Daardoor wijken ze af van 
rationaliteit en kan hun vermogen om concurrentie in de markt te 
beoordelen en erop te reageren worden geraakt.
Binnen de Ordoliberale visie op concurrentie, die stelt dat 
mededingingsrecht bedoeld is om economische vrijheid en het 
concurrentieproces te handhaven, kunnen gedragsinzichten relevanter 
zijn voor mededingingsrecht. Dat komt doordat de Ordoliberale visie 
niet is gebaseerd op ex ante bepaling van marktuitkomsten, wat goed 
aansluit bij gedragsinzichten, aangezien die literatuur geen heldere 
voorspellingen biedt voor marktuitkomsten. Doordat er binnen het 
Europese mededingingsrecht plaats blijft voor de Ordoliberale visie kan 
worden gesteld dat de Europese wetgeving ontvankelijker is voor 
gedragsinzichten dan Amerikaanse antitrustwetgeving.
________________________________________________________
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Dit werk onderzoekt de toepassing van gedragsinzichten op twee 
aspecten van mededingingsrecht: prijsdumping en concentraties. Met 
behulp van de casestudiemethode wordt individueel ondernemings-
gedrag in die situaties bestudeerd. Dit proefschrift concludeert dat als 
wordt aangenomen dat ondernemingen beperkt rationeel zijn, intentie 
relevant kan zijn voor prijsdumping, omdat ondernemingen prijzen 
kunnen verlagen met de bedoeling concurrenten te elimineren, zelfs als 
er geen of weinig kans is op terugverdienen via hogere prijzen. Dat staat 
haaks op de opvatting over prijsdumping in Amerikaans recht, waar 
wordt gesteld dat ondernemingen alleen tot prijsdumping overgaan als 
terugverdienen mogelijk is. Intentie vereist begrip van de wijze waarop 
zakelijke beslissingen worden genomen en biedt daarmee een opening 
om gedragsinzichten te introduceren in wetgeving tegen prijsdumping.
Daarmee is Europese wetgeving tegen prijsdumping, vanwege het 
intentievereiste, ontvankelijker voor gedragsinzichten dan Ameri-
kaanse wetgeving.
Concentratieonderzoek is bij uitstek geschikt voor gedragsinzichten, 
omdat concentraties vaak het resultaat zijn van managementbias dan 
wel van product- of strategische overwegingen, zoals de reactie op 
toetreding van concurrenten. Daarnaast maakt concentratieonderzoek 
betwisting op grond van welfare-based approaches mogelijk, omdat het 
moeilijk is precies te voorspellen wat de welvaartsgevolgen van een 
fusie op lange termijn zijn. Dit proefschrift concludeert dat inzichten uit 
managementonderzoek nuttig kunnen zijn om mogelijke concurrentie-
beperkende motieven achter
fusies te begrijpen, met name wanneer die besluiten zijn genomen om 
directe of potentiële concurrenten uit te schakelen. In die situaties 
zouden autoriteiten potentiële efficiëntiewinsten kritischer moeten 
onderzoeken.
________________________________________________________
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